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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Gamal Atallah; Aggey Simons (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Canada) |
| Abstract: | We analyze innovation incentives under price cap regulation by examining scenarios with endogenous price caps, both with and without regulatory commitment. In a setting without informational imperfections, our analysis reveals two principal conclusions. First, there is no trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. Strengthening firm incentives by allowing it to charge higher prices, and thus realize greater profits, leads to less innovation because it reduces output. The optimal strategy to boost innovation and maximize welfare is to set a low price (and thus, a low profit) target, as innovation incentives are proportional to output. Second, the benefits of regulatory commitment for innovation and welfare are not unambiguously clear: commitment neither consistently outperforms nor underperforms non-commitment. Under demand uncertainty, when the firm is risk-averse, the static-dynamic efficiency trade-off reappears, and the firm may prefer non-commitment due to risk-shielding. Under asymmetric information about firm demand type, the trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency becomes inherent (due to information rents and contract distortions), and commitment becomes unambiguously crucial for fostering innovation by preventing the ratchet effect. |
| Keywords: | Price cap regulation; Regulation, Innovation, R&D, Dynamic efficiency; Commitment. |
| JEL: | D42 L12 L43 L51 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ott:wpaper:2504e |
| By: | Jennifer Alonso-Garcia; Len Patrick Dominic M. Garces; Jonathan Ziveyi |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates optimal withdrawal strategies and behavior of policyholders in a variable annuity (VA) contract with a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB) rider incorporating taxation and a ratchet mechanism for enhancing the benefit base during the life of the contract. Mathematically, this is accomplished by solving a backward dynamic programming problem associated with optimizing the discounted risk-neutral expectation of cash flows from the contract. Furthermore, reflecting traded VA contracts in the market, we consider hybrid products providing policyholders access to a cash fund which functions as an intermediate repository of earnings from the VA and earns interest at a contractually specified cash rate. We contribute to the literature by revealing several significant interactions among taxation, the cash fund, and the benefit base update mechanism. When tax rates are high, the tax-shielding effect of the cash fund, which is taxed differently from ordinary withdrawals from the VA, plays a significant role in enhancing the attractiveness of the overall contract. Furthermore, the ratchet benefit base update scheme (in contrast to the ubiquitous return-of-premium specification in the literature) tends to discourage early surrender as it provides enhanced downside market risk protection. In addition, the cash fund discourages active withdrawals, with policyholders preferring to transfer the guaranteed withdrawal amount to the cash fund to leverage the cash fund rate. |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2507.07358 |
| By: | Anja Prummer; Francesco Nava |
| Abstract: | We study a principal who allocates a good to agents with private, independently distributed values through an optimal mechanism. The principal can strategically shape these value distributions by modifying the good’s features, which affect agents’ valuations. Our analysis reveals that optimal designs are frequently divisive—creating goods that appeal strongly to specific agents or agent types while being less valued by others. These divisive designs reduce information rents and increase total surplus, at the expense of competition. Even when total surplus is constrained, some divisiveness in designs remains optimal. |
| Keywords: | Value Design, Mechanism Design, Di!erentiation |
| JEL: | D82 D46 L15 |
| Date: | 2025–07–23 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0069 |