|
on Cultural Economics |
By: | Francisco Martínez-Sánchez (Universidad de Alicante) |
Abstract: | We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and incentives why a pirate would want to be a leader in prices. The framework of analysis used is a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition, where both incumbent and pirate are committed to keep their prices. We find that both government and incumbent have a key role in avoiding the entry of the pirate. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a monopolist, even if he installs an antipiracy system, because a monopoly provides the lowest social welfare. However, he will let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader, or encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of the pirate, which depends on the technology of the government for monitoring piracy. The pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being brought down by the incumbent and the government, although the leader's profit is lower than the follower's profit. Finally, we find that high-income countries with cheaper monitoring technology have lower piracy rates. |
Keywords: | Pirate, Incumbent, Government, Price Leadership, Copy, Monitoring Piracy, Income |
JEL: | K42 L13 L86 |
Date: | 2007–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-01&r=cul |
By: | Marco S. Giarratana; Anna Torres |
Abstract: | This paper investigates the link between brand performance and cultural primes in high-risk, innovation-based sectors. In theory section, we propose that the level of cultural uncertainty avoidance embedded in a firm determine its marketing creativity by increasing the complexity and the broadness of a brand. It determines also the rate of firm product innovations. Marketing creativity and product innovation influence finally the firm marketing performance. Empirically, we study trademarked promotion in the Software Security Industry (SSI). Our sample consists of 87 firms that are active in SSI from 11 countries in the period 1993-2000. We use the data coming from SSI-related trademarks registered by these firms, ending up with 2,911 SSI-related trademarks and a panel of 18,213 observations. We estimate a two stage model in which first we predict the complexity and the broadness of a trademark as a measure of marketing creativity and the rate of product innovations. Among several control variables, our variable of theoretical interest is the Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance cultural index. Then, we estimate the trademark duration with a hazard model using the predicted complexity and broadness as well as the rate of product innovations, along with the same control variables. Our evidence confirms that the cultural avoidance affects the duration of the trademarks through the firm marketing creativity and product innovation. |
Keywords: | Trademark duration, creativity, uncertainty avoidance cultural index |
JEL: | M31 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1015&r=cul |