nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2025–12–08
thirty papers chosen by
Russell Pittman, United States Department of Justice


  1. An Alternative Focus for Antitrust: Addressing Harmful Competitive Advantage By Jamison, Mark A.
  2. Competition and product diferentiation in the argentine chocolate bar industry By Germán Coloma
  3. Is Draghi report really wrong about telecoms? (An overview of academic papers on telecom market structure and mergers) By Ciriani, Stéphane; Jeanjean, François
  4. Algorithmic Pricing and Sectoral Oversight: Smart Markets, Smarter Telecommunications Regulation By Gannon, John PL
  5. The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications: Comment By C. Lanier Benkard; Nathan H. Miller; Ali Yurukoglu
  6. Oligopolistic Information Markets By Peter Achim; Roland Strausz
  7. Demand-Investment in Distribution Channels By Dongsoo Shin; Roland Strausz
  8. Generic entry, price competition, and market segmentation in the prescription drug market – A comment By Izabela Jelovac
  9. Production Contracts and Buyer Market Power in the U.S. Broiler Chicken Industry By Bolotova, Yuliya V.
  10. Strategic bid response under automated market power mitigation in electricity markets By Chiara Fusar Bassini; Jacqueline Adelowo; Priya L. Donti; Lynn H. Kaack
  11. Identifying root causes in the difference of European 4 to 3 mergers related quantitative model findings on price, investment and quality effects By Földes, Gábor
  12. Good Data and Bad Data: The Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination By Maryam Farboodi; Nima Haghpanah; Ali Shourideh
  13. "Investment Dynamics and Merger Policy: Long-run Effects of Horizontal Merger in Oligopolistic Market" By Takeshi Fukasawa; Hiroshi Ohashi
  14. E.H. Chamberlin, 'An Experimental Imperfect Market' (1948) : A Japanese Translation By Ryo Hongo
  15. Analyzing Competitive Dynamics in the Greek Television Market: An SCP Framework Application By Papathanasopoulos, Athanasios; Kargas, Antonios D.; Varoutas, Dimitris
  16. The exhaustion principle in copyright and modern digital markets By Howell, Bronwyn E.; Potgieter, Petrus H.
  17. Testing Possible Causes of Asymmetric Price Transmission Behavior of Major Importers of U. S. Wheat By Ajewole, Kayode; Johnson, Michael
  18. The Effects of Widespread Online Education on Market Structure and Enrollment By Nano Barahona; Cauê Dobbin; Sebastián Otero
  19. Firm-Level Pass-Through of Supply Chain Disruptions: Insights from the U.S. Beef Market By Marco Duarte; Meilin Ma; Francisco Scott
  20. Large Traffic Generators (LTGs) and network usage: myths and realities By Castells, Pau; Zagdanski, Jakub
  21. Supply without Demand: The Paradox of Economies of Scale in the Case of Chris Gardner By Paulo Roberto Amorim, Paulo Roberto Amorim
  22. Final report for the project "Defining what the relevant market is: A new method for digital antitrust" By Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
  23. Telcos and Big Tech: Value Creation or Destruction? By Samaké, Said-Nour
  24. The temptation to entrust energy regulation to the Polynesian Competition Authority By Christian Montet; Véronique Sélinsky; Florent Venayre
  25. Selling supplemental information By Arlindo Sk\"enderaj
  26. Patents and the business strategies of digital platforms: A comparative analysis of the patent portfolios of large digital platforms By Damásio, Bruno; Silva, Eduardo; Mendonça, Sandro
  27. Do OpenAI's Activities Affect Big Tech?: Implications from Event Study Results By Terada, Shinichiro
  28. Engineering, Procurement, and Construction Leadership and Project Complexity in the German Large Industrial Plant Manufacturing Industry: A Strategic Analysis of Competitive Dynamics in an Era of Global Competition By Hümmer, Matthias
  29. Customer Concentration and SME Survival : The Role of Network Structure and Dynamic Adaptation By HARA, Yasushi
  30. Pro-competition regulation: lessons from the telecoms sector for digital platforms By Cave, Martin; Shortall, Tony

  1. By: Jamison, Mark A.
    Abstract: This paper suggests that antitrust authorities should focus on harmful competitive advantages. These are largely Porterian and Smithian advantages created by firms seeking to disadvantage rivals, governments inadvertently hindering competition, and governments protecting favored stakeholders and partisans without corresponding improvements in economic efficiency. The proposed approach is intended to enable antitrust to get to the heart of market power rather than address symptoms, address market power concerns in dynamic situations, and to make up for antitrust's tendency to ignore competition problems created by governments. This approach would reorient some antitrust resources away from investigating and prosecuting cases and towards investigations that identify problems and develop solutions before harms occur.
