nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2005‒07‒18
two papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
Universita degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Filming Images or Filming Reality: The Life Cycles of Movie Directors from D.W. Griffith to Federico Fellini By David W. Galenson; Joshua Kotin
  2. Advertising on TV: Under- or Overprovision? By Kind, Hans Jarle; Nilssen, Tore; Sørgard, Lars

  1. By: David W. Galenson; Joshua Kotin
    Abstract: Why have some movie directors made classic early films, but subsequently failed to match their initial successes, whereas other directors have begun much more modestly, but have made great movies late in their lives? This study demonstrates that the answer lies in the directors%u2019 motivations, and in the nature of their films. Conceptual directors, who use their films to express their ideas or emotions, mature early; thus such great conceptual innovators as D. W. Griffith, Sergei Eisenstein, and Orson Welles made their major contributions early in their careers, and declined thereafter. In contrast experimental directors, whose films present convincing characters in realistic circumstances, improve their techniques with experience, so that such great experimental innovators as John Ford, Alfred Hitchcock, and Akira Kurosawa made their greatest films late in their lives. Understanding these contrasting life cycles can be part of a more systematic understanding of the development of film, and can resolve previously elusive questions about the creative life cycles of individual filmmakers.
    Date: 2005–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11486&r=cul
  2. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Nilssen, Tore (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo); Sørgard, Lars (Norwegian Competition Authority)
    Abstract: We consider a model where TV channels transmit advertising, and viewers dislike such commercials. We find that the less differentiated the TV channels’ programs are, the lower is the amount of advertising in equilibrium. Relative to the social optimum, there is underprovision of advertising if TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes. In such a situation, a merger between TV channels may lead to more advertising and thus improve welfare. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases by having a larger amount of advertising than a private TV channel. It may actually have advertising even in cases where it is wasteful per se
    Keywords: Television industry; Advertising; Public policy; Mixed oligopoly
    JEL: L82 M37
    Date: 2005–05–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:osloec:2005_015&r=cul

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