|
on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Meg Adachi-Sato (School of Economics, Finance, and Marketing RMIT University, AUSTRALIA and Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how a socially and environmentally aware firm principal can motivate a profit-oriented manager to pursue environmental, social and governance (ESG) outcomes by adjusting the length and timing of wage contracts. In the model, the manager produces a verifiable output that is detrimental to ESG, but also engages in an unverifiable output that reduces ESG costs. The optimal arrangements are a short-term contract if the unverifiable output reduces ESG costs, and a long-term contract if it does not. The paper also demon-strates how social impact bonds can be more effective than short-term debt to finance social programs. |
| Keywords: | Socially responsible investment; ESG; Multitask; Hold-up; Incomplete contracts; Social impact bonds; Sustainability-linked bonds |
| JEL: | D86 G11 G23 M12 M14 |
| Date: | 2021–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2021-14&r= |
| By: | Bena, Jan (University of British Columbia); Erel, Isil (Ohio State University and European Corporate Governance Institute); Wang, Daisy (Ohio State University); Weisbach, Michael S. (Ohio State University and European Corporate Governance Institute) |
| Abstract: | Inducing firms to make specialized investments through bilateral contracts can be challenging because of potential holdup problems. Such contracting difficulties have long been argued to be an important reason for acquisitions. To evaluate the extent to which this motivation leads to mergers, we perform a textual analysis of the patents filed by the same lead inventors of the target firms before and after the mergers. We find that patents of inventors from target firms become 28.9% to 46.8% more specific to those of acquirers’ inventors following completed mergers, benchmarked against patents filed by targets and a group of counterfactual acquirers. This pattern is stronger for vertical mergers that are likely to require specialized investments. There is no change in the specificity of patents for mergers that are announced but not consummated. Overall, we provide empirical evidence that contracting issues in motivating specialized investment can be a motive for acquisitions. |
| JEL: | G34 L14 L22 |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2021-13&r= |
| By: | Meg Adachi-Sato (Faculty of Business Administration and Accountancy, Khon Kaen University, THAILAND and Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how a socially and environmentally aware firm principal can motivate a profit-oriented manager to pursue environmental, social and governance (ESG) outcomes. In the model, the manager produces a verifiable output that is detrimental to ESG, but also engages in an unverifiable output that promotes ESG. I show that an ex-post bargaining contract is preferred to an ex-ante commitment contract if the unverifiable output substantially improves ESG or if there is a large negative externality. The paper also demonstrates how social impact bonds can be more effective than short-term debt to finance social programs. |
| Keywords: | Socially responsible investment; ESG; Multitask; Hold-up; Incomplete contracts; Social impact bonds; Sustainability-linked bonds |
| JEL: | D86 G11 G23 M12 M14 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2021-20&r= |
| By: | Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth |
| Abstract: | We study how workers’ concern for coworkers’ ability (CfCA) affects competition in the labor market. We consider two firms offering nonlinear contracts to a unit mass of prospective workers. Firms may differ in their marginal productivity, while workers are heterogeneous in their ability (high or low), and in their taste for being employed by any of the two firms. Workers receive a utility premium when employed by the firm hiring the workforce with larger average ability and they suffer a utility loss in the opposite case. These premiums/losses are endogenously determined. When workers’ ability is observable and the difference in firms’ marginal productivities is strictly positive, we show that CfCA increases surplus but it also increases firms’ competition for high-ability workers. As a result, CfCA benefits high-ability workers but is detrimental to firms. In addition, CfCA exacerbates the existing distortion in sorting of high-ability workers to firms: too many workers are hired by the least efficient firm. When ability is not observable, the additional surplus appropriated by high-ability workers is eroded by overincentivization (countervailing incentives) and the more so when CfCA is high. Conversely, high-types’sorting improves when CfCA is low and remains the same when it is high. |
| Keywords: | Concern for Coworkers' Quality; Competition; Screening; Sorting |
| Date: | 2021–11–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:126143&r= |
| By: | Giovanni Dosi; Elisa Palagi; Andrea Roventini; Emanuele Russo |
| Abstract: | The role of the patent system in the pharmaceutical sector is highly debated also due to its strong public health implications. In this paper we develop an evolutionary, agent-based model of the pharmaceutical industry to explore the impact of different configurations of the patent system upon innovation and competition. The model is able to replicate the main stylized facts of the drug industry as emergent properties. We perform policy experiments to assess the impact of different IPR regimes changing the breadth and length of patents. Results suggest that enlarging the extent and duration of patents yields adverse effects in terms of innovation outcomes, as well as of market competition and consumer welfare. Such general conclusions hold even if one takes into account the possible positive effects on R&D intensity and information disclosure triggered by patents. |
| Keywords: | Innovation; Intellectual property rights; Market power; Pharmaceutical sector; Agent-based models. |
| Date: | 2021–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2021/37&r= |