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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Peter M. DeMarzo; Ron Kaniel |
| Abstract: | We consider multi-agent multi-firm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to a weighted average of their peers, where weights may vary within and across firms. Despite common shocks, compensation benchmarking can undo performance benchmarking, so that wages load positively rather than negatively on peer output. Although contracts appear inefficient, when a single principal commits to a public contract, the optimal contract hedges agents’ relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. Moreover, the principal can exploit any asymmetries in peer effects to enhance profits. With multiple principals, or a principal that is unable to commit, a “rat race” emerges in which agents are more productive, but wages increase even more, reducing profits and undermining efficiency. Effort levels are too high rather than too low, and can exceed first best. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects. |
| JEL: | D85 D86 G3 G4 J3 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28378&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Fahn; Giorgio Zanarone |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using “subjective performance evaluation”). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an “envy premium”. This premium reduces the value of the employment relationship to the organization, and thus its incentive to pay subjective bonuses to the hard-working employees. To restore credibility of its incentive system, a transparent organization must therefore reduce the weight of bonuses, and increase the weight of fixed salaries, in the employees’ compensation, relative to organizations that operate in a more conventional “pay secrecy” regime. Second, we show that transparency enables the employees to collectively sanction the organization for reneging on subjective incentives. Collective enforcement allows the transparent organization to use strong employment relationships to “cross-subsidize” weak ones, achieving a more balanced allocation of effort than under pay secrecy. We discuss testable implications of our model for compensation design, the choice between transparency and secrecy regimes, and organizational responses to pay transparency laws. |
| Keywords: | social comparisons, secrecy, transparency, relational contracts, incentives |
| JEL: | D03 D23 M52 M54 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8849&r=all |
| By: | Petar Jevtic; Nicolas Lanchier |
| Abstract: | Smart contract risk can be defined as a financial risk of loss due to cyber attacks on or contagious failures of smart contracts. Its quantification is of paramount importance to technology platform providers as well as companies and individuals when considering the deployment of this new technology. That is why, as our primary contribution, we propose a structural framework of aggregate loss distribution for smart contract risk under the assumption of a tree-stars graph topology representing the network of interactions among smart contracts and their users. Up to our knowledge, there exist no theoretical frameworks or models of an aggregate loss distribution for smart contracts in this setting. To achieve our goal, we contextualize the problem in the probabilistic graph-theoretical framework using bond percolation models. We assume that the smart contract network topology is represented by a random tree graph of finite size, and that each smart contract is the center of a {random} star graph whose leaves represent the users of the smart contract. We allow for heterogeneous loss topology superimposed on this smart contract and user topology and provide analytical results and instructive numerical examples. |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2101.08964&r=all |
| By: | Aifan Ling; Jianjun Miao; Neng Wang |
| Abstract: | We study how investors' preferences for robustness influence corporate investment, financing, and compensation decisions and valuation in a financial contracting model with agency. We characterize the robust contract and show that early liquidation can be optimal when investors are sufficiently ambiguity averse. We implement the robust contract by debt, equity, cash, and a financial derivative asset. The derivative is used to hedge against the investors' concern that the entrepreneur may be overly optimistic. Our calibrated model generates sizable equity premium and credit spread, and implies that ambiguity aversion lowers Tobin's q; the average investment, and investment volatility. The entrepreneur values the project at an internal rate of return of 3.5% per annum higher than investors do. |
| JEL: | D81 E22 G12 G32 J33 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28367&r=all |
| By: | Luis Aguiar (UZH - University of Zürich [Zürich]); Philippe Gagnepain (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We attempt to identify and measure potential knowledge spillovers in the French urban transport sector, which is strongly regulated and where a few large corporations are in charge of operating several urban networks simultaneously. We build and estimate a structural cost model where the service is regulated by a local government and is provided by a single operator. Knowledge spillovers are directly linked to the know-how of a specific corporation, but they also depend on the incentive power of the regulatory contract which shapes the effort of the local managers. Exerting an effort in a specific network allows a cost reduction in this network, but it also benefit other networks that are members of the same corporation. Our model provides us with estimates of the operators' absorptive capacity, which is their in-house knowledge power in order to optimally benefit from spillovers. We find that diversity of knowledge across operators of a same corporation improves absorptive capacity and increases the flow of spillovers. Simulation exercises provide evidence of significant reductions in total operating cost following the enlargement of industrial groups. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge spillovers,Absorptive capacity,Cost incentives,Effort,Diversity of knowledge,Public transport |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03110851&r=all |
| By: | Peter G. Hansen |
| Abstract: | I introduce novel preference formulations which capture aversion to ambiguity about unknown and potentially time-varying volatility. I compare these preferences with Gilboa and Schmeidler's maxmin expected utility as well as variational formulations of ambiguity aversion. The impact of ambiguity aversion is illustrated in a simple static model of portfolio choice, as well as a dynamic model of optimal contracting under repeated moral hazard. Implications for investor beliefs, optimal design of corporate securities, and asset pricing are explored. |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2101.12306&r=all |