nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2019‒06‒10
six papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. The new media economics of video-on-demand markets: Lessons for competition policy (updated version) By Budzinski, Oliver; Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine
  2. Do firms exchange knowledge through complementary or substitutive routes of diffusion? By Amir Maghssudipour; Luciana Lazzeretti; Francesco Capone
  3. Media See-saws: Winners and Losers in Platform Markets By Simon P. Anderson; Martin Peitz
  4. Between Aastha and Zee: Mystery of the Missing Market for a Weather Channel By Deodhar, Satish Y.; Deka, Chayasmita
  5. Television, time use and academic achievement: Evidence from a natural experiment By Adrián Nieto Castro
  6. « Are users the next entrepreneurs ? A case study on the video game industry » By Thierry Burger-Helmchen; Claude Guittard

  1. By: Budzinski, Oliver; Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine
    Abstract: The markets for audiovisual content are subject to dynamic change. Where once "traditional" (free-to-air, cable, satellite) television was dominating, i.e. linear audiovisual media services, markets display nowadays strong growth of different types of video-on-demand (VoD), i.e. nonlinear audiovisual media services, including both Paid-for VoD like Amazon Prime and Netflix and Advertised-financed VoD like YouTube. Competition policy decisions in such dynamic markets are always particularly challenging. The German competition authority was presented such a challenge when, at the beginning of the 2010s, German television providers sought to enter online VoD markets with the help of cooperative platforms. We review the antitrust concerns that were raised back then in an ex post analysis. In doing so, we first discuss the dynamic development of the German VoD markets during the last decade. In the second part of this paper, we derive four aspects, in which the previous antitrust analysis cannot be upheld from today's perspective. First, relevant implications of modern platform economics were neglected. Second, some inconsistencies in the assessment of the two projects appear to be inappropriate. Third, the emerging competitive pressure of international VoD providers was strongly underestimated. Fourth, the question of market power in online advertising markets looks very different at the end of the decade.
    Keywords: video-on-demand,media economics,two-sided markets,competition,platform economics,commercial television,public service broadcasters,antitrust policy,YouTube,Amazon,Netflix
    JEL: L40 L82 K21 L13 D40
    Date: 2019
  2. By: Amir Maghssudipour (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa); Luciana Lazzeretti (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa); Francesco Capone (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa)
    Abstract: The aim of the present research is to investigate the rise and the evolution of research on the ‘creative economy’, which focuses on the convergence of four research pillars: contributions on the creative class, creative industries, creative city and cultural industries. Publications on Creative Economy Research have been collected from the ISI Web of Science database, which includes all the academic works starting from the contribution of DCMS in 1998 till 2013. Through the analysis of nearly 1.000 publications produced in 16 years, the birth and evolution of creative economy research is investigated. Besides, the second part of the paper focuses on a relational analysis developed through the use of Social Network Analysis, investigating co-citations of disseminators and founders of creative economy research. Results underline that the Creative economy may be considered a successful multidisciplinary paradigm born and developed in English speaking, North American and European countries, which has contributed to the rise of a new economic sector: the cultural and creative industries.
    Keywords: multiple networks; knowledge diffusion; ERGM; industrial cluster; wine industry.
    JEL: D85 L14 L84
    Date: 2019
  3. By: Simon P. Anderson; Martin Peitz
    Abstract: We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study media platforms which may differ by popularity. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus tends to increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like advertising, advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.
    Keywords: media economics, mergers, entry, advertising, aggregative games
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2019–05
  4. By: Deodhar, Satish Y.; Deka, Chayasmita
    Abstract: Until a few decades ago, Doordarshan was the only channel which would broadcast TV programmes in black-&-white and that too for a few hours. It was a pure public good then, offered free of cost by the government. Today, however, from Aastha to Zee there are hundreds of dedicated private channels competing to offer news, sports, entertainment, and spirituality for a price. And still, there is not a single channel which is dedicated to 24-hour weather forecast. This missing market for the exclusive weather channel is the result of the perceived marginal private benefit to viewers being much less than the marginal social benefit accruing to the society as a whole. Every year unanticipated weather patterns cause huge economic losses to agriculture and other industries and cause a great number of fatalities too. Therefore, government and the corporate sector may offer a 24-hour TV channel for weather forecast in the form of public private partnership (PPP). The weather forecasting infrastructure and data may come from government institutions such as IMD, C-DAC, and ISRO; professional content delivery and services of weathermen who deliver the content may come from TV media firms; and the break-even revenue may come through CSR activities of the corporate sector.
    Date: 2019–06–03
  5. By: Adrián Nieto Castro
    Abstract: This article studies the impact of television on academic performance and a plausible mechanism behind this effect: whether television changes time use. I identify a causal effect by using a natural experiment that consists in the staggered introduction of the digital television signal in the British television market. The digital switchover leads to an increase in television viewing time but does not change television contents. I find that the digital switchover increases academic performance, contributing to human capital formation, and that the effect is larger for schools at the bottom of the score distribution, reducing educational inequality. I also show that the digital switchover decreases the probability of children taking part in detrimental activities such as alcohol drinking, and their frequency. I test for alternative mechanisms, but do not find an effect of television on time dedicated to homework neither behaviour. The results point that the true determinant of academic achievement is the relative educational value of out-of-school activities, rather than the absolute one.
    Keywords: Academic Performance, Educational Inequality, Time Use, Digital Television Switchover, Natural Experiment
    Date: 2019–06
  6. By: Thierry Burger-Helmchen (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Claude Guittard (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Date: 2019–05–28

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