|
on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Larionov, Daniil |
| Abstract: | I consider a repeated auction setting with colluding buyers and a seller who adjusts reserve prices over time without long-term commitment. To model the seller's concern for collusion, I introduce a new equilibrium concept: collusive public perfect equilibrium. For every strategy of the seller I define the corresponding "buyer-game" in which the seller is replaced by Nature who chooses the reserve prices for the buyers in accordance with the seller's strategy. A public perfect equilibrium is collusive if the buyers cannot achieve a higher symmetric public perfect equilibrium payoff in the corresponding buyer-game. In a setting with symmetric buyers with private binary iid valuations and publicly revealed bids, I find collusive public perfect equilibria that allow the seller to extract the entire surplus from the buyers in the limit as the buyers' discount factor goes to 1. I therefore show that a non-committed seller can effectively fight collusion even when she faces patient buyers, can only set reserve prices, and has to satisfy stringent public disclosure requirements. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:23029&r=cta |
| By: | Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients’ severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the optimal dynamic contract and show that it is made up of two components: a time-invariant payment, which depends on the structural characteristics of the provider, and a time-varying component, which is affected by both patient and hospital characteristics. To illustrate the characteristics of the dynamic contract and compare it with a more standard static contract, we provide a numerical exercise calibrated with data from hip replacement hospitalisations in Italy. |
| Keywords: | Health Economics and Policy, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods |
| Date: | 2023–09–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:338404&r=cta |
| By: | Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll; Roberto Quaranta |
| Abstract: | Previous literature on the effect of tenured and tenure-track vs. non-tenure-track professors on students’ performance at university finds contrasting results. Our paper is the first to test whether tenured/tenure-track and non-tenure-track teachers differently affect students’ performance at school. We use data on standardized test scores of a representative sample of primary and secondary school students in Italy and information on their Italian and mathematics teachers’ labor contracts. Controlling for class- and subject-fixed effects, we find that non-tenure-track teachers decrease students’ performance by 0.21 standard deviation. This detrimental effect is fully explained because non-tenure-track teachers are less experienced. In line with previous findings on the adverse effects of teachers’ absences, non-tenure-track teachers are also associated with 0.1 standard deviation worse student performance when their contracts last less than a year. |
| Keywords: | Teachers, Labor Contracts, Students' Performance, Standardized Tests |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cca:wchild:110&r=cta |
| By: | Emma Kroell; Sebastian Jaimungal; Silvana M. Pesenti |
| Abstract: | We study a reinsurer who faces multiple sources of model uncertainty. The reinsurer offers contracts to $n$ insurers whose claims follow different compound Poisson processes. As the reinsurer is uncertain about the insurers' claim severity distributions and frequencies, they design reinsurance contracts that maximise their expected wealth subject to an entropy penalty. Insurers meanwhile seek to maximise their expected utility without ambiguity. We solve this continuous-time Stackelberg game for general reinsurance contracts and find that the reinsurer prices under a distortion of the barycentre of the insurers' models. We apply our results to proportional reinsurance and excess-of-loss reinsurance contracts, and illustrate the solutions numerically. Furthermore, we solve the related problem where the reinsurer maximises, still under ambiguity, their expected utility and compare the solutions. |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2308.11828&r=cta |
| By: | Yonghong An; David Davis; Yizao Liu; Ruli Xiao |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the impact of government procurement in social welfare programs on consumers, manufacturers, and the government. We analyze the U.S. infant formula market, where over half of the total sales are purchased by the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. The WIC program utilizes first-price auctions to solicit rebates from the three main formula manufacturers, with the winner exclusively serving all WIC consumers in the winning state. The manufacturers compete aggressively in providing rebates which account for around 85% of the wholesale price. To rationalize and disentangle the factors contributing to this phenomenon, we model manufacturers' retail pricing competition by incorporating two unique features: price inelastic WIC consumers and government regulation on WIC brand prices. Our findings confirm three sizable benefits from winning the auction: a notable spill-over effect on non-WIC demand, a significant marginal cost reduction, and a higher retail price for the WIC brand due to the price inelasticity of WIC consumers. Our counterfactual analysis shows that procurement auctions affect manufacturers asymmetrically, with the smallest manufacturer harmed the most. More importantly, by switching from the current mechanism to a predetermined rebate procurement, the government can still contain the cost successfully, consumers' surplus is greatly improved, and the smallest manufacturer benefits from the switch, promoting market competition. |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2308.12479&r=cta |
| By: | Xu Han; Zengqing Wu; Chuan Xiao |
| Abstract: | Firm competition and collusion involve complex dynamics, particularly when considering communication among firms. Such issues can be modeled as problems of complex systems, traditionally approached through experiments involving human subjects or agent-based modeling methods. We propose an innovative framework called Smart Agent-Based Modeling (SABM), wherein smart agents, supported by GPT-4 technologies, represent firms, and interact with one another. We conducted a controlled experiment to study firm price competition and collusion behaviors under various conditions. SABM is more cost-effective and flexible compared to conducting experiments with human subjects. Smart agents possess an extensive knowledge base for decision-making and exhibit human-like strategic abilities, surpassing traditional ABM agents. Furthermore, smart agents can simulate human conversation and be personalized, making them ideal for studying complex situations involving communication. Our results demonstrate that, in the absence of communication, smart agents consistently reach tacit collusion, leading to prices converging at levels higher than the Bertrand equilibrium price but lower than monopoly or cartel prices. When communication is allowed, smart agents achieve a higher-level collusion with prices close to cartel prices. Collusion forms more quickly with communication, while price convergence is smoother without it. These results indicate that communication enhances trust between firms, encouraging frequent small price deviations to explore opportunities for a higher-level win-win situation and reducing the likelihood of triggering a price war. We also assigned different personas to firms to analyze behavioral differences and tested variant models under diverse market structures. The findings showcase the effectiveness and robustness of SABM and provide intriguing insights into competition and collusion. |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2308.10974&r=cta |
| By: | de Cornière, Alexandre; Mantovani, Andrea; Shekhar, Shiva |
| Abstract: | We investigate the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a two-sided platform that enables interaction between buyers and sellers. Sellers are heterogenous with respect to their per-interaction benefit, and, under price discrimination, the platform can condition its fee on sellers’ type. In a model with linear demand on each side, we show that price discrimination: (i) increases participation on both sides; (ii) enhances total welfare; (iii) may result in a strict Pareto improvement, with both seller types being better-off than under uniform pricing. These results, which are in stark contrast to the traditional analysis of price discrimination, are driven by the existence of cross-group network effects. By improving the firm’s ability to monetize seller participation, price discrimination induces the platform to attract more buyers, which then increases seller participation. The Pareto improvement result means that even those sellers who pay a higher price under discrimination can be better-off, due to the increased buyer participation. |
| JEL: | D42 D62 L11 L12 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:128428&r=cta |