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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Justus Haucap; Mehmet Karacuka; Hakan Inke |
| Abstract: | Utilizing Connor’s International Cartel Database and employing difference-in-differences methodology, we find that market concentration, the number of buyers and cartel duration have significant impacts on cartel overcharges. We also find that the European Commission's 2006 guidelines on the method of setting fines for cartel infringements seems to have decreased cartel overcharges in the EU. In addition, the EU’s cartel damages directive of 2014 (2014/104/EU) appear to have increased private damage payments. Overall, we find support that these two changes in EU competition policy have a reversing impact on the otherwise increasing trend of cartel overcharges, as making the infringement more costly at least in the EU. |
| Keywords: | cartel fines, cartel damages, EU guidelines, competition law, antitrust |
| JEL: | L41 K21 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12259 |
| By: | Luise Eisfeld (University of Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | New entry is thought to be the primary competitive margin in software markets. I study how acquisitions of venture capital-funded startups affect entry incentives. I assemble a product-level dataset of enterprise software and use text-as-data methods to define markets. I build and estimate a dynamic entry model where acquisitions affect returns to entry via (1) changes in market structure and (2) an entry-for-buyout incentive. In counterfactual simulations, banning all startup acquisitions reduces entry by about 16% in the average market, whereas blocking high-priced deals conducted by incumbents slightly raises entry. These results indicate which acquisitions might merit prioritized scrutiny. |
| Keywords: | Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust, Entry, Startups, Enterprise Software, Innovation |
| JEL: | G34 L22 L26 L49 L86 M13 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2593 |
| By: | Tomaso Duso; Martin Peitz |
| Abstract: | Trade conflicts, geopolitical tensions, digital disruption, and the climate crisis pose major challenges for the European Union (EU) and its member states. As called for in the Draghi Report, industrial policy measures can increase competitiveness, strengthen resilience, and facilitate the twin transformation. This article explores ways in which competition policy can be realigned to better accommodate industrial policy objectives. Using German competition law as a reference point, it presents options with which legislatures and competition authorities can respond to current challenges, reconcile conflicting objectives, and adapt the decision-making framework. It then considers elements of a competition-oriented industrial policy, understood as an evidence-based, targeted approach in which competition serves both as a guiding principle and as a control variable. |
| Keywords: | industrial policy, protection of competition, competition, regulation, competition policy, competitiveness, internal market |
| JEL: | L40 L50 L52 K21 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2025_710 |
| By: | Cavalcanti, T.; Mohaddes, K.; Nian, H.; Yin, H. |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the pass-through of environmental compliance costs along supply chains. We compile a firm-level dataset linking regulated firms in pollution-intensive industries with their top five clients and suppliers. We find that clients of regulated firms invest less in R&D, employ fewer skilled R&D staff, and produce fewer innovations than clients of less regulated firms, while no comparable effects are observed for suppliers. The pass-through is stronger with larger trade volumes, higher input prices faced by clients, and in markets where regulated firms hold greater market power or clients face intense competition. Policy simulations suggest that green technology incentives for regulated firms and R&D subsidies for their clients can mitigate these adverse effects and raise social welfare by enhancing both innovation and environmental quality. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Compliance, Supply Chains, Pass-Through, R&D, Innovation |
| JEL: | O30 Q01 Q55 |
| Date: | 2025–10–18 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2568 |
| By: | Hans-Theo Normann; Nina Ruli\'e; Olaf Stypa; Tobias Werner |
| Abstract: | We analyze the delegation of pricing by participants, representing firms, to a collusive, self-learning algorithm in a repeated Bertrand experiment. In the baseline treatment, participants set prices themselves. In the other treatments, participants can either delegate pricing to the algorithm at the beginning of each supergame or receive algorithmic recommendations that they can override. Participants delegate more when they can override the algorithm's decisions. In both algorithmic treatments, prices are lower than in the baseline. Our results indicate that while self-learning pricing algorithms can be collusive, they can foster competition rather than collusion with humans-in-the-loop. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.27636 |
| By: | Chongwoo Choe; Antoine Dubus; Noriaki Matsushima; Shiva Shekhar |
| Abstract: | Marketplace platforms are central players in online retail and are in an advantageous position to leverage data generated by third-party sellers. This paper analyzes how a platform's encroachment decision - whether to enter its marketplace as a direct competitor - is shaped by regulations that restrict its use of seller data. We show that the platform's encroachment decision follows a non-monotonic pattern: it enters against sellers with either relatively low or sufficiently high brand value, but remains a pure intermediary for intermediate brand values. The data ban regulation alters this strategy by making the platform more likely to exclude low brand-value sellers and more likely to accommodate high brand-value sellers. The implication is that, while such regulation can enhance competition in markets with high-value sellers, it can inadvertently harm sellers and reduce consumer surplus in emerging markets, where sellers typically lack brand recognition and depend on platform visibility. These results underscore the need for more nuanced regulatory approaches - promoting data sharing in emerging markets and targeted bans in mature, established markets - to better balance welfare and competition. |
| Keywords: | marketplace platforms, data regulations, digital markets act, innovation |
| JEL: | L21 L51 L42 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12233 |
| By: | Susan Athey; Fiona Scott Morton |
