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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Rousselière, D.; Vézina, M. |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the foundations of cooperative identity and how it is constructed by the organisation. More specifically, our research focuses on a financial cooperative in the simultaneously emerging and consolidating cultural sector. The originality of this paper lies in the methodology used—textual analysis. We use the Economies of Worth model developed by Boltanski & Thévenot (2006), which accounts for a plurality of legitimate forms of evaluation used in the processes of critique and justification. |
| Keywords: | COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISE;ECONOMIES OF WORTH;ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE;SOCIAL ECONOMY |
| JEL: | Z10 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200902&r=cul |
| By: | Morozan, Cristian; Enache , Elena; Vechiu, Camelia |
| Abstract: | The people who receive the information and buy products/services migrate, nowadays, from traditional to on-line media, a greater number of them is accessing the desired news from specialized sites and from mobile devices, anywhere and anytime. The fast adopting of new technologies affects – and transform – manufacturing, distribution and consume, but to optimize on-line channels is necessary to act objectively, and to found the decisions on performance key indicators. In the process of adapting to these market changes, the marketers have the opportunity to reach a different audience through on-line and mobile instruments. This approach based on real data, facilitated by web analysis, helps companies to focus the efforts and to have success with the new offer versions. |
| Keywords: | digital marketing; blog; mobile marketing; interactive television |
| JEL: | M3 |
| Date: | 2009–03–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:13725&r=cul |
| By: | Ruben Durante; Brian Knight |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of partisan control of the media on news content and viewership by consumers with differing ideologies. We use data from Italy, where the main private television network is owned by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center-right coalition, and the public television corporation is largely controlled by the ruling coalition. Our first finding is that when, following the 2001 national elections, the control of the government switched from the center-left to the center-right, news content on public television shifted to the right. Second, we find evidence that viewers responded to these changes by modifying their choice of news programs. Right-leaning viewers increased their propensity to watch public channels which, even after the change, remained to the left of private channels. Furthermore, some left-wing viewers reacted by switching from the main public channel to another public channel that was controlled by the left during both periods. In line with these shifts in viewership, we also find evidence of an increase in trust in public television among right-wing viewers and a corresponding decrease among left-wing ones. Finally, we show that this behavioral response, which tended to shift ideological exposure to the left, significantly, though only partially, offset the movement of public news content to the right. |
| JEL: | D7 H0 |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14762&r=cul |
| By: | James Simpson |
| Abstract: | Wine production in Europe today is dominated by small family vineyards and cooperative wineries, while in the New World viticulture and viniculture is highly concentrated and vertically integrated. This paper argues that these fundamental organizational differences appeared from the turmoil in wine markets at the turn of the twentieth century. As technological change endangered existing rents, growers, wine-makers, and merchants lobbied governments to introduce laws and create new institutions that regulated markets in their favor. The political voice and bargaining power of the economic agents varied greatly both within, and between, countries, leading to the introduction of very different policies. |
| Keywords: | Wine history, Farm organization, Vertical co-ordination, Agricultural commodity chains, Cooperatives, Appellations |
| JEL: | L14 N51 Q13 |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:wp09-01&r=cul |
| By: | Rachael E. Goodhue; Jeffrey LaFrance; Leo K. Simon (School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University) |
| Abstract: | We consider the impact of taxes on the quantity and quality produced of goods, such as wine, for which market value accrues with age by a competitive producer. Any pair of taxes that includes a volumetric sales tax and any one of three other types of tax – an ad valorem sales tax, an ad valorem storage tax, or a volumetric storage tax – spans the full range of feasible tax revenues with positive tax rates. For any tax system that reduces quality relative to the firm’s no-tax equilibrium, there is another tax system that increases tax revenues, eliminates the quality distortion, and does not increase the quantity distortion. Many wine industry observers believe that most, if not all, existing tax systems tend to result in the suboptimal provision of quality. Our results suggest that the wide variety of wine tax systems is not prima facie evidence that these systems, or most of them, are inefficient. Provided the system includes a volumetric sales tax it may be efficient, regardless of which of the other instruments, or how many of them, are used. Assertions regarding inefficiency must be evaluated on an empirical case-by-case basis. Our analysis provides a theoretical framework for such research. |
| Keywords: | aging, Alchian-Allen effect, tax policy, wine |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wsu:wpaper:lafrance-6&r=cul |