nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2012‒06‒05
four papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
University Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Advertising Pricing Models in Media Markets: Lump-Sum versus Per-Consumer Charges By Helmut Dietl; Markus Lang; Panlang Lin
  2. Communication Controlling of Digital Signage : Perception, Usage and Effects of Digital Point-of-Sale Media By Sven Pagel; Alexander Juergens; Janina Guenther; Katrin Mollekopf
  3. The Price of Media Capture and the Looting of Newspapers in Interwar France By Vincent Bignon, Marc Flandreau
  4. Amenity Value of Urban Forest Landscapes Attributed to Houses within a 10-Minute Driving Distance By Kim, Seung Gyu; Cho, Seong-Hoon; Roberts, Roland K.; Claassen, Roger

  1. By: Helmut Dietl (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Markus Lang (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich); Panlang Lin (Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: This paper develops a model of asymmetric competition between a pay and a free media platform. The pay media platform generates revenues from media consumers through subscription fees, while the free media platform generates revenues from charging advertisers either on a lump-sum basis (regime A) or on a per-consumer basis (regime B). The paper shows that the advertising level on the free platform is higher and this platform attracts more consumers in regime A than B even though advertisers have to pay more for an ad and consumers dislike ads. Moreover,\ the pay media platform faces a higher subscription fee and a lower consumer demand in regime A than B. Compared to regime B, the profit of the free (pay) media platform is higher (lower) in regime A, while aggregate profits are only higher if the consumers' disutility from ads is sufficiently low. The advertisers are better off in regime A than B, while the opposite is true for the media consumers. Finally, in small media markets, social welfare is lower in regime A than B, while this is true in large media markets only if the media consumers' disutility from advertising is sufficiently high.
    Keywords: Advertising, media platform, two-sided market, lump-sum charge, per-consumer charge, asymmetric competition
    JEL: D40 L10
    Date: 2012–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iso:wpaper:0157&r=cul
  2. By: Sven Pagel (Department of Economics of the Duesseldorf University of Applied Sciences); Alexander Juergens (Department of Economics of the Duesseldorf University of Applied Sciences); Janina Guenther (Department of Economics of the Duesseldorf University of Applied Sciences); Katrin Mollekopf (Department of Economics of the Duesseldorf University of Applied Sciences)
    Abstract: Shopping is an adventure. Not only flagship-stores, but also ordinary supermarkets around the corner can deliver excellent shopping experience by using appealing digital instruments, for example by applying digital signage. The number of digital screens at the point of sale is ever increasing in recent years. Frequently these screens are just used as digital posters. Acoustic and visual attractions of Point-of-Sale-TV are hardly ever combined. Also the installation of PoS-TV does not seem to have any regulations at all. First insights and recommendations for installing PoS-TV can be drawn from an explorative and quantitative study in three different markets. Purchase as an economical impact is only the third Stepp with in acomplex reception process of perception, usage and effect.
    Keywords: Moving Image, Digital Signage, Point-of-Sale, Video-Content, Food retail, Usability, Eyetracking, Bewegtbildkommunikation, Lebensmitteleinzelhandel
    JEL: D12 M31
    Date: 2011–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ddf:wpaper:fobe19&r=cul
  3. By: Vincent Bignon, Marc Flandreau (Graduate Institute of International Studies)
    Abstract: This paper develops a new insight enabling the empirical study of media capture: minority shareholders of newspapers and readers face similar risks. Both are adversely affected when corrupt insiders use the newspaper for personal profit and receive invisible revenues. This means that relevant data on influence and exploitation of newspaper has been hiding in plain sight in stock exchange or over-the-counter prices, since stock transactions reflect the value of this capture. Empirical data is consistent with increasing levels of looting in France during the 1930s. We provide a comparison with Britain and argue that Britain managed to protect its newspapers better.
    Keywords: Media, governance, minority shareholders, control premium, corruption, Interwar, France
    JEL: D72 G34 L82 N24 N74
    Date: 2012–05–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp09-2012&r=cul
  4. By: Kim, Seung Gyu; Cho, Seong-Hoon; Roberts, Roland K.; Claassen, Roger
    Abstract: The main objective of this research is to propose a data-driven approach to estimate the amenity values of restoring urban forest landscapes at potential target sites. The approach allows establishing the overall price-driving time relationship between the amenity values attributable to both deforested and forested areas and their proximities to housing locations within a given community. Establishing the overall price-driving time relationship is important because the hedonic price model cannot be used to estimate the amenity values of yet to be restored urban forest landscapes that do not exist at the time of housing sales transactions. We estimated the sum of the differences between amenity values of deforested and forested areas on housing prices across different proximities to a potential restoration site. It can be viewed as a proxy for the value added to nearby houses resulting from a given urban forest restoration project at a potential target site.
    Keywords: urban forest landscapes, spatial hedonic model, travel distance, Land Economics/Use,
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea12:123552&r=cul

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