| Abstract: |
Two decades of empirical evaluation have shown that corruption has a negative
impact on economic growth, political stability, judicial effectiveness,
democratization, educational attainment, and equality of income. However,
corruption exists, persists, and varies significantly by culture. Lab studies
have recently come to the forefront in identifying both the incentives and
disincentives for corrupt behavior. However, lab studies on culture and
corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This paper begins
with a discussion of non-experimental work in this area, and evaluates the
experimental findings in the context of earlier research. The authors sketch
out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (through
institutions and social norms), and argue that discrepancies in experimental
results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or
unobserved variation in beliefs) or to differences in the response to
punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for
previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include:
behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results
in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective
anti-corruption measures. |