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on Economics of Strategic Management |
| By: | Jonathan Beck; Michal Grajek; Christian Wey |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp523&r=cse |
| By: | Audretsch, David B; Lehmann, Erik E |
| Abstract: | The resource theory of the firm implies that knowledge is a key resource bestowing a competitive advantage for entrepreneurial firms. However, it remains rather unclear up to now, how new ventures and small business can access knowledge resources. The purpose of this paper is to suggest two strategies in particular that facilitate entrepreneurial access to and absorption of external knowledge spillovers: the attraction of managers and directors with an academic background. Based on data on board composition of 295 high technology firms, the results clearly demonstrate the strong link between geographical proximity to research intense universities and board composition. |
| Keywords: | board composition; corporate governance; entrepreneurship; university spillover |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5335&r=cse |
| By: | Ela Glowicka |
| Abstract: | Governments in the EU grant Rescue and Restructure Subsidies to bail out ailing firms. In an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly we study effects of such subsidies on market structure and welfare. We adopt a common market setting, where consumers from the two countries form one market. We show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional costreducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower and the only gaining player is the rescued firm. <br> <br> <i>ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Bail-out in gemeinsamen Märkten: Ein strategischer Ansatz) <br> Die Regierungen der EU gewähren staatliche Beihilfe zur Rettung und Umstrukturierung von Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten. In einem internationalen asymmetrischen Cournot-Duopol werden die Wohlfahrtseffekte und die Konsequenzen solcher Beihilfe für die Marktstruktur analysiert. Grundannahme ist ein gemeinsamer Markt, auf dem Verbraucher aus zwei Ländern zusammenkommen. <br>Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert, sind Allokations- und Produktionseffizienzen geringer, und der einzige aufholende Teilnehmer ist die gerettete Firma.</i> |
| Keywords: | subsidies, asymmetric oligopoly, exit, European Union |
| JEL: | F13 L13 L52 |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2005-20&r=cse |
| By: | Michael S. Dahl; Christian Ø.R. Pedersen; Bent Dalum |
| Abstract: | How can the growth of regional clusters be explained? This paper studies in great detail the growth of the wireless communication cluster in Northern Denmark. Unlike the dominant theories, we argue that initial success of the first firms are the main driving force behind the generation of new firms that eventually lead to the formation of clusters. The success of the first firms tend to generate spinoffs, which becomes successful themselves due to the background of the founders. |
| Keywords: | Agglomeration; Clusters; Spin-offs; Knowledge Diffusion |
| JEL: | R10 O13 J60 L63 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:05-18&r=cse |
| By: | José Miguel Benavente; Alexander Galetovic; Ricardo Sanhueza |
| Abstract: | Las pyme pagan más que las empresas grandes por su financiamiento, se les exigen garantías, se las financia a plazos cortos y muchas no se pueden endeudar. Se piensa que estas prácticas son fallas de mercado que deberían corregirse con intervenciones regulatorias. Sin embargo, nosotros argumentamos que son respuestas apropiadas a (i) el mayor costo medio de los préstamos pequeños; (ii) el problema de la selección originado por la salida y reemplazo de firmas que ocurre en todas las industrias, que es más intenso cuando se trata de pymes; (iii) la necesidad de alinear los incentivos de deudores y acreedores cuando la información es asimétrica. Mostramos que estas prácticas también son comunes en países con mercados de capitales desarrollados. Finalmente, proponemos medidas para mejorar el financiamiento de las pyme. SMEs pay more for credits than large firms, their loans tend to be granted against collateral and on short repayment terms, and many are redlined. These practices have usually been interpreted as financial-market imperfections that discriminate against SMEs. We argue that they are responses to (i) the higher average cost of smaller loans; (ii) the selection problems due to the natural replacement of business in all industries, which is much more acute among SMEs; (iii) the need to align the incentives of financiers and entrepreneurs when information is asymmetric. We show that these practices are widspread in countries where capital markets are developed. We also make several proposals to increase access to financing by SMEs |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edj:ceauch:201&r=cse |
| By: | Jürgen Bitzer (Free University Berlin); Philipp J.H. Schröder (Aarhus School of Business) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents the stylized facts of open source software innovation and provides empirical evidence on the impact of increased competition by OSS on the innovative activity in the software industry. Furthermore, we introduce a simple formal model that captures the innovation impact of OSS entry by examining a change in market structure from monopoly to duopoly under the assumption that software producers compete in technology rather than price or quantities. The paper identifies a pro-innovative effect of OSS competition. |
| Keywords: | open source software, innovation, strategic interaction |
| JEL: | L13 L30 L86 |
| Date: | 2005–12–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0512001&r=cse |