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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Michael Fritsch; Alina Sorgner |
| Abstract: | It has widely been recognized that creativity plays an immense role not only for arts, sciences, and technology, but also for entrepreneurship, innovation, and thus, economic growth. We analyze the level and the determinants of self-employment in creative professions at the level of individuals. The analysis is based on the representative micro data of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The findings suggest that people in creative professions appear more likely to be self-employed and that a high regional share of people in the creative class increases an individual’s likelihood of being an entrepreneur. Investigating the determinants of entrepreneurship within the creative class as compared to non-creative professions reveals only some few differences. |
| Keywords: | Entrepreneurship, new business formation, creativity, creative class |
| JEL: | L26 Z1 D03 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp538&r=cul |
| By: | Leopoldo Fergusson; Juan F. Vargas; Mauricio A. Vela |
| Abstract: | Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the ‘parapolitics' scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our results highlight the complementarity between different dimensions of democratic institutions. |
| Date: | 2013–02–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:010487&r=cul |
| By: | Seo-Young Cho (DIW, Berlin / Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether male soccer tradition can predict the success of female soccer. Different from the existing literature, this paper utilizes panel data covering 175 countries during the 1991-2011 period, capturing country heterogeneity effects and time trends. An instrumental variable approach is further employed in order to identify causal relation. My findings do not support the widespread perception that male tradition determines female soccer attainments. On the other hand, my results indicate that women’s empowerment can be a driving force for the success of female soccer. |
| Keywords: | female and male soccer, women’s empowerment, panel analysis |
| JEL: | C33 J16 Z10 |
| Date: | 2013–02–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:iaidps:223&r=cul |
| By: | Ho Fai Chan; Bruno S. Frey; Jana Gallus; Benno Torgler |
| Abstract: | Despite the social importance of awards, they have been largely disregarded by academic research in economics. This paper investigates whether a specific, yet important, award in economics, the John Bates Clark Medal, raises recipients’ subsequent research activity and status compared to a synthetic control group of nonrecipient scholars with similar previous research performance. We find evidence of positive incentive and status effects that raise both productivity and citation levels. |
| Keywords: | Awards, incentives, research, John Bates Clark Medal, synthetic control method |
| JEL: | A13 C23 M52 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:111&r=cul |