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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Clare Leaver (Blavatnik School of Government University College); Owen Ozier (Williams College); Pieter Serneels (University of East Anglia); Andrew Zeitlin (Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a pay-for-percentile or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection. |
| Keywords: | pay-for-performance, selection, incentives, teachers, field experiment |
| JEL: | C93 I21 J45 M52 O15 |
| Date: | 2021–01–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2021-04&r=all |
| By: | Alexander Karaivanov (Simon Fraser University) |
| Abstract: | I map the link between financial contracts and the algorithmic tools and constraints of blockchain technology related to property rights, information, commitment, and enforcement. I describe and formalize the microfoundations and possible use of blockchains as direct conduit for implementing financial contracts in incomplete markets settings and as collateral mechanism for on- and off-chain transactions and contracts. |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sfu:sfudps:dp21-03&r=all |
| By: | Toptancı, Ali İskan |
| Abstract: | A production sharing agreement is a contract that regulates the relations between an oil-producing country and an international oil company, or between a national oil company and an international oil company. An international oil company bears all petroleum operating expenses and in return covers the cost value and its shares and expenses from oil production. An oil-producing country receives its share of oil production and receives taxes. Iraq signed oil sharing agreements with West Al Qurna, a Russian oil company, in 2007 and 2008 to develop an oil field. The Kurdistan Region has used production sharing agreements with international oil companies by the Kurdistan Region Oil and Gas Law No. 28 2007. This was done although the oil contracts were not recognized by the Iraqi federal governments. The Kurdistan Region Administration claimed that such oil contracts encourage and attract international investments in the Kurdistan Region and that these agreements have legitimacy according to Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution. Article 112 gives the Kurdistan Regional Government the right to oil contracts with international oil companies. International oil companies carry the most risk in production sharing contracts, but oil contracts are also more suitable for them. Because these contracts provide a framework for maximum recovery and oil production. In the Kurdistan Region, oil contracts have become a political issue rather than a legal and economic problem between the Kurdistan Region and Iraq. The study shows that production sharing agreements are more attractive than Iraqi oil contracts for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Therefore, international oil companies demand to invest more in the Kurdistan Region. In this case, there are some disadvantages. International oil companies generally have more control over setting contract terms. They can negotiate long-term and broad contract terms against oil-producing countries. |
| Keywords: | Kurdistan Region,Oil Sharing Contracts,Oil |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esrepo:230888&r=all |