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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | David Galenson |
| Abstract: | The joint production of paintings by more than one artist was not uncommon in the past: a number of Old Masters had assistants do much of the work on their paintings, executing images that had been planned by the master. Yet prior to the twentieth century very few paintings were actually signed by more than one artist. Early in the twentieth century, many important conceptual artists occasionally co-authored paintings or drawings, but consistent co-authorship of paintings, sculptures, and photographs is a practice that is novel to the late twentieth century. These recent instances have generally involved pairs of conceptual artists. The English team, Gilbert and George, is the most important pair that has consistently produced co-authored works; they have executed all of their work jointly since 1969, when they made Singing Sculpture, their first and most famous piece. A number of pairs of young conceptual artists had worked closely together earlier in the century, but they did not formally co-author their work, perhaps because of the art world's commitment to the ideal of the autonomous artist. Since the critical and economic success of Gilbert and George has demonstrated that this resistance can be overcome, co-authorship has become more common among younger conceptual artists, and this trend is likely to continue in future. |
| JEL: | J01 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13484&r=cul |
| By: | Cuccia, Tiziana; Cellini, Roberto |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that the standard result according to which labour-managed firms produce a lower amount of output, as compared to profit-maximising firms, is reversed if production per se gives utility and the workers’ membership of labour-managed firms is set prior to market decisions. Under the same hypotheses, the labour-managed firms set a higher product quality than the profit-oriented ones, ceteris paribus. The considered hypotheses are particularly relevant for the case of the performing arts sector, so that the presence of labour-managed firms should be particularly welcomed in this sector. |
| Keywords: | workers'enterprises; labour managed firms; arts |
| JEL: | L82 L23 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5192&r=cul |
| By: | Cellini, Roberto; Cuccia, Tiziana |
| Abstract: | The presence of information externality, and the consequent necessity of public intervention to amend the effect of market failure, has been deeply analysed in the case of scientific research. In this Note we argue that the same point is particularly appropriate also in the case of arts: the presence of information externality concerning the personal skills of artists can represent a valid reason to believe that purely private funding of arts is inefficient, and to call for public intervention in this sector. |
| Keywords: | Arts; Experimentation; Financing; Incomplete Information; Bayes theorem |
| JEL: | Z11 C72 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5193&r=cul |
| By: | Gershkov, Alex; Toxvaerd, Flavio |
| Abstract: | This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction theory. |
| Keywords: | Auctions; Buyer credulity; Information disclosure; Seller manipulation |
| JEL: | D44 D82 G12 G14 |
| Date: | 2007–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6503&r=cul |
| By: | Jung, Hanjoon Michael |
| Abstract: | We model media manipulation in which a sender or senders manipulate information through the media to influence receivers. We show that if there is only one sender who has a conditional preference for maintaining its credibility in reporting accurate information and if the receivers face a coordination situation without information about their opponents' types, the sender could influence the receivers to make decisions according to the sender's primary preference by manipulating the information through the media, which makes the report common knowledge. This is true even when the sender and the receivers have contradictory primary preferences. This result extends to the cases in which the sender has imperfect information or in which the sender's primary preference is to maintain its credibility. In the case of multiple senders, however, when there is enough media competition or when simultaneous reporting takes place, the receivers could play their favored outcome against senders' preferences, which sheds light on a solution to the media manipulation problem. |
| Keywords: | Arms Race; Common Knowledge; Information Transmission; Media Bias; Media Competition; Media Manipulation. |
| JEL: | D83 D82 C72 |
| Date: | 2007–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5230&r=cul |