    Keywords: antitrust, market definition, competitive advantage, regulation
    JEL: K21 L12 L22 L4
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331279
  2. By: Germán Coloma
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the behavior of the Argentine chocolate bar industry during the period 2019-2022. It mainly focuses on the level of competition between the firms in the industry, estimating conduct parameters that signal the existence of harder or softer competition. The estimations change considerably under different demand specifications, and also if we explicitly model product differentiation at the level of the supplying firms. This allows discarding extreme hypotheses such as perfect competition and collusion, and it slightly favors the existence of quantity (Cournot) competition over price (Bertrand) competition.
    Keywords: Chocolate bars, Argentina, competition, product differentiation, conduct parameters.
    JEL: C32 L13 L66
    Date: 2024–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:869
  3. By: Ciriani, Stéphane; Jeanjean, François
    Abstract: The Draghi (2024) Report defines clear policies to restore the competitiveness of the EU through raising investment in innovation. The Report proposes "New EU Telecom Act" to update merger control through considering both static and dynamic effects rather than just static market shares or Herfindahl Index (HHI). Some authors have argued that Draghi's view on the consolidation's effects on investment is flawed. This article provides a review of the literature on the impact of mergers and mobile market concentration on price, investment, and quality. It also provides evidence that the evolution of mobile markets during the two last decades have changed the ways that mergers affect competition. It provides policy makers with relevant insights to form their views on the desirability of consolidation in the European wireless markets, in a context where the need for a new approach to mergers in the telecom sector has been outlined in the Draghi's report.
    Keywords: Competition, Investment, Telecom, Market structure, Mergers
    JEL: D25 D43 K21 L40 L51 L63
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331262
  4. By: Gannon, John PL
    Abstract: The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into pricing systems has heightened longstanding concerns about tacit collusion, particularly in structurally concentrated sectors like telecommunications. While competition authorities struggle with doctrinal limits around algorithmic coordination, this paper argues that sectoral regulators, such as in telecommunications, are well placed to respond. Furthermore, rather than expanding direct oversight of AI tools, regulators should adopt a posture of focal point disruption: strategically examining how regulation itself influences the predictability, observability, and dimensionality of competition. Drawing on coordination theory and recent merger jurisprudence, the paper identifies existing rules, such as those governing offer presentation, personalization limits, and product standardisation, that may inadvertently entrench collusive equilibria. In AI-mediated environments, these effects can be magnified. The paper proposes practical criteria for regulatory design that preserve asymmetries, support selective transparency, and reintroduce unpredictability into market interactions. Rather than waiting for general competition law to evolve, sector-specific regulators must actively assess whether their frameworks stabilize tacit alignment. The aim is not to constrain innovation but to ensure that regulatory architecture does not inadvertently make collusion easier in the age of AI while maximizing the benefits it might bring to competition. This approach offers a flexible, forward-looking alternative to AI-specific regulation or contorted competition law of uncertain effect, grounded in structural awareness and anticipatory governance.
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331270
  5. By: C. Lanier Benkard; Nathan H. Miller; Ali Yurukoglu
    Abstract: De Loecker et al. (2020) (DEU) estimate that markups increased significantly in the United States from 1955 to 2016. We find this result is sensitive to unreported sample restrictions that drop 27% of the available observations. Applying the methodology as described in the article to the full sample, markup increases are more muted until late in the sample period, and are almost entirely driven by Finance and Insurance firms. If these firms are removed, markup increases are modest. We conclude that the DEU methodology and data, as they are described in the article, do not support the conclusion that broad-based increases in market power have occurred in recent decades.
