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on Economics of Strategic Management |
| By: | Andrew J.Y. Yeh (Reserve Bank of New Zealand); Steven Lim (University of Waikato); Ed Vos (University of Waikato) |
| Abstract: | We offer a theory that sheds light on the current debate over whether the form of corporate ownership converges to the Berle-Means image. Our analytical results are threefold. First, legal rules and firm-specific protective arrangements are complementary. Secondly, corporate ownership patterns can be convergent or path dependent depending on the relative importance of these protective arrangements. We predict, for example, diffuse stock ownership in countries that impose legal limits on blockholders’ power to expropriate minority investor rights. Thirdly, we find that convergence toward diffuse share ownership is a movement towards the social optimum. Our empirical results suggest a case for the co-existence of path dependence and functional convergence (convergence to the diffuse form of share ownership through cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges that impose more stringent disclosure and listing requirements). These results have implications for the design of executive compensation, the case for institutional investor activism and the proposal to increase shareholder power. |
| Keywords: | corporate governance; ownership concentration; institutions; quality of governance; path dependence; functional convergence |
| JEL: | G32 G34 O17 |
| Date: | 2006–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wai:econwp:06/07&r=cse |
| By: | Francisco J. Mas (Universidad de Alicante); Antonio Ladrón de Guevara Martínez (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Felipe Ruiz Moreno (Universidad de Alicante) |
| Abstract: | The main objective of this work is to propose an oligopolistic competition model thatincorporates product differentiation through quality of service in the Spanish bank loansmarket. This model allows us to detect the competitive behavior patterns in terms of the outputof all the financial entities with respect to three strategic groups defined in terms of size. Thismodel of competitive interactions is tested with a sample of 100 firms in the Spanish bank loanmarket between 1992 and 1994. This period of time is characterized by both, the end of a longprocess of deregulation and the integration of the Spanish Banking System in the EuropeanBanking System. The findings evidence a stronger aggressiveness from the larger-size groupwhen the medium and smaller-size groups increase their output. Besides, the results detect anaggressive conduct between the entities within the larger-size group. El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en proponer un modelo de competencia oligopolísticacon diferenciación de producto vía calidad de servicio en el mercado de créditos bancarios, elcual permite detectar el patrón de conducta competitiva del output (variaciones conjeturales anivel de cantidades de créditos vendidos) para todas y cada una de las entidades financierasrespecto de cada uno de los grupos estratégicos definidos por tamaño. Este modelo deinteracciones competitivas es contrastado con 100 entidades del mercado español de créditosbancarios entre 1992 y 1994, período temporal que marca la culminación de un proceso dedesregulación e integración europea del sistema bancario español y que incide directamente enla competencia en términos de cantidades de créditos vendidos. Los resultados obtenidosevidencian que el grupo de entidades de mayor tamaño tiene una actitud agresiva ante unaumento del output de los grupos de entidades pequeñas y medianas. Además, se detecta unaconducta agresiva entre las entidades del grupo de mayor tamaño. |
| Keywords: | Variación Conjetural, Comportamiento Competitivo, Grupos Estratégicos, Banking; Competition; Strategic Groups. |
| Date: | 2006–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2006-07&r=cse |