nep-cul New Economics Papers
on Cultural Economics
Issue of 2004‒12‒12
four papers chosen by
Roberto Zanola
Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale

  1. Cofinancing to Manage Risk in the Motion Picture Industry By Ronald Goettler; Phillip Leslie
  2. Do Cultures Clash? Evidence from Cross-National Ultimatum Game Experiments By Swee Hoon Chuah; Robert Hoffmann; Martin Jones; Geoffrey Williams
  3. The Impact of Newspapers on Consumer Confidence: Does Spin Bias Exist? By Karel-Jan Alsem; Steven Brakman; Lex Hoogduin; Gerard Kuper
  4. Spatial Competition in the Network Television Industry By Ronald Goettler; Ron Shachar

  1. By: Ronald Goettler; Phillip Leslie
    Date: 2003–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:1090529974&r=cul
  2. By: Swee Hoon Chuah (Nottingham University Business School); Robert Hoffmann (Nottingham University Business School); Martin Jones (Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee); Geoffrey Williams (Nottingham University Business School)
    Abstract: Economic, political and social globalisation entails increasing interaction between individuals of different cultures. While experimental economists have established differences between the behaviour within different cultures, the effect of cultural difference on cross-culture interactions has so far not been sufficiently explored. This paper reports on the results of experiments with ultimatum games designed for this purpose, in which Malaysian Chinese and UK subjects played opponents of their own as well as of the other culture. We find that cultural differences exist between the behaviour of Western and Asians interacting (a) within their own respective national groups, and (b) with members of the other group. This evidence is discussed in terms of the possibility of a 'clash of cultures'.
    Keywords: Note:
    JEL: C78 C91 D64 Z13
    Date: 2004–11–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nub:occpap:9&r=cul
  3. By: Karel-Jan Alsem; Steven Brakman; Lex Hoogduin; Gerard Kuper
    Abstract: It is sometimes argued that news reports in the media suffer from biased reporting. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2002) argue that there are two types of media bias. One bias, called ideology, reflects a news outlet’s desire to affect reader opinions in a particular direction. The second bias, referred to as spin, reflects the outlet’s attempt to simply create a memorable story. Competition between outlets can eliminate the effect of ideological bias, but increases the incentive to spin stories. We examine whether we find some evidence of spin in Dutch newspaper reporting on the state of the economy. If newspapers are indeed able to create memorable stories this should, according to our hypothesis, affect the opinion of readers with respect to the state of the economy. Sentiments about the actual state of the economy could be magnified by spin. As a result, consumer confidence – a variable that routinely measures the opinion on the state of the economy – can be expected to be affected not only by economic fundamentals, but also by the way these fundamentals are reported. We construct a variable that reflects the way consumers perceive economic news reported in newspapers. We find that this variable indeed has a significant impact on consumer confidence, which is short-lived.
    JEL: E20 E21 E30
    Date: 2004
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1328&r=cul
  4. By: Ronald Goettler; Ron Shachar
    Abstract: We present an empirical study of spatial competition and a methodology to estimate demand for products with unobservable characteristics. Using panel data, we estimate a discrete choice model with latent product attributes and unobserved heterogenous consumer preferences. Our application of the methodology to the network television industry yields estimates that are consistent with experts' views. Given our estimates, we compute Nash equilibria of a product location game, and find that firms' observed strategies (such as the degree of product differentiation) are generally optimal. Discrepancies between actual and optimal strategies reflect the networks' adherence to "rules of thumb," and possibly, bounded rationality behavior.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:993576035&r=cul

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