    JEL: D22 L1 L40
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34513
  6. By: Peter Achim (York University); Roland Strausz (HU Berlin)
    Abstract: In modern information markets, buyers routinely combine signals from multiple sellers. We develop a model of ``portfolio competition'' to analyze this distinctive feature. We show that the combinability of information overturns standard oligopoly intuition. Unlike traditional markets, competitive pressure does not necessarily protect buyers: when signals are complements, sellers can leverage the buyer's desire for the joint portfolio to extract the full social surplus, regardless of the number of competitors. We characterize the precise conditions for rent extraction, which reduce to a simple geometric test for symmetric sellers. Furthermore, we find that the canonical logic of market entry fails. Entry is never socially excessive because efficient portfolio choices eliminate business-stealing effects. Paradoxically, entry can reduce competitive pressure: when entrants provide strong complementarities, they shift the buyer's threat point, allowing all sellers to extract higher rents.
    Keywords: information markets; portfolio competition; market entry; data economy; complementarity;
    Date: 2025–11–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:554
  7. By: Dongsoo Shin (Santa Clara University); Roland Strausz (HU Berlin)
    Abstract: We study a manufacturer's demand-investment decisions in distribution channels subject to double marginalization. Casting this as a mechanism design problem, we show that demand-enhancing investments strengthen retailers' incentives to exploit market power, forcing manufacturers to concede greater rents. Manufacturers therefore optimally restrict product quality or market coverage. We fully characterize which demand parameters create these perverse incentives: increases benefit manufacturers in segments where they control pricing but harm them in segments with binding incentive constraints. This reveals fundamental limits to demand-side investment in vertical relationships.
    Keywords: demand; investment incentives; distribution channels; double marginalization;
    JEL: D21 D82 L11
    Date: 2025–11–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:553
  8. By: Izabela Jelovac (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In this note, we revise the theoretical condition in Regan (2008) under which the price of brand-name drugs increases with the number of generic competitors—a phenomenon known as the generic paradox. We show that this condition derives from the analysis of an interior solution while it actually excludes the existence of an interior solution. Therefore, the theoretical result in Regan (2008) arises from an internal inconsistency.
    Keywords: Generic entry, Price competition, Market segmentation
    Date: 2025–11–20
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05375917
  9. By: Bolotova, Yuliya V.
    Abstract: The motivations for this case study are recent developments in the U.S. broiler chicken industry involving allegations of an illegal exercise of buyer market power by the five largest broiler chicken processors in the country in the market for broiler grow-out services. This case study introduces economic, business, and legal issues related to the alleged input price-fixing cartel of the five largest broiler processors. The case study describes the broiler processors’ conduct and presents a theoretical framework that may explain market and price effects of the alleged input price-fixing cartel. In addition, the case study introduces a comprehensive analysis of a sample broiler production agreement between a broiler grower and a broiler processor with a particular attention paid to design of the payment (compensation) system included in this agreement. The teaching note provides suggested answers to discussion and analytical questions, and it also includes multiple-choice questions that can be used as in-class assignments, quizzes, and exam questions.1 This case study is suitable for a variety of undergraduate and graduate courses taught in agricultural economics and agribusiness programs and for extension and outreach audiences.
    Keywords: Agribusiness, Production Economics
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea24:344127
  10. By: Chiara Fusar Bassini; Jacqueline Adelowo; Priya L. Donti; Lynn H. Kaack
    Abstract: In auction markets that are prone to market power abuse, preventive mitigation of bid prices can be applied through automated mitigation procedures (AMP). Despite the widespread application of AMP in US electricity markets, there exists scarce evidence on how firms strategically react to such price-cap-and-penalty regulation: when the price cap rarely leads to penalty mitigation, it is difficult to distinguish whether AMP are an effective deterrent or simply too lax. We investigate their impact on the bids of generation firms, using 2019 data from the New York and New England electricity markets (NYISO, ISO-NE). We employ a regression discontinuity design, which exploits the fact that the price cap with penalty is only activated when a structural index (e.g., congestion, pivotality) exceeds a certain cutoff. By estimating the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) of screening activation, we can causally identify successful deterrence of anti-competitive behavior. Around 30-40% of the analyzed bidders per market exhibit a significant strategic response - corresponding to a decrease in maximum bid prices of 4-10 $/MWh to avoid the penalty. However, there is significant heterogeneity between firms, and the regulatory impact on the overall market is not statistically detectable, suggesting lax mitigation thresholds. Using a merit-order simulation, we estimate the welfare impact of more stringent thresholds to lie between 350 and 980 thousand dollars of increased buyer surplus per mitigated hour, with the associated number of mitigated hours being below 33 hours/year. Our results motivate the empirical calibration of mitigation thresholds to improve the efficiency of AMP regulation.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.20812
