nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2005‒08‒13
four papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
Universita degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Toward Abstraction: Ranking European Painters of the Early Twentieth Century By David W. Galenson
  2. Demand Estimation for Italian Newspapers: The Impact of Weekly Supplements By Elena Argentesi
  3. VIOLACIÓN A LOS DERECHOS DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL: LA INCIDENCIA DEL INGRESO, LA CULTURA, LA EDUCACIÓN, LAS ORGANIZACIONES, LAS INSTITUCIONES Y LA INNOVACIÓN EN LA PIRATERÍA DE SOFTWARE By Pablo Marquez
  4. Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products By Yooki Park; Suzanne Scotchmer

  1. By: David W. Galenson
    Abstract: Paris was the undisputed capital of modern art in the nineteenth century, but during the early twentieth century major innovations began to occur elsewhere in Europe. This paper examines the careers of the artists who led such movements as Italian Futurism, German Expressionism, Holland's De Stijl, and Russia's Suprematism. Quantitative analysis reveals the conceptual basis of the art of Umberto Boccioni, Giorgio de Chirico, Kazimir Malevich, and Edvard Munch, and the experimental basis of the innovations of Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, and Piet Mondrian. That the invention of abstract art was made nearly simultaneously by the conceptual Malevich and the experimental Kandinsky and Mondrian emphasizes the importance of both deductive and inductive approaches in the history of modern art.
    JEL: J0
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11501&r=cul
  2. By: Elena Argentesi
    Abstract: This paper looks at a form of non-price competition that has taken place in the Italian newspaper market, whereby weekly supplements are sold with the newspaper at a higher price. I estimate the impact of this selling strategy using a logit and a nested logit model of demand on a panel of Italian newspapers. I show that supplements increase the readership both in the weekday of issue and in the average weekday. This suggests that supplements are a way to attract new readers for the newspaper. This promotional effect is due both to business stealing and to market expansion.
    JEL: L11 L82 C33
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2004/28&r=cul
  3. By: Pablo Marquez (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)
    Abstract: The target of this paper is to question the causes of software intellectual property rights violation. To solve this question, the author analyses how has evolved the economic literature of IPR violation showing that the traditional market variables do not fulfill the requirements to explain the IPR violation. Thus, the author proposes that it is necessary to include in the model the educational, cultural, technological, and institutional context, which has not been taken into account, in order to build a coherent exposition of the problem. Subsequently, shows econometrically that it is possible to build an alternative model to explain software piracy including the a forementioned variables. The results suggest that culture, institutions and technology matter in the development of IPR protection policy even more than traditional variables as income.
    Keywords: Intellectual property, piracy, culture, institutions, education, innovation, intellectual property rights violation.
    JEL: K
    Date: 2005–08–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0508002&r=cul
  4. By: Yooki Park; Suzanne Scotchmer
    Abstract: As it becomes cheaper to copy and share digital content, vendors are turning to technical protections such as encryption. We argue that if protection is nevertheless imperfect, this transition will generally lower the prices of content relative to perfect legal enforcement. However, the effect on prices depends on whether the content providers use independent protection standards or a shared one, and if shared, on the governance of the system. Even if a shared system permits content providers to set their prices independently, the equilibrium prices will depend on how the vendors share the costs. We show that demand-based cost sharing generally leads to higher prices than revenue-based cost sharing. Users, vendors and the antitrust authorities will typically have different views on what capabilities the DRM system should have. We argue that, when a DRM system is implemented as an industry standard, there is a potential for "collusion through technology."
    JEL: L13 L14 L15 K21 O33
    Date: 2005–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11532&r=cul

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