|
on Economics of Strategic Management |
Issue of 2008‒07‒05
ten papers chosen by Joao Jose de Matos Ferreira University of the Beira Interior |
By: | Marcus Wagner |
Abstract: | This paper analyses the link between sustainability-related innovation and sustainability performance and the role that family firms play in this. This theme is particular relevant from a European point of view given the large number of firms that are family-owned. Governments often support environmentally and socially beneficial innovation with various policy instruments with the intention is to increase international competitiveness and simultaneously support sustainable development. In parallel, firms use corporate social responsibility (CSR) and environmental management systems partly in the hope that this will foster such innovation in their organisation. Hence the main research question of this paper is about the association of CSR and environmental management with environmentally and socially beneficial innovation and its determinants. Based on panel data, the paper analyses the link of corporate sustainability performance with sustainability innovation and the effect of being a family firm using panel estimation techniques. The paper discusses the results of the analysis, which point to a moderating role of family firms on the link of sustainability innovation and performance and assesses the policy implications of this insight. |
Keywords: | sustainability, innovation, management, quantitative methods, family firms |
JEL: | C30 L73 Q25 |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2008-046&r=cse |
By: | Henrekson, Magnus (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Johansson, Dan (Ratio) |
Abstract: | High-growth firms (HGFs) are critical for net job creation and economic growth. We analyze HGFs using the theory of competence blocs, linking firm growth to property rights and the interaction of complementary expertise. Specifically, we discuss how the institutional framework affects the prevalence and performance of HGFs. Firm growth is viewed as resulting from the perpetual discovery and use of productive knowledge. A key element in this process is the competence bloc, a nexus of economic actors with complementary competencies that are vital in order to generate and commercialize novel ideas. The institutional framework determines the incentives for these individuals to acquire and utilize knowledge. We identify a number of institutions that foster the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. In particular, our analysis points to the pivotal roles played by tax structures, labor market regulation, and the contestability of currently closed service markets. Finally, we characterize institutions beneficial for sclerotic or dynamic capitalism, respectively, depending on whether they provide a favorable environment for the emergence of competence blocs and the creation of HGFs. |
Keywords: | Competence Bloc; Dynamic Capitalism; Entrepreneurship; Flyers; Gazelles; High-growth Firms; Industrial Policy; Innovation; Institutions; Labor Security; Product Market Regulations; Property Rights; Sclerotic Capitalism; Self-employment; Tax Policy |
JEL: | H32 L25 L50 M13 O31 P14 |
Date: | 2008–06–24 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0757&r=cse |
By: | Holmberg, Pär (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
Abstract: | Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers’ market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are substitutes). The optimal contracting level of a risk-neutral producer is determined by the extent to which strategies are substitutes and the slope of the residual demand in the forward market. Conditions under which strategies are substitutes are identified for a two-stage game with supply function competition and capacity constrained producers. |
Keywords: | Supply Function Equilibrium; Forward Market; Strategic Contracting; Arbitrage; Strategic Substitutes; Oligopoly; Electricity Market |
JEL: | C72 D43 D44 G13 L13 L94 |
Date: | 2008–06–24 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0756&r=cse |
By: | Bastian Westbrock |
Abstract: | Empirical work suggests that the network of research and development alliances is asymmetric, with a small number of firms involved in the majority of partnerships. This paper relates the structure of the collaboration network to a fundamental characteristic of the demand for research output: the benefits of knowledge accumulation create private and social incentives for a concentration of collaborative activities. I theoretically investigate the formation of bilateral collaborative links in two different industry settings, one socially managed, the other oligopolistic. I find that in both cases a concentrated network is the typical equilibrium structure as well as the socially efficient structure. |
Keywords: | R&D collaboration, market structure, networks |
JEL: | D43 D85 L13 |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0815&r=cse |
By: | Fernando Munoz-Bullon; Maria Jose Sanchez-Bueno |
Abstract: | The objective of this study is to examine the effect of downsizing on corporate performance, considering a sample of manufacturing firms drawn from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies during the 1993- 2005 period. No significant differences in post-downsizing performance arise between companies which downsize and those that do not. Likewise, we find that substantial workforce reductions through collective dismissals do not either lead to improved performance levels. Downsizing, therefore, may not be a way for managers to increase performance, particularly in a context like the Spanish one, where the labour market is characterized by a high protection of employees’ rights and substantial contract termination costs. |
Keywords: | Downsizing, Corporate performance, Spanish labour market |
JEL: | J21 J65 |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb083007&r=cse |
By: | Fernando Munoz-Bullon |
Abstract: | This contribution investigates why firms keep on downsizing once they have started to do so. From a theoretical standpoint, we develop economic and institutional explanations for explaining corporate downsizing duration. The empirical work is carried out applying event history techniques to a sample of manufacturing firms drawn from the Spanish Survey on Business Strategies from 1994 to 2005. Although results show support for persistence in downsizing over time, repeated personnel reductions is not a widespread tool in managing the workforce in this country. In addition, we find certain key corporate parameters such as profitability, temporality rate, size and employment termination costs (as well as market demand trends) to be important determinants of the continuation of on-going downsizing experiences. This is the first study on this issue using corporate-level data for Spain and multivariate methods. |