  11. By: Földes, Gábor
    Abstract: EU Digital Decade 2030 connectivity targets require from operators to provide full broadband fixed and mobile population-based coverage. There is a common agreement on detected investment GAP, however the resolution plans are diverging. In order to stimulate investments, operators argue for more cooperation (horizontal mergers) among operators to improve economies of scale, while regulators advocate for more competition to force investment race. The aim of the paper to focus on how economies of scale can be improved by a horizontal merger and what size of the risk may occur from constrained competition that partially may offset efficiency benefits at total social welfare level. The research question is set to understand and identify root causes in the differences of consumer price, operator investment and service quality assessments related 4 to 3 (mobile) mergers in the EU. The methodology of the paper is that based on qualitative research on competition policy aspects initiates snowballing approach for systematic literature review and critical assessment of academic papers applying quantitative researches on Europe-wide and decades-long database for regression and DiD (Difference in Differences Model) Fixed panel model analysis. The hypothesis is that the differences in findings of quantitative models might be more transparent and understandable if relevant modelling assumptions and data specifications are explicitly expressed on which scenario the finding is relevant and valid. The novelty of the paper is to attempt to set-up an apple-to-apple comparison of different quantitative models, by adding validity criteria and the relevance of the sample-based finding for the whole data population.
    Keywords: telecom mobile operators, horizontal mergers, competition, consumer prices, 5G network investments
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331269
  12. By: Maryam Farboodi; Nima Haghpanah; Ali Shourideh
    Abstract: We study how a monopolist’s use of consumer data for price discrimination affects welfare. To answer this question, we develop a model of market segmentation subject to residual uncertainty. We fully characterize when data usage monotonically increases or decreases welfare or when the effect is non-monotone. The characterization reduces the problem to one with only two demand curves, and gives a condition for the two-demand-curves case that highlights that information affects welfare in three distinct ways. In the non-monotone case, we provide tight bounds on the welfare effects of information and identify the best local direction for providing additional information.
    JEL: D42 D83 L12 L15
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34514
  13. By: Takeshi Fukasawa (Waseda Institute for Advanced Study, Waseda University); Hiroshi Ohashi (Faculty of Economics, the University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates long-run effects of a horizontal merger and its remedies in a capital-intensive industry. It estimates a dynamic oligopoly model with continuous investment, enabled by a computationally efficient simulation algorithm. A decomposition of investment incentives shows that static forces dominated dynamic considerations. The merger, despite raising prices, increased social welfare, primarily through efficiency gains. The analysis also finds that divestiture remedies had persistent effects lasting nearly two decades, and that optimal remedy design differs markedly depending on whether consumer or social welfare is used as the evaluative standard.
    Date: 2025–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2025cf1264
  14. By: Ryo Hongo (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)
    Abstract: This is the Japanese translation of E.H. Chamberlin's article 'An Experimental Imperfect Market' (1948). The article analyzed the results of those experiments which he had conducted in his course at Harvard University and showed that the prices and trading volumes in the experiments deviated from the equilibrium predicted by the standard supply and demand theory. For this contribution, he is often cited as one of the most important precursors in experimental economics (Smith 1962).
    Keywords: experimental economics, imperfect competition, Monopolistic Competition, Vernon Smith.
    JEL: B13
    Date: 2025–12
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kgu:wpaper:301
  15. By: Papathanasopoulos, Athanasios; Kargas, Antonios D.; Varoutas, Dimitris
    Abstract: This study examines the Greek television market from 2018 to 2023 using the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework, applying simultaneous equations to analyze the interactions among national TV broadcasters during this period. The findings indicate that market structure, measured by audience share, is significantly influenced by lagged advertising revenue and operational expenditure. Market conduct, proxied by content production and acquisition costs, is shaped by past advertising income and audience shares but remains constrained by the sector's continued reliance on traditional broadcasting and the allocation of ownership capital to other operational areas rather than content innovation. Market performance, measured by advertising revenue, is positively correlated with audience share, investment in content, and digital visibility, yet remains constrained by persistent inefficiencies in operational spending. During the period under review, the market evolved from moderate (2018–2020) to low (2021–2023) concentration, with ownership concentration exhibiting limited influence on either conduct or performance. Despite ongoing financial challenges and continued reliance on traditional broadcasting models, the emerging link between website traffic and advertising revenue points to a gradual shift toward digitalization. As one of the first studies to apply a simultaneous-equations SCP model to the Greek television sector, this research contributes novel insights into the structural dynamics, strategic constraints, and performance outcomes shaping legacy media in an evolving digital landscape.
