|
on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Vladimir I. Danilov; Alexander V. Karzanov |
| Abstract: | We consider a hypergraph (I,C), with possible multiple (hyper)edges and loops, in which the vertices $i\in I$ are interpreted as agents, and the edges $c\in C$ as contracts that can be concluded between agents. The preferences of each agent i concerning the contracts where i takes part are given by use of a choice function $f_i$ possessing the so-called path independent property. In this general setup we introduce the notion of stable network of contracts. The paper contains two main results. The first one is that a general problem on stable systems of contracts for (I,C,f) is reduced to a set of special ones in which preferences of agents are described by use of so-called weak orders, or utility functions. However, for a special case of this sort, the stability may not exist. Trying to overcome this trouble when dealing with such special cases, we introduce a weaker notion of metastability for systems of contracts. Our second result is that a metastable system always exists. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.13089&r= |
| By: | Alessio Tomelleri |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates trends in the transitory and permanent variance of male earnings in Italy using social security data from 1990 to 2016. Cohort-specific earnings variability is compared by the number of non-standard contracts to test the extent to which the increase in income instability is related to labour market deregulation for fixed-term contracts. Results show a relationship between the reforms that liberalised temporary contracts and increasing income instability, mainly affecting younger cohorts. In addition, younger workers exhibit an increase in the variance of permanent earnings as the number of atypical contracts increases. This is related to a decline in long-term mobility and an increase in long-term inequality. Results show that the reforms that liberalised temporary arrangements led to a short-run increase in earnings instability and a long-term increase in inequality. |
| Keywords: | Earning instability, Labour market reforms, Cohorts, Income mobility |
| JEL: | J31 J41 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fbk:wpaper:2022-02&r= |
| By: | Jin-Wook Chang; Matt Darst |
| Abstract: | This paper studies competitive market shutdowns due to adverse selection, where sellers post nonexclusive menus of contracts. We first show that the presence of the worst type of agents (moldy lemons) causes markets to fail only if their mass is sufficiently large. We then show that a small mass of moldy lemons can lead to a large cascade of exits when buyers possess outside options. Our results suggest a parsimonious way of generating sudden market shutdowns without relying on institutional details or imposing additional structure on the model. Thus, the simple insights on the properties of market shutdowns we consider are applicable to many different markets and contexts. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric information; Market unraveling; Non-exclusive contracting |
| JEL: | D52 D53 D82 E44 G32 |
| Date: | 2022–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2022-13&r= |
| By: | Yiyang Zheng |
| Abstract: | Predictions of short-term directional movement of the futures contract can be challenging as its pricing is often based on multiple complex dynamic conditions. This work presents a method for predicting the short-term directional movement of an underlying futures contract. We engineered a set of features from technical analysis, order flow, and order-book data. Then, Tabnet, a deep learning neural network, is trained using these features. We train our model on the Silver Futures Contract listed on Shanghai Futures Exchange and achieve an accuracy of 0.601 on predicting the directional change during the selected period. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2203.12457&r= |
| By: | Yusuke Kamishiro; Rajiv Vohra; Roberto Serrano |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a noncooperative approach to core stability in an economy with incomplete information. The analysis covers general exchange economies, although our tightest results hold when effective coalitions consist of at most two players, as in matching. We study the perfect Bayesian equilibria of an extensive form mechanism that extends the one used by Serrano and Vohra (1997) to implement the core of a complete information economy. This leads to a version of the core that we refer to as the sequential core, which allows for information to be transmitted among the agents during the process of coalition formation. Such information flows include proposals that can be viewed as signaling devices and/or screening contracts. The same result is obtained in a model of infinite-horizon coalitional bargaining for stationary PBE. Equilibrium refinements are then used to provide justifications for the coarse core and the fine core. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2022-001&r= |