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on Cultural Economics |
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Issue of 2018‒02‒26
four papers chosen by Roberto Zanola Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Carmela Milano; Sandra Rothenberger |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the impact of Facebook on cultural audience, putting the emphasis on the transmission of cultural capital in elitist circles. Our purpose is to provide important evidence concerning the digital opportunities and challenges for the use of social networks in cultural management. Based on an exploratory study, we look closely at the attitudes and reactions of cultural audience to the use of Facebook by theaters. We focus hereby on the democratization (acceptance) or the vulgarization (rejection) effects of the use of Facebook. We conclude that demographics and psychographics such as the generational effect and the personalities of the influence “the acceptance”, while environmental factors such as peer and media influence “the rejection” of the use of Facebook. The present findings help cultural institutions to have a better understanding of the profile of the actual theater audience, their needs, desires and fears. |
| Keywords: | social networks and Facebook; arts consumer research; theater management; cultural capital; vulgarization; democratization; structural equation modeling |
| JEL: | D23 D83 |
| Date: | 2018–02–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:spaper:2013/267649&r=cul |
| By: | Ngo Van Long; Martin Richardson; Frank Stahler |
| Abstract: | We construct a Hotelling-type model of two media providers, each of whom can issue fake and/or real news and each of whom can invest in the debunking of their rival's fake news. The model assumes that consumers have an innate preference for one provider or the other and value real news. However, that valuation varies according to their bias favoring one provider or the other. We demonstrate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which only one firm issues fake news and we show, in this setting, that increased polarization of consumers - represented by a wider distribution - increases the prevalence of both fake news and debunking expenditures and is welfare reducing. We also show, interalia, that a stronger preference by consumers for their preferred provider lowers both fake news and debunking. Finally, we compare monopoly and duopoly market structures in terms of "fake news" provision and show that a public news provider can be welfare improving. |
| Keywords: | fake news, media, debunking |
| JEL: | D21 L15 L82 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2018-659&r=cul |
| By: | Levy, Gilat; Moreno de Barreda, Inés; Razin, Ronny |
| Abstract: | We model the power of media owners to bias readers' opinions. In particular we consider readers that have "correlation neglect", i.e., fail to understand that content across news outlets might be correlated. We study how a media owner who controls several outlets can take advantage of the readers' neglect. Specifically, we show that the owner can manipulate readers' beliefs even when readers understand the informativeness of news outlet by outlet. The optimal strategy of the owner is to negatively correlate good news and positively correlate bad news. The owner's power is increasing in the number of outlets she owns but is constrained by the limited attention of readers. Importantly, our analysis suggests several new insights about welfare in media markets. First, measures of media bias have to take into account the correlation between news outlets. Second, media-market competition curbs the ability of owners to bias readers' beliefs. In particular, we show that readers always benefit from breaking media conglomerates, even when all the new media owners share the same bias. Finally, we highlight a potential cost of media diversity. When readers have correlation neglect, diversity in the interests of owners might lower the informativeness of news content. |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12640&r=cul |
| By: | Stefano Gagliarducci (University of Rome Tor Vergata, EIEF, IZA and Dondena); Massimiliano Gaetano Onorato (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Francesco Sobbrio (LUISS “G. Carli” and CESIfo); Guido Tabellini (Bocconi University, CIFAR, CEPR and CESIfo) |
| Abstract: | What is the role of the media in coordinating and mobilizing insurgency against a foreign military occupation? We analyze this question in the context of the Nazi-fascist occupation of Italy during WWII. We study the effect of BBC radio counter-propaganda (Radio Londra) on the intensity of internal resistance to the Nazi-fascist regime. Using variation in monthly sunspot activities affecting the sky-wave propagation of BBC broadcasting towards Italy, we show that BBC radio had a strong impact on political violence. We provide further evidence to prove that BBC radio played an important role in coordinating resistance activities, but had no lasting role in motivating the population against the fascist regime. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eie:wpaper:1803&r=cul |