nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2013‒11‒14
three papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
University Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Video Games Playing: A substitute for cultural consumptions? By Karol J. Borowiecki; Juan Prieto-Rodriguez
  2. Religious origins of democracies and dictatorships By Grigoriadis, Theocharis
  3. How Culture Molds the Effects of Self Efficacy and Fear of Failure on Entrepreneurship By Wennberg, Karl; Pathak, Saurav; Autio, Erkko

  1. By: Karol J. Borowiecki (Department of Business and Economics at University of Southern Denmark); Juan Prieto-Rodriguez (Departament of Economics, University of Oviedo)
    Abstract: This article provides an applied investigation of video game users. We estimate zero-inflated ordered probit models to control for an excess of zeros in our ordinal dependent variable. We find that video games playing is not negatively associated with the involvement in other cultural practices. On the contrary, instead of being a substitute for more traditional forms of cultural consumption, the probability of game playing increases with the consumption of other cultural goods (e.g., listening to music or watching television) or active involvement in artistic activities (e.g., writing or visual arts production). Game playing is in general an urban phenomenon, and it is positively associated with the ownership of home equipment and access to new technologies but decreases with a personÕs greater time restrictions. The main differences to the traditional art formats is that game playing particularly appeals to younger, usually male, cohorts.
    Keywords: Cultural participation, Video games, Zero-inflated ordered probit model
    JEL: D12 R12 I29 J29 Z11
    Date: 2013–11
  2. By: Grigoriadis, Theocharis
    Abstract: In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the emergence of democracies and dictatorships. Religion is defined as a stochastically set demand for public goods. Different types of religious collectives reflect different tradeoffs between centralized resource distribution and market rewards. Religions are defined as collectivist, when their respective collectives facilitate the hierarchical provision of common pool resources toward their members at the expense of market incentives. Religions are defined as individualist, when their respective collectives recruit and preserve their members on the basis of market incentives. Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism are treated as collectivist religions, whereas Judaism and Protestantism as individualist ones. I provide a historical overview that designates the Jewish kibbutz as the collective of democracy and the Russian-Orthodox monastery as the collective of dictatorship. Assuming a collectivist economy, I solve the radical government and modernization stochastic games. I find that modernization occurs in a collectivist economy when the threat of a radical government is imminent and when the leader has high extraction rents over the economy. In order to stay in power, the leader credibly commits to provide more public goods in the future, and thus modernization occurs. Underdevelopment occurs at intermediate levels of state enforcement, modernization at low levels and centralization at high levels of state enforcement. The emergence of a radical government is more likely in a collectivist rather than in an individualist economy. --
    Keywords: democracy,dictatorship,collectivism,individualism,modernization,Orthodoxy,Judaism
    JEL: D72 D73 D78 P21 P26 P32 P51 Z12
    Date: 2013
  3. By: Wennberg, Karl (The Ratio Institute & Stockholm School of Economics); Pathak, Saurav (Michigan Tech University); Autio, Erkko (Imperial College London Business School)
    Abstract: We use data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness study (GLOBE) for 42 countries to investigate how the effects of individual’s self-efficacy and fear of failure on entrepreneurial entry are contingent on national cultural practices. Using multi-level methodology, we observe that the positive effect of self-efficacy on entry is moderated by the cultural practices of institutional collectivism and performance orientation. Conversely, the negative effect of fear of failure on entry is moderated by the cultural practices of institutional collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. We discuss the implications for theory and methodological development in culture and entrepreneurship.
    Keywords: Culture; Entrepreneurship; Institutions; Multi-level
    JEL: D24 L25 L26
    Date: 2013–11–04

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