Keywords: | Downsizing duration, Spain, Organizational learning, Manufacturing firms, Temporary contracts, Employment termination costs |
JEL: | M54 J65 J21 |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:wbrepe:wb082805&r=cse |
By: | Tom Broekel (Department of Economic Geography, Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University, The Netherlands); Andreas Meder (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany) |
Abstract: | Studies analyzing the importance of intra- and inter-regional cooperation for regional innovation performance are mainly of qualitative nature and focus strongly on the positive effects that high levels of cooperation can yield. For the case of the German labor market regions and the Electrics + Electronics industry the paper provides a quantitative-empirical analysis taking into account the possibility of negative effects related to regional lock-in, lock-out, and cooperation overload situations. Using conditional nonparametric frontier techniques and cooperation behavior measures we ï¬nd positive as well as substantial negative effects of cooperation with the latter being induced by excessive and unbalanced cooperation behavior. |
Keywords: | regional innovation performance, cooperation, lock-out, lock-in, cooperation overload |
JEL: | R12 O18 O31 |
Date: | 2008–06–26 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-053&r=cse |
By: | Andreas Meder (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany) |
Abstract: | A key issue of different streams of economic literature is to determine the impact of certain dimensions of proximity on the cooperative behavior of actors and, thus, on interactive learning processes. This paper is a quantitative study on the impact of technological and geographical proximity on the choice of the cooperation partner. Patents that were filed for Germany in the years 1998 to 2003 are used to identify the impact of both dimensions of proximity as well as their interplay. It can be shown that an increasing proximity in either of these dimensions has an independent positive impact on the cooperation probability. |
Keywords: | cooperation, cognitive proximity, geographical proximity |
JEL: | C30 L14 O32 |
Date: | 2008–06–26 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-054&r=cse |
By: | Klaus Masuch (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Ramon Gómez-Salvador (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Nadine Leiner-Killinger (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Rolf Strauch (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Jarkko Turunen (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Melanie Ward-Warmedinger (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Jan De Mulder (Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique, Boulevard de Berlaimont 14, 1000 Brussels, Belgium.); Harald Stahl (Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Yvonne McCarthy (Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, Dame Street, Dublin 1, Ireland.); Daphne Nicolitsas (Bank of Greece, 21, E. Venizelos Avenue, 10250 Athens, Greece.); Aitor Lacuesta (Banco de España, Alcala 50, 28014 Madrid, Spain.); Mathilde Ravanel (Banque de France, 39, rue Croix-des Petits-Champs, 75049 Paris Cedex 01, France.); Piero Cipollone (Banca d'Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy.); Christelle Olsommer (Banque centrale du Luxembourg, 2 boulevard Royal, 2983 Luxembourg.); Alfred Stiglbauer (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Otto Wagner Platz 3, 1011 Wien, Austria.); Álvaro Novo (Banco de Portugal, 148, Rua do Comercio, 1101 Lisbon Codex, Portugal.); Klara Stovicek (Banka Slovenije, Slovenska 35, 1505 Ljubljana, Slovenia.); Heidi Schauman (Suomen Pankki - Finlands Bank, P.O. Box 160, 00101 Helsinki, Finland.); Almut Balleer; Kieran McQuinn (Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, Dame Street, Dublin 1, Ireland.); Pasqualino Montanaro (Banca d'Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy.); Alfonso Rosolia (Banca d'Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy.); Eliana Viviano (Banca d'Italia, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Rome, Italy.); Cláudia Filipa Duarte (Banco de Portugal, 148, Rua do Comercio, 1101 Lisbon Codex, Portugal.); Matija Vodopivec (Banka Slovenije, Slovenska 35, 1505 Ljubljana, Slovenia.) |
Abstract: | The aim of this report, which has been prepared by a Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Eurosystem, is to describe and analyse the main developments in labour supply and its determinants in the euro area, review the links between labour supply and labour market institutions, assess how well labour supply reflects the demand for labour in the euro area and identify the future challenges for policy-makers. The data available for this report generally cover the period from 1983 to spring 2007. JEL Classification: D02, P11, P16, C43, C61. |
Keywords: | Lisbon Strategy, economic governance, benchmarking, benefit of the doubt weighting. |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbops:20080085&r=cse |
By: | Demosthenes Ioannou (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Marien Ferdinandusse (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Marco Lo Duca (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Wouter Coussens (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.) |
Abstract: | This paper reviews the governance framework of the Lisbon Strategy and discusses the specific option of increasing the role of benchmarking as a means of improving the implementation record of structural reforms in the European Union. Against this background, the paper puts forward a possible avenue for developing a strong form of quantitative benchmarking, namely ranking. The ranking methodology relies on the construction of a synthetic indicator using the “benefit of the doubt” approach, which acknowledges differences in emphasis among Member States with regard to structural reform priorities. The methodology is applied by using the structural indicators that have been commonly agreed by the governments of the Member States, but could also be used for ranking exercises on the basis of other indicators. JEL Classification: E5, J1, J2, J6. |
Keywords: | Labour supply, employment, participation, hours worked, immigration, skill and education, structural policies, labour demand, unemployment, euro area countries, labour markets, taxes and benefi ts, childcare, pensions, training, human capital, labour quality, working time and contracts, discrimination, mismatch, returns to education. |
Date: | 2008–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbops:20080087&r=cse |