    Keywords: Greek TV market, Structure-Conduct-Performance, SCP, media concentration, digital transformation, media economics, television industry
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331296
  16. By: Howell, Bronwyn E.; Potgieter, Petrus H.
    Abstract: The exhaustion principle, or first-sale doctrine, limits copyright holders' control after the authorised sale of a tangible copy, enabling resale, lending, and preservation. In digital markets, however, this principle has largely become irrelevant, as distribution models now rely on licences that prevent secondary use. This paper examines how the disappearance of copyright exhaustion affects four key digital markets – books, music, video, and software – along six dimensions: access, preservation, privacy, transactional clarity, user innovation, and platform competition. Drawing on a structured review of legal and economic literature, it assesses both the erosion of these benefits and possible remedies, including forward-and-delete technologies, common law exhaustion, relaxed anti-circumvention rules, and enhanced fair use provisions for libraries. The study argues that digital distribution has shifted the balance of rights too far towards copyright holders and that differentiated regulatory reforms may be needed to restore a socially beneficial equilibrium that preserves both market efficiency and user rights.
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331276
  17. By: Ajewole, Kayode; Johnson, Michael
    Abstract: This study deals specifically with the international transmission of wheat prices wherein the effect of prices in one market impacts the prices of another. Specifically, it shows that import prices in some countries respond in an asymmetric fashion to changes in the export prices of U.S. wheat. Our results indicate that market concentration in the importing country influences price asymmetry and amount of price variability sends a sufficient clear signal to market participants. We also find that the 2008 financial and food price crisis changed the degree of asymmetry in most of the countries studied in this paper.
    Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis, International Relations/Trade
    Date: 2024–07–26
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae24:344396
  18. By: Nano Barahona; Cauê Dobbin; Sebastián Otero
    Abstract: We study the rapid expansion of Brazil's private online higher-education sector and its effects on market structure and college enrollment. Exploiting regional and field-specific variation in online education penetration, we find that online programs expand access for older students but divert younger students from higher-quality in-person programs. Greater competition lowers tuition prices but also reduces the supply of in-person degrees. Using an equilibrium model of college education, we show that in the absence of online programs, total enrollment would be 14 percent lower, while in-person enrollment would rise by 33 percent. On net, aggregate labor-market value added declines by 1.4 percent. Online education raises value added for older students, who benefit from increased access, but lowers it for younger students, who shift toward lower-return online options. Counterfactual policies that restrict online enrollment to older cohorts could increase value added for younger students without reducing gains for older cohorts.
    JEL: I23 I24 I26 J24 L11 L13
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34522
  19. By: Marco Duarte; Meilin Ma; Francisco Scott
    Abstract: We leverage a fire outbreak that caused a large but temporary capacity loss at the largest U.S. beef packer to study how firm conduct shapes the pass-through of supply disruptions along the supply chain. Despite evidence of industry-wide increases in processing costs, retail prices for the affected packer’s products fell. To rationalize this pattern, we develop a model of bilateral retailer-packer bargaining that accounts for reliability of product delivery. The model highlights how disruptions alter bargaining leverage and shift margins between buyer and seller. Counterfactual simulations demonstrate that the sign and magnitude of pass-through are highly sensitive to the magnitude of capacity loss and perceived reliability.
