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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Stefan Terstiege |
| Abstract: | I consider a situation, where the agent can acquire payoff-relevant information either before or after the contract is signed. To raise efficiency, the principal might solicit information; to retain all surplus, however, she must prevent precontractual information gathering. The following class of stochastic contracts may solve this trade-off optimally: before signing, information acquisition is not solicited, and afterwards randomly. The key insight is that randomization makes precontractual information costlier for the agent. |
| Keywords: | Information acquisition, Principal-agent, Mechanism design, Randomization |
| JEL: | D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse07_2011&r=cta |
| By: | Berliant, Marcus; Yu, Chia-Ming |
| Abstract: | Canonical analysis of the classical general equilibrium model demonstrates the existence of an open and dense subset of standard economies that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria. This paper shows that the analogous result is not true in urban economies under appropriate modifications for this field. An open subset of economies where none of the modified rational expectations equilibria fully reveals private information is found. There are two important pieces. First, there can be information about a location known by a consumer who does not live in that location in equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium rent does not reflect this information. Second, if a consumer’s utility depends only on information about their (endogenous) location of residence, perturbations of utility naturally do not incorporate information about other locations conditional on the consumer’s location of residence. Existence of equilibrium is proved. Space can prevent housing prices from transmitting information from informed to uninformed households, resulting in an inefficient outcome. |
| Keywords: | Urban Economics; General Equilibrium; Private Information; Rational Expectations |
| JEL: | R13 D82 D51 |
| Date: | 2012–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37121&r=cta |
| By: | Anne Opschoor (Erasmus University Rotterdam and the Tinbergen Institute); Michel van der Wel (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, ERIM and CREATES); Dick van Dijk (Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute and ERIM.); Nick Taylor (Cardiff Business School) |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of private information on volatility. We develop a comprehensive framework to investigate this link while controlling for the effects of both public information (such as macroeconomic news releases) and private information on prices and the effect of public information on volatility. Using high-frequency 30-year U.S. Treasury bond futures data, we find that private information, measured by order flow, is statistically and economically significant for explaining volatility. Private information is more important than public information, with the effect of an order flow shock on volatility being 18% larger than the effect of the most influential macroeconomic announcement. |
| Keywords: | Information, order flow, macroeconomic announcements, Treasury futures. |
| JEL: | G14 E44 |
| Date: | 2012–02–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:create:2012-08&r=cta |
| By: | Maasland, E. (Tilburg University) |
| Abstract: | Auction theory is a branch of game theory that considers human behavior in auction markets and the ensuing market outcomes. It is also successfully used as a tool to design real-life auctions. This thesis contains five essays addressing a variety of topics within the realm of auction theory. The first essay gives an easily accessible overview of the most important insights of auction theory. The second essay, motivated by the UMTS-auctions that took place in Europe, studies auctions in which, in contrast to standard auction theory, losing bidders benefit from a high price paid by the winner(s). Under this assumption, the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are no longer revenue equivalent. The third essay analyzes how well different kinds of auctions are able to raise money for charity. It turns out that standard winner-pay auctions are inept fund-raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another’s high bid. As this problem does not occur in all-pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win or lose, all-pay auctions are more effective in raising money. The fourth essay studies a particular auction type, a so-called simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists, that has been used for example in the Netherlands and Ireland to auction available spectrum. The results in this essay show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium. The fifth essay argues that inefficient auction outcomes due to strong negative (informational) externalities (created by post-auction interactions) can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-5242208&r=cta |