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on Cultural Economics |
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Issue of 2006‒09‒16
three papers chosen by Roberto Zanola Universita degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | David W. Galenson |
| Abstract: | This paper surveys 31 new genres of art that were invented during the twentieth century, chronologically from collage, papier colle, and readymades through installation, performance, and earthworks. This unprecedented proliferation in art forms was a direct consequence of the dominant role of conceptual innovation in the century's art, as a series of young iconoclasts deliberately broke the conventions and rules of existing artistic practice in the process of devising new ways to express their ideas and emotions. This overview affords a more precise understanding of one conspicuous and important way in which twentieth-century art differed from that of all earlier eras. The proliferation of genres has fragmented the advanced art world. A century ago, a great painter could influence nearly all advanced artists, but today it is virtually impossible for any one artist to influence practitioners of genres as diverse as painting, video, and installation. This survey also underscores the central role of Picasso in the advanced art of the past century, as he not only created the first, and one of the most important, of the new genres, but in doing so he also provided a new model of artistic behavior that became an inspiration for many other young conceptual artists. |
| JEL: | J0 |
| Date: | 2006–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12499&r=cul |
| By: | Magala, S.J. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University) |
| Keywords: | cultural encouters;beliefs;globalization;emergence;internet; |
| Date: | 2001–09–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:euriar:2002218&r=cul |
| By: | Ambrus, Attila; Reisinger, Markus |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees. |
| Keywords: | Media; Multihoming; Platform Competition; Two-Sided Markets |
| JEL: | D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2006–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:1178&r=cul |