    Keywords: cost pass-through; supply chain disruptions; Beef cattle; Meat processing
    JEL: Q14 Q18 L13 D81
    Date: 2025–11–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedkrw:102167
  20. By: Castells, Pau; Zagdanski, Jakub
    Abstract: We investigate the economic justification for market-based payments from large internet traffic generators (LTGs) to network operators and internet service providers (ISPs) to support network investments, connectivity, and digital society objectives. Our analysis addresses ongoing debates about the LTG-ISP relationship. First, we confirm that traffic volume significantly influences network costs, countering claims to the contrary. Second, we frame telecommunications as a two-sided market where consumers access content and content providers reach consumers via networks, with payment structures varying based on market dynamics, as seen in other two-sided markets. We argue that extending incentives for efficient network use solely to consumers is ineffective due to their limited control over data consumption and transmission. In contrast, LTGs possess the technical expertise and capability to manage data flows, including optimizing their services' traffic generation, making them better candidates for such incentives. Despite this, market-based payment solutions have not gained traction. We identify regulatory constraints, such as net-neutrality rules, universal service obligations, and peering/interconnection regulations, as key factors reducing network operators' bargaining power. This asymmetry hinders their ability to negotiate agreements that effectively incentivize LTGs to use networks efficiently, limiting the adoption of such payment models.
    Keywords: Telecommunications economics, Large traffic generators (LTGs), Internet service providers (ISPs), Two-sided markets, Interconnection agreements
    JEL: L96 L51 L13 O33 D62
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331256
  21. By: Paulo Roberto Amorim, Paulo Roberto Amorim
    Abstract: This paper examines the paradox of economies of scale through the real case of Chris Gardner, whose attempt to commercialize portable bone-density scanners illustrates the consequences of excess supply in the absence of effective market demand. Despite a technologically superior product, hospitals and clinics already possessed equipment capable of meeting their needs, making additional purchases economically unjustifiable. High fixed costs, low utilization rates, and market saturation resulted in diseconomies of scale rather than efficiency gains. The analysis highlights how misaligned expectations between entrepreneurial supply and institutional demand can lead to financial losses, even when innovation is present. This case provides an applied perspective on the economic principles of scale, sunk costs, and market structure.
    Keywords: Economies of Scale, Excess Capacity, Market Demand, Sunk Costs, Health Technology, Innovation, Chris Gardner
    JEL: D24 L11 L26 M21 O12
    Date: 2025–08–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:126610
  22. By: Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus
    Abstract: This is the final report for the project “Defining what the relevant market is: A new method for digital antitrust.”
    Keywords: Market Definition
    JEL: D12
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esrepo:333212
  23. By: Samaké, Said-Nour
    Abstract: This paper examines how the rise of Over-the-Top (OTT) or Content and Application Provider (CAP) services reshapes the revenue and investment behavior of telecommunications operators in mobile and fixed broadband markets. A micro-founded theoretical framework links OTT engagement to operators’ pricing and investment incentives, and the predictions are tested empirically using a multi-country quarterly panel (2017 Q3–2024 Q2) combining operator and application-level data. The empirical strategy combines multi-way fixed effects, shift-share instrumental variables (SSIV), and dynamic System GMM estimation to address endogeneity and persistence. Results show that greater OTT usage significantly lowers the average revenue per connection (ARPC) in mobile markets. As users access identical OTT platforms through any network, perceived differentiation between operators vanishes. Price competition intensifies under flat-rate plans, preventing operators from monetizing growing data traffic and leading to revenue dilution. In contrast, the effect on fixed broadband ARPU remains weak, reflecting cost-based pricing and utility-type demand. On the investment side, rising OTT traffic increase capital expenditure (CapEx) as operators expand network capacity. In European mobile markets, investment follows an inverted-U pattern with market concentration, peaking at intermediate levels. Revenue losses from OTT usage are also less pronounced in moderately concentrated markets but stronger in fragmented ones. Overall, OTT expansion erodes monetization while compelling operators to invest to sustain rising traffic. This structural tension exposes a trade-off between static efficiency, constrained by declining revenues, and dynamic efficiency, preserved through continued investment. Policy frameworks should balance competition, pricing flexibility, and value sharing between connectivity and content providers.
