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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey; Paolo Pamini |
| Abstract: | An empirical overview of the UNESCO World Heritage List according to various characteristics is presented. The officially stated intention of the World Heritage List is to protect global heritage. Our focus is on the imbalance of the existing List according to countries and continents. The existing distribution is compared to hypothetical distributions considered “balanced” from different points of view. It turns out that the World Heritage List is unbalanced with respect to a distribution of Sites according to population, area or per capita income. This paper wants to reveal facts about the existing distribution, and is designed to help a reasoned discussion to emerge. |
| Keywords: | Global public good; World Heritage; Cultural Certificates; Monuments; UNESCO |
| JEL: | Z11 D6 F5 H87 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2009-31&r=cul |
| By: | Boone Ch.; Declerck C.H.; Rao H.; Van Den Buys K. |
| Abstract: | What explains the recognition gained by artists? Is it learning by doing? Or is it social structure? We study the recognition gained by modernistic composers in Belgium during the interwar years,and find that learning by doing increases recognition for pioneers, and that it matters only when there is fragmentation of the genre. However, novices secured recognition if they worked in a genre allied with a political ideology; more specifically, when the far right parties gained ground reflecting the rise of Flemish nationalism, expressionists belonging to the German pole garnered more recognition even if they were novices. Taken together, these results suggest that worlds of art shape the fates of works of art. |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2009016&r=cul |
| By: | Peeters Th. |
| Abstract: | Collective sales of media rights are a common practice in sports leagues. Proponents of the system claim that it is a necessary tool for the maintenance of competitive balance. In this empirical paper, I argue that, in European soccer, collective sales do not increase competitive balance as compared to individual sales. Secondly, I demonstrate the negative effect of the UEFA Champions League on competitive balance. Finally, I illustrate the beneficial effect of a larger market size and a more equal distribution of drawing power. These results shed new light on antitrust and solidarity policies in the sports industry. |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ant:wpaper:2009009&r=cul |