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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Jean-Paul Carvalho |
| Abstract: | Culture constrains individual choice by making certain behaviour taboo. We propose an evolutionary model in which members of different groups attempt to coordinate over time. We show that cultural constraints can lead to a permanent break down in coordination between groups, even when coordination is attainable and Pareto-efficient. Hence restrictive cultures make coordination with out-group members more difficult. By limiting a person’s options, however, highly restrictive cultures act as a strategic commitment, forcing out-group members to conform to in-group norms if they want to coordinate. In this way, cultural constraints on behaviour may lead to higher expected welfare. When people rationally choose their culture, we demonstrate that restrictive and permissive cultures can co-exist in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Coordination games, Culture, Taboos, Commitments, Cultural Evolution |
| JEL: | C72 C73 Z1 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:489&r=cul |
| By: | Abitbol, Pablo |
| Abstract: | This report presents the results of a replication, with 199 culturally-diverse subjects, of Thomas Schelling’s (1957) experiments on tacit coordination. Section 1 introduces the concept of focal point equilibrium selection in tacit one-shot symmetric pure coordination games, as presented by Schelling in his classic article; it then traces its subsequent exploration through experimental research, shows how it has been explained, particularly in terms of culture, and relates that kind of explanation to the experimental and null hypotheses of the present study and its associated predictions. Section 2 describes the design of the intercultural tacit coordination experiment, and section 3 the results. Finally, section 4 presents a very preliminary discussion of the implications of the experiment’s results in terms of the cultural explanation of focal point equilibrium selection. |
| Keywords: | Culture; cultural diversity; coordination; game theory; Thomas Schelling |
| JEL: | C72 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23474&r=cul |
| By: | De Stobbeleir, K.; De Clippeleer, I.; Dewettinck, K. (Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School) |
| Abstract: | Considerable research efforts have been invested in identifying the individual and contextual factors that facilitate employee creativity. However, the literature also abounds with conflicting research results regarding critical factors for employee creativity. At the basis of these contradictions is the lack of attention that has been given to the study of the potential differential impact of these antecedents on specific sub-processes of creativity. Historically, scholars have focused on studying the antecedents of creativity as an outcome variable, but far less is known about how these factors differentially impact the various stages within the creative process. Building on this research gap, the aim of this study is to explore the possible differential impact on the phases of the creative process of five antecedents previously identified as important predictors of creativity: (1) personality; (2) rewards; (3) the role of co-workers; (4) leadership; and (5) the configuration of work settings. The present study demonstrates the need to conceive creativity as a process if we want to advance in building a comprehensive theory of employee creativity. We found that the factors that emerged in one phase of the creative process were not necessarily the same as the factors observed in other phases. In fact, the prerequisites for creativity in one phase sometimes contradicted the necessary conditions for creativity in another phase. Specifically, we found evidence for six countervailing forces. |
| Date: | 2010–06–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2010-08&r=cul |
| By: | Jean-Paul Carvalho |
| Abstract: | Veiling among Muslim women is modelled as a form of cultural resistance which inhibits the transmission of secular values. Individuals care about opinions of their community members and use veiling to influence these options. Our theory predicts that veiling is highest when individuals from highly religious communities interact in highly secular environments. This accounts for puzzling features of the new veiling movement since the 1970s. Though veiling helps retain religious values, we show taht bans on veiling aimed at assimilation can be counterproductive. By inducing religious types to segregate in local communities, bans on veiling can lead to increased religiosity. |
| Keywords: | Veil, Islamic revival, Signalling, Identity, Economics of religion |
| JEL: | C72 C73 Z1 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:491&r=cul |
| By: | Jiri Bohm; Petr Kral; Branislav Saxa |
| Abstract: | In this paper we analyze the favorableness and extent of the media coverage of the CNB’s monetary policy decisions in the period of 2002–2007. We identify the factors explaining the variance in these two dimensions using an extensive set of articles published in the four most relevant Czech daily broadsheets immediately after monetary policy meetings. We take account of parameters of the CNB’s actual monetary policy decisions and related communication as well as variables characterizing the general economic environment that prevailed at the times of the individual meetings. The most appealing results are that those CNB’s decisions that surprise financial markets are − if needed − not negatively perceived by the media and that the media welcomes interest rate changes. Therefore, from the media coverage point of view, there is no need for too much smoothing. Simultaneously, our analyses shed some light on how the media tends to report on (economic) events in general. |
| Keywords: | Communication, media, monetary policy, newspapers. |
| JEL: | E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2009/10&r=cul |