    Keywords: Telecommunication, Two-sided market, Big Tech, CAP, OTT
    JEL: D71 L51 K23 L86 L93 O32 O33
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331303
  24. By: Christian Montet (UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française); Véronique Sélinsky (Barreau de Montpellier); Florent Venayre (UPF - Université de la Polynésie Française)
    Abstract: Faced with evidence of inefficient regulation of network industries in French Polynesia, a draft law of the country (loi du pays) introduced in 2024 aimed to assign energy regulation to the Polynesian Competition Authority (APC). However, in light of opposition from some quarters, the Bill – initially intended to be submitted to the legislature – was ultimately withdrawn in December 2024. This paper shows that the proposed law was, in fact, incapable of improving the efficiency of energy regulation in French Polynesia. It preserved significant prerogatives for the government department in charge of energy, relegating the APC to a primarily consultative role, the allocated human and financial resources were insufficient, and the proposed new organisation risked creating internal conflicts and compromising the independence and impartiality of the APC. While the APC continues to advocate for this sectoral regulatory power to be granted to it – considering even an extension to telecommunications – our analysis calls for increased vigilance regarding any future projects of this kind. The well-documented drawbacks of merging competition and regulatory authorities could, moreover, be easily avoided in French Polynesia through cooperation with mainland French regulatory authorities.
    Abstract: Face aux constats d'une régulation inefficiente des industries de réseau en Polynésie française, un projet de loi du pays visait en 2024 à confier la régulation de l'énergie à l'Autorité polynésienne de la concurrence (APC). Le projet qui devait être soumis au législateur avait finalement été retiré en décembre 2024 en raison de certaines oppositions. Cet article montre comment ce projet de loi n'était effectivement pas en mesure d'améliorer l'efficacité de la régulation énergétique polynésienne. D'une part, il maintenait des prérogatives significatives de l'administration en charge de l'énergie, limitant l'APC à un rôle essentiellement consultatif. D'autre part, les moyens humains et financiers alloués étaient insuffisants et la nouvelle organisation projetée risquait de générer des conflits internes et de porter atteinte à l'indépendance et à l'impartialité de l'Autorité. Alors que l'APC continue de demander que cette compétence de régulation sectorielle lui soit accordée, envisageant même de l'étendre aux télécommunications, notre analyse appelle à une vigilance accrue quant à d'éventuels nouveaux projets de ce type. Les défauts généralement reconnus de la fusion des autorités de concurrence et de régulation peuvent par ailleurs être facilement évités en Polynésie française grâce à la coopération avec les autorités de régulation hexagonales.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05384404
  25. By: Arlindo Sk\"enderaj
    Abstract: I consider an environment in which a decision maker faces uncertainty and privately holds information in the form of a signal about the true state of the world. The decision maker purchases additional information from a data broker before receiving the signal realization. I characterize the data broker's optimal selling mechanism, which involves screening over all possible signals. I allow the space of all signals the data broker can sell to be arbitrarily correlated with the signal the decision maker owns. This plays a key role in designing the optimal menu. In the binary action setting, the data broker extracts the efficient surplus by offering a distinct binary signal for each type. Moreover, this result holds even when the broker does not know the prior distribution over states. In more general environments, I provide conditions on the payoff structure and the decision maker's type space under which the data broker extracts the efficient surplus. I discuss scenarios in which efficient surplus extraction is not possible.
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.14103
  26. By: Damásio, Bruno; Silva, Eduardo; Mendonça, Sandro
    Abstract: Recent years have recorded a growth in the number of patent applications filed by digital platforms. This paper argues that by profiling these patent portfolios, we can obtain insightful patterns on platforms' business and innovation strategies. For this purpose, we build a dataset of over 380, 000 patent applications filed at least by one of ten large US and Chinese digital platforms between 1986 and 2024. A significant rise in patent activity has taken shape since 2012, largely due to an impressive number of applications filed by Chinese platforms. Platforms tend to patent alone and concentrate their patenting activity on computer technology and electric communication, with machine learning being an overarching theme. However, some platforms like Apple pursue the development of a diversified patent portfolio, while others build one more specialized and aligned with their core business. Additionally, platform applications receive a significant number of citations, despite a skewed distribution which is only slightly challenged by Apple. Finally, applications by Chinese platforms have a more limited international protection when compared to their American counterparts, as attested by their patent family sizes.
