nep-cse New Economics Papers
on Economics of Strategic Management
Issue of 2008‒02‒23
nine papers chosen by
Joao Jose de Matos Ferreira
University of the Beira Interior

  1. Competitive intelligence and network mapping of interfirm alliances By Brigitte GAY (LEREPS-GRES & Toulouse Business School)
  2. When Clusters become Networks By Sandra Phlippen; Bert van der Knaap
  3. Hawks and doves in segmented markets : A formal approach to competitive aggressiveness By Claude d’Aspremont; Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira; Jacques Thépot
  4. Product innovation and imitation in a duopoly with differentiation by attributes By Reynald-Alexandre Laurent
  5. How Banking Competition Changed over Time By Jacob A. Bikker; Laura Spierdijk
  6. Agglomeration Externalities, Innovation and Regional Growth: Theoretical Perspectives and Meta-Analysis By Henri L.F. de Groot; Jacques Poot; Martijn J. Smit
  7. Chile : a strategy to promote innovative small and medium enterprises By Palladini, Eric; Goldberg , Mike
  8. Restructuring of Energy-intensive Industrial Branches in Romania and Proposals for Industrial Policy Measures By Gábor Hunya; Waltraut Urban
  9. PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ARE INFRASTRUCTURES RESPONDING TO THE NEW ODA STRATEGY By Argentino Pessoa

