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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Addison, John T. (University of South Carolina); Teixeira, Paulino (University of Coimbra); Grunau, Philipp (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung); Bellmann, Lutz (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the potential impact of works councils and unions on the deployment of fixed-term contracts and agency temps. We report inter al. that works councils are associated with a higher number of temporary agency workers when demand volatility is high while the opposite holds for fixed-term contracts. These disparities likely reflect differences in function, with agency work being more directed toward the protection of a shrinking core and fixed-term contacts being as much a port of entry as a buffer stock. We are also able to identify the number of new hires with a fixed-term contract as well as the number of FTC conversions (into regular employment) and renewals, the correlates of which flows are broadly consistent with the stock data. |
| Keywords: | agency temps, fixed-term contracts, stepping stones, buffer stocks, labor market duality, extensive/intensive margins, works councils, unions, collective bargaining, demand volatility, complementarity, Germany |
| JEL: | J21 J23 J41 J J51 J63 K31 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11378&r=cta |
| By: | Oleg Malafeyev; Olga Koroleva; Dmitriy Prusskiy; Olga Zenovich |
| Abstract: | The main purpose of this paper is to formalize the modelling process, analysis and mathematical definition of corruption when entering into a contract between principal agent and producers. The formulation of the problem and the definition of concepts for the general case are considered. For definiteness, all calculations and formulas are given for the case of three producers, one principal agent and one intermediary. Economic analysis of corruption allowed building a mathematical model of interaction between agents. Financial resources distribution problem in a contract with a corrupted intermediary is considered.Then proposed conditions for corruption emergence and its possible consequences. Optimal non-corruption schemes of financial resources distribution in a contract are formed, when principal agent's choice is limited first only by asymmetrical information and then also by external influences.Numerical examples suggesting optimal corruption-free agents' behaviour are presented. |
| Date: | 2018–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1804.02333&r=cta |
| By: | Nguyen-Ones, Mai (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Steen, Frode (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | Applying detailed consecutive daily micro data at the gasoline station level from Sweden we estimate a structural model to uncover the degree of competition in the gasoline retail market. We find that retailers do exercise market power, but despite the high upstream concentration, the market power is very limited on the downstream level. The degree of market power varies with both the distance to the nearest station and the local density of gasoline stations. A higher level of service tends to raise a seller’s market power; self-service stations have close to no market power. Contractual form and brand identity also seem to matter. We find a clear result: local station characteristics significantly affect the degree of market power. Our results indicate that local differences in station characteristics can more than offset the average market Power found for the whole market. |
| Keywords: | Gasoline markets; market Power; markup estimation; local market competition |
| JEL: | D22 L13 L25 L81 |
| Date: | 2018–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2018_006&r=cta |