nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2010‒09‒11
six papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
University Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Department of Art, Culture & Language: An Analysis By Kriti Kapur
  2. A World Without Intellectual Property? Boldrin and Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly By Gilbert, Richard
  3. Targeted Advertising in Magazine Markets By Ambarish Chandra; Ulrich Kaiser
  4. Mass Media and Special Interest Groups By Maria Petrova
  5. Application of DEA to Voting for the Baseball Hall of Fame By Thomas Miceli; Brian Volz
  6. Every Viewer has a Price - On the Differentiation of TV Channels By Häckner, Jonas; Nyberg, Sten

  1. By: Kriti Kapur
    Abstract: Heritage is inherited, it is everywhere around us. It is natural or created or has evolved in the course of history. Heritage is something, which is specific and typical of a place, area, region or country on one hand and of a family, community or people on the other. It may be broadly categorised as natural and cultural. [Working Paper No. 46]
    Keywords: heritage, natural, created, culture, family, community
    Date: 2010
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2805&r=cul
  2. By: Gilbert, Richard
    Abstract: In their recent book, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Michele Boldrin and David Levine conclude that patents and copyrights are not necessary to provide protection for either innovation or creative expression and should be eliminated. The authors note the many flaws of the U.S. system of intellectual property protection and argue that other means are available to appropriate the benefits of invention and creative expression. However, the authors overlook important functions of intellectual property. Their efforts would be put to better use by more carefully analyzing policy proposals that may improve our system of intellectual property rights and have some potential to be implemented.
    Keywords: intellectual property, patent, copyright
    Date: 2010–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:compol:1141498&r=cul
  3. By: Ambarish Chandra (University of British Columbia); Ulrich Kaiser (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: We examine the scope and value of targeted advertising in the magazine industry. We use data on reader characteristics at individual media, in contrast to previous work that has needed to infer this information from aggregate data. Our results show a strong relationship between subscriber characteristics and advertising prices. Advertisers clearly value more homogenous groups of readers, measured according to income, gender and age. Our results explain recent trends of declining advertising expenditures in print media, in favor of increasing online advertising.
    Keywords: targeted advertising; reader homogeneity; quantile regression; magazines; advertising rates
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuieci:2010-02&r=cul
  4. By: Maria Petrova (New Economic School)
    Abstract: Media revenues are an important determinant of media behavior. News coverage depends not only on the preferences of media consumers but also on the preferences of advertisers or subsidizing groups. We present a theoretical model of the interaction between special interest groups and media outlets in which the media face a trade-off between a larger audience and lower payments from special interest groups versus a smaller audience and more biased content. We focus on the relationship between the costs of production of media product and the level of distortion in news coverage that can be introduced by interest groups. Speciically, we look at the effect of falling marginal costs or the growing reliance on advertising revenues. We show that if people do not want to tolerate bias, or if special interest groups have budget constraint, then this effect is negative. If people do not pay attention to bias, or if the size of the audience is very important for the interest group, then this effect becomes positive. If markets are fully covered, and all consumers buy one unit of media product, then the effect disappears.
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0144&r=cul
  5. By: Thomas Miceli (University of Connecticut); Brian Volz (Assumption College)
    Abstract: This paper applies Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to voting for the Baseball Hall of Fame. The approach interprets a player’s career statistics as inputs, and the percentage of votes he received for the HOF as the output. A constructed frontier based on past voting defines the maximum number of votes that a player should receive based on his statistical profile. Our results suggest that about a third of current members of the HOF (excluding Negro League players, managers, umpires, and executives) should be replaced by more deserving players. Our conclusions, however, do not account for those aspects of a player’s career (both positive and negative) not captured by statistics.
    Keywords: Baseball hall of fame; data envelopment analysis; production theory
    JEL: C44 D20 L83
    Date: 2010–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2010-22&r=cul
  6. By: Häckner, Jonas (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University); Nyberg, Sten (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)
    Abstract: This study has three main objectives. First, we develop a realistic framework for studying the incentives to differentiate broadcasting in free-to-air TV markets. Consumers are allowed to vary the amount of time spent in front of the television set depending on preferences over program types (e.g., entertainment versus news), differences in the alternative cost of time and an Hotelling type dimension reflecting i.e., political positioning. Second, since empirical evidence suggest that different consumer segments are priced differently in the market for advertising, we analyze the implications of targeted advertising on the equilibrium level of differentiation. Third, we compare the equilibrium outcome with the socially optimal configuration. When consumers have no preferences over program types, standard Hotelling type results apply. Market forces minimize differentiation while the optimal degree is at an intermediate level. As preferences over program types get stronger the difference between optimal and market outcomes is initially reduced. However, when a large enough number of consumers start flipping between channels in order to avoid the least preferred program type, minimal differentiation suddenly becomes optimal while market forces leads to excessive differentiation. Hence, policies aimed at increasing diversity is beneficial only when viewers care little about program content.
    Keywords: Product Differentiation; TV Channels; Advertising
    JEL: L32 L82
    Date: 2010–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0015&r=cul

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