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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Francisco Martínez-Sánchez (Universidad de Alicante); Miguel González-Maestre (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms choose also their level of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition. We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes depends, crucially, on the interplay between the net direct effect of advertising on welfare and the degree of substitutability between platforms. We also consider the effects on quality and welfare of recent policies tending to eliminate advertising as a way of financing publicly-owned platforms. |
| Keywords: | endogenous quality, two-sided markets, broadcasting duopoly, publicly-owned platform, advertising regulation. |
| JEL: | L11 L33 L82 M37 |
| Date: | 2012–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2012-03&r=cul |
| By: | Francisca Guedes de Oliveira (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão - Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Porto); Alexandra Leitão (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão - Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Porto) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates empirically the determinants of air quality in a large cross-section of countries. We assess air quality by sulfur emissions and, following the literature, we consider three different groups of determinants: economic, political and cultural. We confirm the existence of an EKC for sulfur (inverted-U shaped relation between wealth and pollution). Political determinants are proxied by ethnic or religious fractionalization indexes and the country’s legal origin (we consider five possible legal origins: English common law, French civil law, German civil law, Scandinavian legal system and Socialist legal system). Cultural determinants are assessed by the percentage of a country’s population that belongs to one of the three main religions (Catholic, Muslim or Protestant). Our goal is to establish the economic, political and cultural profile of a country that manages to be efficient in providing good air quality. We conclude that a country will provide higher air quality if it has one or more of the following characteristics: it is ethnic and/or religious homogeneous, it has a German or Scandinavian legal tradition; it is Protestant. |
| Keywords: | Air quality, political determinants, cultural determinants,environmental efficiency |
| JEL: | H40 H89 Q53 Q59 |
| Date: | 2012–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cap:wpaper:012012&r=cul |
| By: | Faillo, Marco (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Grieco, Daniela (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Zarri, Luca (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit) |
| Abstract: | Is culture an important variable to explain whether groups can successfully provide public goods? A wealth of empirical evidence on both industrialized and developing countries shows that cooperation levels decrease in the presence of ethnic divisions. Although several laboratory works deal with cultural differences, so far most studies restrict their attention to cross-cultural comparisons among internally homogeneous societies. We depart from these contributions and conduct an intercultural public goods game with punishment experiment in Italy, a country where immigration is a quite recent, but politically hot phenomenon. We investigate the effects of introducing a varying number of foreign participants within a homogeneous pool of native subjects. Our results indicate that foreigners contribute significantly less than natives, natives react lowering their own contribution levels, and, consequently, the degree of cultural diversity negatively affects the overall level of cooperation. In terms of sanctioning, we observe no difference in the overall amount of assigned and received punishment points; however, behaving mostly as free-riders, foreigners are more likely to use anti-social punishment. In the absence of institutional restrictions ruling out anti-social punishment, this might amplify the documented detrimental effect on cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics; Public Good Games; Cooperation; Cultural Diversity; Anti-social Punishment |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D64 D71 |
| Date: | 2012–03–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:aiccon:2012_102&r=cul |