nep-cta New Economics Papers
on Contract Theory and Applications
Issue of 2018‒07‒23
two papers chosen by
Guillem Roig
University of Melbourne

  1. Product innovation by supplying in domestic and foreign markets By Bratti, Massimiliano; Felice, Giulia
  2. Public Procurement and Reputation: An Agent-Based Model By Nadia Fiorino; Emma Galli; Ilde Rizzo; Marco Valente

  1. By: Bratti, Massimiliano (European Commission – JRC); Felice, Giulia (Politecnico di Milano)
    Abstract: This paper uses European firm-level survey data to provide some robust empirical evidence that suppliers engaged in production to order (PTO) for foreign firms are more likely to introduce product innovations than those engaged in PTO for domestic firms, even when differences in size, R&D and productivity are controlled for. We propose a demand-driven theoretical explanation based on the interactions between an upstream producer of a specialized input and a downstream producer in a framework of incomplete contracts, agency frictions, and imperfect information.
    Keywords: buyer, supplier, product innovation, production to order, foreign market
    JEL: D21 D22 F21 L23 O31
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrs:wpaper:201803&r=cta
  2. By: Nadia Fiorino; Emma Galli; Ilde Rizzo; Marco Valente
    Abstract: Based on the literature on public procurement regulation, we use an Agent-Based Model to assess the performance of different selection procedures. Specifically, we aim at investigating whether and how the inclusion of reputation of firms in the public procurement selection process affects the final cost of the contract. The model defines two types of actors: i) firms potentially competing to win the contract; ii) a contracting authority, aiming at minimizing procurement costs. These actors respond to environmental conditions affecting the actual costs of carrying on the project and unknown to firms at the time of bidding and to the contracting authority. The results from the model are generated through simulations by considering different congurations and varying some parameters of the model, such as the firms' skills, the level of opportunistic rebate, the relative weight of reputation and rebate. The main conclusion is that reputation matters and some policy implications are drawn.
    Keywords: Public works; Procurement; Agent-based modelling
    Date: 2018–06–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2018/18&r=cta

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