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on Cultural Economics |
| By: | Stennek, Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics) |
| Abstract: | Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded |
| Keywords: | Exclusive Contracts; Quality; Bargaining; Avertising; Investment |
| JEL: | C78 D43 K21 L42 |
| Date: | 2007–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0691&r=cul |
| By: | William R. Johnson |
| Abstract: | On college campuses across the country and on millions of home computers, too, young adults download from each other digital files containing recorded music and films for their entertainment. The owners of that copyrighted material pursue the downloaders with legal action as well as the software services that facilitate it. Napster’s existence as a free file-sharing internet site was shut down in 2001, and the Supreme Court has recently ruled that a successor file-sharing service, Grokster, engaged in copyright infringement by providing an easy way for individuals to exchange files. The amount of filesharing activity is not trivial; Paul Romer (2002) estimates that Napster users were downloading at the rate of 1.5 billion downloads per month before Napster was shut down and that the consumer surplus generated by downloading roughly equaled the revenues of the recording industry. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property, property rights, creativity |
| JEL: | D8 O34 O38 Z11 |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vir:virpap:368&r=cul |
| By: | William R. Johnson |
| Abstract: | Technological changes over the past two decades have made it easier to distribute and to copy intellectual property. Creators and owners of intellectual property have responded to these changes with a variety of creative pricing strategies. The paper reviews some of these pricing innovations. Two broad categories of innovations are explored: those that facilitate price discrimination and those that exploit complementarities between di¤erent types of creative works. |
| Keywords: | pricing, intellectual property |
| JEL: | D4 O34 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vir:virpap:369&r=cul |
| By: | Anna Alberini (University of Maryland); Alberto Longo (Queen’s University Belfast); Patrizia Riganti (The University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we illustrate how surveys can be used to elicit the preferences of the public and of policymakers and city officials for regeneration projects at urban sites. Our methodology uses rating exercises, coupled with conjoint-choice stated preferences for the general public and with ranking exercises for the public officials and other stakeholders, and is then applied to investigate alternative reuses of the Venice Arsenale, Italy, and their economic, environmental and social impacts. One interesting feature of the conjoint choice questions for members of the public is that the responses to these questions can be used to estimate the social benefits of regeneration projects, i.e., how much people are willing to pay for these urban transformations. Another advantage of our approach is that it can be used seek and foster broader public participation into urban decisionmaking processes. |
| Keywords: | Land Use, Decision-Making, Cleanup, Sustainable Development, Local Economic Development, Choice Experiments |
| JEL: | R14 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.137&r=cul |