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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University); Thommes, Kirsten (University of Paderborn); Tilkes, Katja Rebecca (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally analyze whether the opportunity to receive a permanent contract motivates temporary group members in a public good setting and how this affects the other group members. We compare an exogenous and an endogenous decision mechanism to extend the temporary agent's group membership. The exogenous mechanism to extend the contract is modeled by a random draw. In the endogenous setting, one other group member decides about the temporary agent's future group membership. Our results reveal that both — the decision to extend a contract and the decision mechanism itself — affect not only the temporary group member's effort but also the efforts of the permanent group members and, ultimately, also cooperation within the group after the decision has been made. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, experiments, groups, public good games, teams, temporary employment |
| JEL: | C9 M5 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12513&r=all |
| By: | Albrecht, James (Georgetown University); Cai, Xiaoming (Tongji University); Gautier, Pieter A. (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Vroman, Susan (Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of equilibria of which only one is socially efficient. In the inefficient equilibria, firms have market power that arises from the fact that the value of a worker’s application portfolio depends on what other firms offer, which allows individual firms to free ride and offer workers less than their marginal contribution. Finally, by allowing for general mechanisms, we are able to examine the sources of inefficiency in the multiple applications literature. |
| Keywords: | multiple applications, directed search, competing mechanisms, efficiency, market power |
| JEL: | C78 D44 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12512&r=all |
| By: | Nikolchenko, N. |
| Abstract: | Research attention is increasingly focused on inter-organizational relationships, that reveals in growing studies in management, particularly supply chain management. The terms collaboration, cooperation and coordination are used for qualifying inter-organizational relationships. The form of relationships between supply chain members must also match the task at hand. If the type of relationships does not match performance requirements, then such relationships become dysfunctional. The research reviews existing literature on collaboration, cooperation and coordination in supply chains and to define the differences between them, to formulate definitions of supply chain collaboration, cooperation and coordination. |
| Keywords: | supply chain, performance, collaboration, coordination, coordinating contract, |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sps:wpaper:16080&r=all |