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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Fulvio Castellacci (TIK Centre, University of Oslo); Clara Viñas-Bardolet (TIK Centre, University of Oslo) |
| Abstract: | Temporary contracts are increasingly used in academia. This is a major concern for non-tenured researchers, since weak job security may hamper job satisfaction. In spite of the relevance of this topic, scholarly research on the theme is scant. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the role of academic tenure for job satisfaction of researchers in European countries. The work uses data from the MORE2 survey, a recent large-scale representative survey of researchers in all European countries. The results show that, ceteris paribus, academics with a permanent contract are on average more satisfied with their job than those that are employed on a temporary basis. We also show that academic tenure is a relatively more important factor of job satisfaction for researchers at an intermediate stage of the career. Finally, we point out some important differences in the working of the model among European countries. Our hypotheses receive significant empirical support for the groups of Continental EU and Nordic economies, which combine high job satisfaction and good working conditions, on the one hand, with relatively weak job security for younger academics, on the other. |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tik:inowpp:20181008&r=cta |
| By: | Jessica Martin (INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées, IMT - Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse UMR5219 - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UPS - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - PRES Université de Toulouse - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Anthony Réveillac (INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées, IMT - Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse UMR5219 - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - UT2J - Université Toulouse - Jean Jaurès - UPS - Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - PRES Université de Toulouse - INSA Toulouse - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Toulouse - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we provide a new approach to tackle the Principal-Agent Risk-Sharing problem using optimal stochastic control technics. Our analysis relies on an optimal decomposition of the expected utility of the Principal in terms of the reservation utility of the Agent. In particular, this allows us to derive the Borch rule as a necessary optimality condition for this decomposition to hold, which sheds a new light on this economic concept. As a by-product, this approach provides a class of risk-sharing plans that satisfy the Borch rule; class to which the optimal plan belongs. |
| Keywords: | Principal Agent problem,Risk-Sharing,Borch rule,Reverse Hölder inequality,Optimal Contracting Theory |
| Date: | 2018–09–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01874707&r=cta |
| By: | Marina Halac; Ilan Kremer; Eyal Winter |
| Abstract: | A rm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the rm offers payments contingent on success. We study the rm's optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the rm the maximum payoff. This scheme pays investors differential net returns (per unit of capital) depending on the size of their investments. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the rm's payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality. |
| Keywords: | mechanism design, contracting with externalities, collective action problem, strategic complementarities, unique implementation |
| JEL: | D86 G24 L24 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lan:wpaper:245773051&r=cta |
| By: | Pascale Phelinas (CESSMA UMRD 245 - Centre d'études en sciences sociales sur les mondes africains, américains et asiatiques - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Inalco - Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7); Johanna Choumert (EDI - Economic Development Initiatives - Economic Development Initiatives [EDI]) |
| Date: | 2018–09–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:ird-01875351&r=cta |