nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2005‒01‒02
four papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Piracy and Competition By Paul Belleflamme; Pierre Picard
  2. The Danish Cultural Heritage: Economics and Politics By Chr. Hjorth-Andersen
  3. The Danish Museum System By Chr. Hjorth-Andersen
  4. Tourism, Poaching and Wildlife Conservation: What can Integrated Conservation and Development Projects accomplish? By Anders Skonhoft; Anne Borge Johannesen

  1. By: Paul Belleflamme; Pierre Picard
    Abstract: The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizontally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and reduces total surplus.
    Keywords: information goods, piracy, copyright, pricing
    JEL: K11 L13 L82 L86 O34
    Date: 2004
  2. By: Chr. Hjorth-Andersen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This paper deals with the Danish cultural heritage understood as the tangible heritage, mainly buildings. The paper briefly describes the political economy of conserving the cultural heritage and the means of preserving it. The main focus of the paper is, however, on the present Danish conservation policy. The paper presents estimates of the costs of preserving the cultural heritage on a national scale. It is concluded that while the level of conservation probably conforms to the wishes of the Danish people marginal decisions are probably misguided. In particular, a detailed examination of the practices of the Danish Conservation Board is presented. The Board is not guided by the recommended cost-benefit perspective but rather in practice devoted to preserving architectonical values.
    Keywords: cultural heritage, cultural policy, preservation
    JEL: Z1
    Date: 2004–12
  3. By: Chr. Hjorth-Andersen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This paper deals with the Danish Museum System and presents a detailed examination of the Danish Museums, though restricted to museums devoted to cultural history rather than arts. The emphasis of the paper is on the system rather than the individual museum, in marked contrast to most contributions in the literature where the individual museum is analyzed. Due to the information policy of the Danish government it is possible to get closer look of the actual workings of the museums than is standard in the literature. The paper concludes that the Danish museums are autonomous to a degree that makes it unlikely that an optimal system of museums is achieved. The paper concludes by discussing some proposals for rearrangement of the museum system.
    Keywords: museums, cultural policy, preservation
    JEL: Z1
    Date: 2004–12
  4. By: Anders Skonhoft (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Anne Borge Johannesen (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
    Abstract: Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) have frequently been established in Africa to improve wildlife conservation and the welfare of local communities. However, their effectiveness so far has been hampered by conflicts and illegal harvesting activities. Within a Gordon-Schäfer-type model, this paper focuses on the strategic interaction between the manager of a protected area and a group of local people living near the park. The park manager benefits from wildlife through non-consumptive tourism and safari hunting. The local people benefit through hunting, although this is illegal according to existing laws, but they also bear costs as wildlife causes agricultural damage. Depending on the economic and ecological environment, we show that ICDPs relying on money transfers to the local people derived from the park manager’s activities may or may not promote wildlife conservation. In addition, we demonstrate that the effects on the welfare of the local people are ambiguous.
    Keywords: wildlife, conservation, conflicts, local welfare
    JEL: Q2 Q20
    Date: 2004–08–15

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