nep-cta New Economics Papers
on Contract Theory and Applications
Issue of 2016‒11‒13
two papers chosen by
Guillem Roig
University of Melbourne

  1. Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems By Lazarova, E.A.; Borm, Peter; Estevez, Arantza
  2. The importance of institutional and organizational characteristics for the use of fixed-term and agency work contracts in Russia By Smirnych, L. I.; Wörgötter, Andreas

  1. By: Lazarova, E.A. (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Borm, Peter (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management); Estevez, Arantza
    Abstract: In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by monetary reward functions. We characterize Pareto optimal matchings by means of contractual exchange stability and matchings of maximum total reward by means of compensational exchange stability. To conclude, we show that in going from an initial matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in the sense that there will be no subset of agents who can all by deviation obtain a higher reward. The proof of this result uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty.
    Date: 2016
  2. By: Smirnych, L. I.; Wörgötter, Andreas
    Abstract: Non-renewable fixed-term and agency work contracts are becoming more used instead of the traditional Russian model of open-ended employment. The authors examine the influence of institutional and organizational factors on the use of two forms of non-standard work contracts in Russia with data from a Survey covering 3313 enterprises for the years 2009 to 2011. Probit and Tobit regressions are used to test several hypotheses about the use of non-standard work contracts derived from the literature. The results indicate that state-owned and unionized enterprises are more likely to use fixed-term contracts; and a high level of perceived dismissal protection for permanent workers is positively associated with fixed-term contracts use. The incidence and intensity of fixed-term and agency work contracts are lower at enterprises with flexible wages. A significant impact of organizational factors is confirmed only for fixed-term contracts. Enterprises use less fixed-term contracts, if they have workers with tenure from 5 to 10 years and high job complexity.
    Keywords: fixed-term contracts,agency work,non-standard employment,labor flexibility,Russia
    JEL: J41 J21 J63 J23
    Date: 2016

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