nep-cse New Economics Papers
on Economics of Strategic Management
Issue of 2024‒06‒24
six papers chosen by
João José de Matos Ferreira, Universidade da Beira Interior


  1. MNE Spillovers and Local Export Dynamics in China: The Role of Relatedness and Forward-Backward Linkages By Yibo Qiao; Nicola Cortinovis; Andrea Morrison;
  2. Inventor Mobility, Knowledge Diffusion, and Growth By Koike Yasutaka-Mori; Toshitaka Maruyama; Koki Okumura
  3. Business groups, strategic acquisitions and innovation By Carlo Altomonte; Nevine El-Mallakh; Tommaso Sonno
  4. Innovation and Intellectual Property Use in the Global Video Game Industry By Prince C. Oguguo
  5. The role of asymmetric innovation’s sizes in technology licensing under partial vertical integration By Sánchez, Mariola; Nerja, Adrian
  6. CEO turnover risk and firm environmental performance By Giulio Cornelli; Magdalena Erdem; Egon Zakrajsek

  1. By: Yibo Qiao; Nicola Cortinovis; Andrea Morrison;
    Abstract: This article investigates how MNEs influence the export behavior of domestic firms in the context of China. We conceptually disentangle different MNE spillovers related to local export dynamics, linking in a unique framework specific spillover mechanisms, channels, activation conditions and type of knowledge conveyed. Empirically, our analysis relies on a panel dataset containing all Chinese manufacturing firms in the period 2000-2007. The results show that relatedness linkages matter in the context of export quantity, while forward-backward linkages matter for the sophistication of export. These findings suggest that relatedness linkages convey mainly marketing-related knowledge spillovers, while forward-backward linkages are diffusing mainly product-related knowledge spillovers.
    Keywords: Relatedness, forward-backward linkages, multinational enterprises, export, innovation, China
    Date: 2024–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2415&r=
  2. By: Koike Yasutaka-Mori; Toshitaka Maruyama; Koki Okumura
    Abstract: This paper develops an endogenous growth model that incorporates a frictional inventor market and examines the allocation of inventors across firms, knowledge diffusion, and its impact on growth. In our model, inventors play dual roles: they engage in in-house R&D and transfer knowledge from previous employers to new ones when changing jobs. Using an administrative panel dataset on German inventors matched to their employing establishments and patents, we find that, relative to general workers, inventors are more likely to transition to less productive establishments and suffer a higher wage growth via the transition. We also find that the knowledge base of establishments measured by patents grows faster when a significant proportion of their inventors originate from establishments possessing a larger knowledge base. We then calibrate the model to reflect these empirical findings and examine the effects of innovation policy. While subsidies to frontier firms discourage knowledge diffusion from these firms to technologically lagging firms, these subsidies also encourage innovation within frontier firms. The former negative effect dominates in the short term, but the latter positive effect dominates in the long run.
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1244&r=
  3. By: Carlo Altomonte; Nevine El-Mallakh; Tommaso Sonno
    Abstract: We build a novel worldwide database merging information on patent-citations of firms paired with information on firms' affiliation to Business Groups (BGs). We exploit these data to document how BGs appropriate knowledge through standalone firm acquisition. First, we confirm that innovative standalone firms have a higher probability of becoming part of a BG. Second, we document how BGs tend to acquire firms that are on an upward trend in patents and citations. We also show that innovating activity significantly deteriorates post-acquisition, particularly for firms with high-quality, cited patents. Third, we show that such a deterioration in innovation activity is driven by acquired firms patenting within the same technological classes of the acquiring BG, while the latter does not hold for acquired firms patenting in different technologies than the BG's. We also find that acquisitions occurring in environments characterized by higher market concentration and more mature leading firms are associated with a relatively more pronounced reduction in innovation. These results generalize the defensive acquisition narrative, suggesting that BGs leverage these transactions as a strategic manoeuvre to solidify their market position in the face of potential competition.
    Keywords: business groups, innovation
    Date: 2024–04–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1996&r=
  4. By: Prince C. Oguguo
    Abstract: This paper is an analysis of the evolution of the global video game industry, a sector characterized by rapid technological innovation and changing business models. It builds on the work of Ozalp (2024) and delves into how innovation in hardware, software, digital transformation and business models have redefined the boundaries of game development and player experiences. The paper also explores the important job roles in the industry, the role of intellectual property and end with predictions for the future of the industry. It aims to provide an accessible understanding of the industry's evolution, its current state, and its potential future directions.
    Keywords: Innovation, Video Games, Intellectual property, Technology
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:85&r=
  5. By: Sánchez, Mariola; Nerja, Adrian
    Abstract: In this paper, we compare the scenarios of exclusive licenses and cross-licenses under the existence of partial vertical integration. To do this, a successive duopoly model is proposed, with two owners and two firms competing in a differentiated product market. Each technology owner has a share in one of the competing firms, so that competition is also extended to the upstream R&D sector. We propose a novel analysis where differences in the size of their innovation process are allowed, extending the results in Sánchez et al. (2021). We find that the cross-licensing scenario is preferred when the size of the innovation is small; this occurs regardless of the participation in the competing companies and how many innovate. If the innovation is very large, the owners may be better off with exclusive licenses.
    Keywords: Patent Licensing; Exclusive licenses; Market for technology; Asymmetric innovation
    JEL: L13 L24 O33
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120829&r=
  6. By: Giulio Cornelli; Magdalena Erdem; Egon Zakrajsek
    Abstract: We investigate the relationship between the probability of a CEO forced-turnover and firm performance on several environmental dimensions. Our findings suggest that a higher risk of being terminated for the CEO is correlated with a lower environmental ranking, particularly on environmental innovation activities, and more ESG controversies for the firm. The inclusion of ESG-pay clauses in executives' compensation packages only marginally offsets such deterioration. Looking at data on Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, we consistently find that a rise in the probability of being terminated corresponds to an increase in scope 2 and 3 emissions ("carbon leakeage"), whereas scope 1 emissions remain unchanged. Through an instrumental variable approach, we trace the deterioration of firms' ESG controversies- and environmental innovation scores to a strategical re-orientation towards short-terminism.
    Keywords: corporate finance, ESG, emissions, environmental innovation, short-terminism
    JEL: D22 G30 G34 O31 Q55
    Date: 2024–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bis:biswps:1190&r=

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