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on Cultural Economics |
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Issue of 2014‒04‒11
seven papers chosen by Roberto Zanola Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
| By: | Goodridge, PR |
| Date: | 2014–03–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imp:wpaper:12918&r=cul |
| By: | Karlsson, Charlie (CITR, Blekinge Inst of Technology); Rouchy, Philippe (CITR, Blekinge Inst of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Large media clusters have emerged in a limited number of large cities, characterizing the geographical concentration of the global media industry. This paper starts by exploring the effect of the rapid advancement of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) had on the media economy. It concludes that the role of the “weightless economy” on media cluster has enhanced its production and distribution functions. We review the specificities of media cluster that ties agglomeration to creative, diversified attributes of production and distribution. The implication is that media firms hold strong tendencies to cluster in urban regions since they make full usage of its resources, namely its export capabilities and import transformation strength. Finally, we invite researchers to consider Jacobs’ metropolitan and global reciprocating system of city growth as a valid unit for analysing media clusters. The question leads envisaging if media clusters' strong metropolitan base allows them to grow further through globalised circuits. The paper concludes that large, media clusters drive on intellectually dense network of information, which can only be cultivated through large agglomerations existing capabilities. Consequently, the research question focuses upon the economic role of knowledge in media creation and export replacement. We emphasize the strength of Jacob’s model of media cluster for understanding its mechanism of value creation and endogenous system of globalisation. |
| Keywords: | Clustering; media industry; agglomeration; weightless economy; creative industry; globalization; regional development |
| JEL: | L82 R11 |
| Date: | 2014–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bthcsi:2014-001&r=cul |
| By: | Andrea Tesei; Paolo Pinotti (Università Bocconi); Ruben Durante (Département d'économie) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long-term impact of early exposure to Berlusconi’s commercial TV network, Mediaset, on voting behavior and civic engagement in Italy. To do so, we exploit differences in Mediaset signal reception across Italian municipalities due to the network’s staggered introduction over the national territory and to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors. We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 exhibit greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office, relative to municipalities that were exposed only later on. This difference, estimated between 1 and 2 percentage points, is extremely robust and tends to persist in the following four elections. This effect can hardly be attributed to differential exposure to partisan news bias since, prior to 1985, content on Mediaset channels was dominated by light-entertainment programs and no news programs were broadcast until 1991, by which time the network was accessible to the entire population. Instead, we present evidence that early exposure to commercial TV was associated with a substantial decline in social capital consistent with the diffusion of a culture of individualism and civic disengagement that favored the political success of Berlusconi. |
| Keywords: | mass media, voting, civic engagement |
| JEL: | L82 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8t4pad92&r=cul |
| By: | Florian Schuett (University of Tilburg); Amedeo Piolatto (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | We build a framework linking competition in the media market to political participation. Media outlets report on the ability of candidates running for office and compete for audience through their choice of slant. Citizens consume news only if the expected utility of being informed about candidates' ability is sufficiently large for their group collectively. Our results can reconcile seemingly contradictory empirical evidence showing that entry in the media market can either increase or decrease turnout. While information pushes up independent turnout, partisans adjust their turnout to the ability of their preferred candidate, and on average they vote less when informed. |
| Keywords: | Demand for news, Electoral turnout, Group-rule utilitarianism, Media bias. |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2014-03&r=cul |
| By: | Markus Pasche (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena) |
| Abstract: | In case of digital goods such like music, intellectual property rights are typically not exerted by the creators (artists) but by intermediaries. Their profits, and therefore also the income of the artists, are endangered by copyright infringements (piracy). It is well known from static welfare analysis that to some extent piracy reduces the deadweight loss by limiting monopoly power and could therefore increase welfare. This paper contributes to the discussion by including the costs of law enforcement into the welfare analysis. Most models in the literature assume that law is enforced by governmental activities. In contrast, this paper considers that law enforcement is exerted by agents (e.g. lawyer chancellories, provider of screening technologies) which are also seen as intermediaries. The enforcement effort is therefore endogenously determined. It is shown that this will lead to suboptimal welfare outcomes. A social planner has to regulate punishment and enforcement effort to a moderate level. A more rigorous fight against piracy could only be justified by negative dynamic welfare effects due to a loss of creativity. However, there is no empirical evidence for that. |
| Keywords: | digital goods, music, piracy, copyright, intermediation, law en- forcement, welfare |
| JEL: | D60 L12 K11 K42 |
| Date: | 2014–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-008&r=cul |
| By: | Thomas Paris (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - GROUPE HEC - CNRS : UMR2959); Frédéric Leroy (HEC Paris - Recherche - Hors Laboratoire - GROUPE HEC) |
| Abstract: | The important role of entrepreneurship in the dynamics of the arts sector and the influence of the leader's personality make succession a key issue in creative industries. What happens to an artistic organization when its founder leaves? How does it evolve? Can it adopt a style of management that is compatible with the founder's absence? This article focuses on the case of Groupe Bernard Loiseau, an iconic French company in the culinary arts whose owner and chef died suddenly. It sheds light on how the question of succession and that of style were addressed in this organization and how they are addressed in artistic organizations in general. |
| Keywords: | Succession; culinary art;entrepreneurial management;creative industries |
| Date: | 2014–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00973150&r=cul |
| By: | Éric Darmon (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France); Thomas Le Texier (CREM UMR CNRS 6211, University of Rennes 1, France) |
| Abstract: | In the case of digital piracy should rights be publicly or privately enforced? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of non-monitored illegal channels raise important issues for the design of digital anti-piracy policies. In this paper, we study the impact of these two enforcement settings (public vs. private) in the presence of an illegal non-monitored outside option for users. Taking account of market outcomes, we show that in both cases, the optimal strategies of the legal seller and the monitoring authority leads to rejection of the outside option out while accommodating to the presence of illegal monitored channels. Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement generates higher monitoring levels and lower price levels. Public enforcement also generates greater (legal) welfare. However, we identify potential con ict of interests between the legal seller and the social planner when the eciency of non monitored networks is low. We provide some insights into the role of supply side anti-piracy policies. |
| Keywords: | copyright infringement, law enforcement, digital piracy, illegal file-sharing, illegal behavior deterrence |
| JEL: | D23 D78 K42 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201403&r=cul |