    Keywords: patents, digital platforms, portfolio, China
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331264
  27. By: Terada, Shinichiro
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether the activities of OpenAI—particularly those related to its generative AI product, ChatGPT—have affected major U.S. technology firms, Big Tech, collectively referred to as GAFAM (Alphabet/Google, Apple, Meta/Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft). Using a short-term event study methodology, we analyze the abnormal stock returns of these firms in response to key OpenAI-related events, including product launches, corporate investments, and technological integrations. Our empirical analysis reveals three main findings. First, the release of ChatGPT had no statistically significant effect on the stock returns of each of GAFAM firms. Second, Microsoft's direct investments in OpenAI, including a $1 billion and a multi-billion-dollar deal, resulted in neutral market responses, suggesting a balance between cost and expected strategic benefit. Third, collaborations that integrated OpenAI's technology into Microsoft's Bing and Edge, and Apple's iOS ecosystem yielded statistically significant positive abnormal returns for the respective firms. These results imply that OpenAI's competitive impact on GAFAM is not direct rivalry but rather complementary enhancement. OpenAI's AI capabilities function as a core competence that strengthens the existing revenue-generating platforms of Big Tech. This suggests a business ecosystem in which AI technologies are not isolated strategic assets, but rather enablers of broader corporate competitiveness.
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331311
  28. By: Hümmer, Matthias
    Abstract: This conceptual paper develops an integrated framework for understanding how multi-dimensional project complexity management capabilities mediate competitive dynamics in Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) industries. Drawing on systematized narrative review of literature from 2020 to 2025, combined with foundational complexity theory, two complementary models are constructed: an ascending pathway depicting how emerging contractors systematically build technical, organizational, and environmental capabilities to achieve global EPC leadership; and a descending pathway characterizing how established leaders experience capability erosion when organizational and environmental complexity management capabilities deteriorate faster than technical knowledge persists. The core theoretical contribution demonstrates that sustainable EPC competitive advantage increasingly derives from the ability to simultaneously manage high technical, organizational, and environmental complexity, rather than technical knowledge alone. This insight is operationalized through a Technical-Organizational-Environmental (TOE) complexity framework, mapping how capability phases correspond to distinct complexity profiles and identifying critical junctures where strategic intervention can alter trajectory. The framework is applied diagnostically to the German Large Industrial Plant Manufacturing Industry (GLIPMI), identifying distinct subsectors in different phases of capability erosion and specifying sector-specific vulnerabilities and intervention points. Eight testable propositions are formulated connecting complexity management capabilities to competitive outcomes. The paper provides both theoretical grounding for capability-based competition in EPC markets and practical implications for firms, industry associations, and policymakers. However, it needs to be acknowledged that this framework represents theory-building rather than empirical validation; the propositions require future primary research to test causal mechanisms and boundary conditions. The analysis suggests that complexity management capability is necessary for sustained EPC leadership but may not be sufficient when confronted with asymmetric subsidization, pricing pressures, or structural financing disadvantages.
    Date: 2025–11–27
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:fzr8x_v1
  29. By: HARA, Yasushi
    Abstract: This study revisits the impact of customer concentration on the performance and survival of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) by proposing an integrated “Quantity-Quality-Structure” framework. Utilizing a large-scale panel dataset of Japanese manufacturing SMEs, we employ rigorous empirical methods—including two-way fixed-effects models with controls for export status, Cox proportional hazards models, and dynamic event studies—to disentangle the complex effects of inter-firm relationships. While the static relationship between customer concentration (Quantity) and sales growth is found to be inconsistent across industries, our survival analysis reveals a robust and critical finding: high concentration significantly increases the risk of firm exit, supporting the vulnerability tenet of Resource Dependency Theory. Conversely, simple network connectivity (Degree Centrality) acts as a powerful buffer, significantly reducing exit risk and functioning as “structural insurance, ” whereas network brokerage (Betweenness Centrality) can exacerbate risks in certain assembly industries. Furthermore, dynamic analyses of strategic change reveal that firms “decoupling” from major customers face a multiyear “danger zone” of increased vulnerability before achieving diversification. Successful growth strategies are shown to be driven not by expanding existing B2B ties, but by a strategic pivot to new market types, specifically direct-to-consumer (B2C) segments. These findings reframe the debate on customer concentration from one of performance optimization to one of existential risk management and dynamic adaptation.
    Keywords: Customer Concentration, Firm Survival, Inter-firm Networks, Strategic Adaptation, SMEs
    JEL: L14 L25 M10 C23
    Date: 2025–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:tdbcdp:e-2025-02
  30. By: Cave, Martin; Shortall, Tony
    Date: 2025
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse25:331257

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