  1. By: Brigitte GAY (LEREPS-GRES & Toulouse Business School)
    Abstract: In many industries, networks, rather than firms, have become the organizing level at which firms compete with each other. One role of competitive intelligence is to help firms understand their global environment as well as master their position in a number of industrial sectors. The pertinence of a firm strategy and position in the different segments it is involved in, can be analyzed by mapping the complex alliance networks that characterize industries today. These tools enable also a tech watch of individual, highly innovative, sectors as well as understand the links between countries and the positions of the nations themselves in the global environment.
    Keywords: Alliance, network, mapping, biotechnology, competition
    JEL: L14 O3
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2008-05&r=cse
  2. By: Sandra Phlippen (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Bert van der Knaap (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: Policy makers spend large amounts of public resources on the foundation of science parks and other forms of geographically clustered business activities, in order to stimulate regional innovation. Underlying the relation between clusters and innovation is the assumption that co-located firms engaged in innovative activities benefit from knowledge that diffuses locally. In order to access this knowledge, firms are often required to form more- or less formal relations with co-located firms. Empirical evidence shows however that besides some success cases like Silicon Valley and the Emilia- Romagna region where firms collaborate intensively, many regional clusters are mere co-locations of firms. To enhance our understanding of why some clusters become networks of strategic collaboration and others don’t, we study link formation within European biopharmaceutical clusters. More specifically we look at the effect of cluster characteristics such as number of start-up firms, established firms or academic institutions, or the nature of the collaborations on the probability of local link formation
    Keywords: regional clusters; networks; local & global linkages; pharmaceutical industry
    JEL: R11 R12 R58 D83 D85
    Date: 2007–12–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20070100&r=cse
  3. By: Claude d’Aspremont; Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira; Jacques Thépot (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université Louis Pasteur)
    Abstract: Competitive aggressiveness is analyzed in a simple spatial oligopolistic competition model, where each one of two firms supplies two connected market segments, one captive the other contested. To begin with, firms are simply assumed to maximize profit subject to two constraints, one related to competitiveness, the other to market feasibility. The competitive aggressiveness of each firm, measured by the relative implicit price of the former constraint, is then endogenous and may be taken as a parameter to characterize the set of equilibria. A further step consists in supposing that competitive aggressiveness is controlled by each firm through its manager hiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is exogenously intensified, through higher product substitutability or through larger relative size of the contested market segment, competitive aggressiveness is decreased at the subgame perfect equilibrium. This decrease partially compensates for the negative effect on profitability of more intense competition.
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lar:wpaper:2007-04&r=cse
  4. By: Reynald-Alexandre Laurent
    Abstract: This paper considers a probabilistic duopoly in which products are described by their specific attributes, this form of differentiation embodying the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Consumers make discrete choices and follow a random decision rule based on these attributes. A three-stage game is studied in which firms develop new attributes for their products (innovation), then may imitate the attributes of the competing product and finally compete in price. At the equilibrium, the firm selling the less appreciated product is generally incited to imitate its rival. Confronted to a threat of imitation, the benchmark firm sometimes decreases strategically its attribute index in order to diminish its unit cost of innovation and the differentiation on the market, deterring the imitation in this way. This strategy is efficient when imitation costs are sufficiently concave. In the opposite case, it is preferable for the benchmark firm to accept the imitation. Thus, according to the shape of imitation costs, equilibria with "deterrence" or with "accommodation" occur, completing the current typology of strategic responses to a threat of imitation.
    Date: 2008
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pse:psecon:2008-04&r=cse
  5. By: Jacob A. Bikker; Laura Spierdijk
    Abstract: This paper is the first detailed and world-wide investigation of the developments in banking competition during the past fiffteen years. Using the Panzar-Rosse approach, we establish significant changes over time in the competitiveness of the banking industry. The changes in competition over time are small on average, but substantial for several countries and regions. Various Western economies faced a significant decline in banking competition during recent years. In particular, the competitive climate in the euro area was subject to a major break around 2001 - 2002, initiating a period of less competition. Also for the United States and Japan we establish a break during this period. The part of Eastern Europe that now belongs to the European Union experienced a significant but modest decrease in competition during the past ten years. Furthermore, the banking industry in emerging markets became more competitive during the last decade. We attribute the predominantly downward trend in competition to increased bank size and the shift from traditional intermediation to off-balance sheet activities.
    Keywords: competition, banking industry, Panzar-Rosse model, structural breaks
    JEL: C52 G21 L11 L13
    Date: 2008–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:0804&r=cse
  6. By: Henri L.F. de Groot (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute); Jacques Poot (University of Waikato); Martijn J. Smit (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Technological change and innovation and are central to the quest for regional development. In the globally-connected knowledge-driven economy, the relevance of agglomeration forces that rely on proximity continues to increase, paradoxically despite declining real costs of information, communication and transportation. Globally, the proportion of the population living in cities continues to grow and sprawling cities remain the engines of regional economic transformation. The growth of cities results from a complex chain that starts with scale, density and geography, which then combine with industrial structure characterised by its extent of specialisation, competition and diversity, to yield innovation and productivity growth that encourages employment expansion, and further urban growth through inward migration. This paper revisits the central part of this virtuous circle, namely the Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities (specialisation), Jacobs externalities (diversity) and Porter externalities (competition) that have provided alternative explanations for innovation and urban growth. The paper evaluates the statistical robustness of evidence for such externalities presented in 31 scientific articles, all building on the seminal work of Glaeser et al. (1992). We aim to explain variation in estimation results using study characteristics by means of ordered probit analysis. Among the results, we find that the impact of diversity depends on how it is measured and that diversity is important for the high-tech sector. High population density increases the chance of finding positive effects of specialisation on growth. More recent data find more positive results for both specialization and diversity, suggesting that agglomeration externalities become more important over time. Finally, primary study results depend on whether or not the externalities are considered jointly and on other features of the regression model specification.
    Keywords: innovation; regional development; agglomeration; urban externalities; meta-analysis
    JEL: C52 O18 O31 R11
    Date: 2008–02–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wai:econwp:08/01&r=cse
  7. By: Palladini, Eric; Goldberg , Mike
    Abstract: With its strong export orientation and emphasis on competitiveness, the Chilean economic model has been the envy of its neighbors for more than a decade. However, there are underlying vulnerabilities. Historically, exports have been concentrated in mining and agriculture, sectors dominated by large firms that do not generate a large share of employment. Small and medium enterprises play a key role in employment generation and economic decentralization in Chile, yet their employment was stagnant between 2000 and 2004. Based on work completed in 2003, this study provides a review of the Chilean government ' s substantial investment in programs that support small and medium enterprises. This review of government programs confirms the importance of coordination and an overarching strategy, in the form of a National Innovation System, led by a single institution. The review also finds that demand-driven programs were more likely to be sustainable. Finally, the study demonstrates that Chile (and other countries with many support programs for small and medium enterprises in place) needs an integrated management information system to analyze, assess, coordinate, and streamline the program portfolio for small and medium enterprises in the future.
    Keywords: ,E-Business,Microfinance,Access to Finance,Banks & Banking Reform
    Date: 2008–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4518&r=cse
  8. By: Gábor Hunya (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Waltraut Urban (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw)
    Abstract: Part 1 of the report provides an overview of the position of energy-intensive industries in Romania as compared to other Central and East European economies. The industries identified as particularly 'energy-intensive' are the paper industry, the chemical, the non-metallic mineral products and the basic metals industries. The countries selected for benchmarking are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. The comparison includes production, employment, productivity and investment including foreign direct investment in the respective branches. Part 2 presents a more detailed analysis of the most energy-intensive sub-branches (pulp & paper, basic chemicals, glass, ceramics, cement, iron & steel and aluminium) focusing on major performance indicators such as value added and foreign trade developments; also included is information on the ownership structure, status of modernization, compliance with the acquis and the further demand for restructuring. Part 3 points out the demand for and possibilities of policy support for the energy-intensive branches in Romania with a view to EU membership. A special focus is on sectoral issues (steel and basic chemicals), energy pricing (electricity, gas), regional, labour market and environmental issues.
    Keywords: Romania, energy intensity, industrial policy, foreign trade, competitiveness
    JEL: L1 L52 L61 L65 H32 Q43 Q48 Q58
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rpaper:rr:339&r=cse
  9. By: Argentino Pessoa (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Portugal)
    Abstract: The developing world needs far more financing for infrastructure than can be provided by domestic public finances alone and through ODA (Official Development Aid). Around middle 1980s a new strategy based on the use of public-private agreements, relying on ODA to enhance the quality of projects, reduce risks and raise profitability was gradually implemented for the provision of infrastructures and public utilities. This paper evaluates the more typical forms of private sector involvement and its actual importance (by type of public utility and by region), and shows that the new strategy has failed in improving the provision of infrastructures in the developing world.
    Keywords: infrastructures, ODA, outsourcing, public-private partnership, public utilities, regulation
    JEL: H4 H54 I18 I28 L33
    Date: 2008–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:266&r=cse

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