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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Lindbeck, Assar (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Weibull, Jörgen (Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We analyze investment decisions when information is costly, with and without delegation to an agent. We use a rational-inattention model and compare it with a canonical signal-extraction model. We identify three "investment conditions". In "sour" conditions, no information is acquired and no investment made. In "sweet" conditions, investment is made "blindly", i.e. without acquiring costly information. In intermediate, "normal" conditions, the decision-maker acquires information and conditions the investment decision upon the information obtained. We investigate if the investor can benefit from employing an agent when the agent's effort and information is private. Not even in the case of a risk neutral agent will the principal perfectly align the agent's incentives with her own at the moment of investment (had the principal known the agent's private information). Optimal contracts for risk neutral agents not only reward good investments but also punishes bad investments. Such contracts include three components: a fixed salary, stocks and options. |
| Keywords: | Investment; Rational inattention; Signal Extraction; Principal-agent; Information aquisition; Contract; Bonus; Penalty |
| JEL: | D01 D82 D86 G11 G23 G30 |
| Date: | 2017–05–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1171&r=cta |
| By: | Thibaut Mastrolia (CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées - Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study moral hazard problems in contract theory by adding an exogenous Planner to manage the actions of Agents hired by a Principal. We provide conditions ensuring that Pareto optima exist for the Agents using the scalarization method associated with the multi-objective optimization problem and we solve the problem of the Principal by finding optimal remunerations given to the Agents. We illustrate our study with a linear-quadratic model by comparing the results obtained when we add a Planner in the Principal/multi-Agents problem with the results obtained in the classical second-best case. More particularly in this example, we give necessary and sufficient conditions ensuring that Pareto optima are Nash equilibria and we prove that the Principal takes the benefit of the action of the Planner in some cases. |
| Keywords: | multi-objective optimization problems,BSDE,Moral hazard,Nash equilibrium,Pareto efficiency |
| Date: | 2017–04–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01504473&r=cta |