| Abstract: | We study how market power in artificial intelligence (AI) shapes wages and welfare in open-economy general equilibrium by treating AI as a priced, imported factor. Across three models, we separate technical efficiency from the impact of upstream price setting. In a two-traded-goods benchmark, the incidence of AI price changes depends on how sectoral skill intensity changes with AI prices; non-monotone intensity can generate “double harm” for unskilled workers (lower real wage after a large decrease in the price of AI, and real wage decreases further when the AI price rises as a result of market power). With one non-traded sector, we observe that the classic “Dutch disease” effect here would arise when one sector gets more productive and draws labor away from other sectors, creating scarcity and raising prices; but this is not what we expect from the introduction of labor-substituting AI. In contrast, our last model considers two non-traded sectors and CES/free entry, and the opportunity for discrete adoption of technology that replaces unskilled labor from the AI-using sector. When AI reduces unit costs and increases variety, it will not pull U from non-tradables, instead it will displace workers from the AI-using sector and lower wage due to diminishing returns in alternative sectors. Strategic upstream pricing of AI then harms welfare through unit-cost (usage fees) and variety (access fees) channels, with income leakage abroad. We derive an adoption frontier tying feasible usage prices to displaced workers’ outside options and show a monopolist typically prices on this boundary; capping one instrument shifts rents to the other. Broad gains for the adopting country relies on pressure (or regulation) on both usage and access fees and as well as policy that supports productive absorption of displaced labor. The framework clarifies when AI can lower real wages and aggregate welfare despite efficiency gains. |
| JEL: | L10 L12 L4 L40 L5 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34444 |
| By: | Bathan, Bates M.; Daloonpate, Apichart; Mahathanaset, Itthipong |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy |
| Date: | 2025–09–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:asea25:373367 |
| By: | Edmark, Karin (SOFI, Stockholm University, and); Persson, Lovisa (Kristianstad University, and) |
| Abstract: | We study the wage effects of an expansion of for-profit preschools in Sweden, which followed after a reform in 2006 removed municipalities’ right to veto private entry. The expansion decreased preschool employers’ monopsony power by increasing the number of alternative employers. We use a differences-in-differences event study design to evaluate the impact on preschool workers’ wages, and find no evidence that wages were affected. In the context that we study, the absence of an upward wage effect may be explained by the entering for-profit firms’ propensity to hire less qualified, lower-paid staff, and workers from other sectors of the economy than the preschool sector. |
| Keywords: | Monopsony power; For-profit provision; Preschool workers; Gender gap |
| JEL: | H44 I20 J31 J42 |
| Date: | 2025–11–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1541 |
| By: | Tatyana Deryugina; Alminas Zaldokas; Anastassia Fedyk; Yuriy Gorodnichenko; James Hodson; Ilona Sologoub |
| Abstract: | We develop a novel, scalable method for assessing the quality of public procurement systems using standard administrative data. Our approach compares the distribution of procurement opportunities to the distribution of contract awards across firms. We first derive a simple theoretical benchmark that relates the expected distribution of contract value winning firms, measured as a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), to the distribution of auction values, measured as a respective HHI, and the number of winning firms. Significant deviations of winning firms' HHI from this benchmark indicate potential governance failures such as corruption or unchecked collusion. Our method requires no subjective input, is transparent and reproducible, and allows for meaningful comparisons across countries, industry sectors, and over time. We use procurement data from Ukraine and EU member states in 2018-2021 to assess the performance of five large sectors. Results indicate that Ukraine's procurement performance in four of the five sectors is comparable to many other European countries. However, Ukraine's construction sector consistently displays the largest excess concentration among all countries considered, consistent with anecdotal evidence of corruption in this sector. Overall, with minimal data requirements, our method offers a practical tool for cross-sector and cross-country assessment of procurement systems. |
| Keywords: | procurement, corruption, Ukraine, collusion |
| JEL: | D73 L10 H11 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12250 |
| By: | Manuel C. Kathan (University of Augsburg); Raphaela Roeder (University of Augsburg); Sebastian Utz (University of Augsburg); Martin Nerlinger (University of St. Gallen - School of Finance; Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | We examine how changes in competition affect firms’ carbon performance. Exploiting reductions in import tariffs as a quasi-natural experiment that increases competitive pressure, we find that stronger competition improves firms’ carbon efficiency through lower Scope 1 and 2 emission intensities. These results remain robust to alternative specifications, heterogeneous treatment effects, and placebo tests. Mechanism analyses indicate systematic differences in firms’ strategic responses. High-emission firms tend to adopt visible environmental actions and reallocate resources toward intangible assets, whereas low-emission firms increase investment and financing activities. Overall, our results highlight competition as a determinant of corporate decarbonization, suggesting that market forces can complement regulatory approaches to improving firms’ environmental performance. |
| Keywords: | Carbon Emissions, Environmental Performance, Sustainability, Competition, Import Tariffs, Quasi-Natural Experiment |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2588 |
| By: | Doron Sayag; Avichai Snir; Daniel Levy |
| Abstract: | In 1991 and 2008, Israel abolished the equivalents of 1-cent and 5-cent coins, respectively, effectively eliminating low-denomination coins and introducing rounding in cash transactions. When totals were rounded up, shoppers incurred a small rounding tax. Using detailed data on price endings and basket sizes across supermarkets, drugstores, small groceries, and convenience stores, we estimate that the magnitude of the rounding tax borne by Israeli consumers averaged only between 0.001 percent and 0.002 percent of revenues in the fast-moving consumer goods markets. These findings have implications for the ongoing debate regarding the desirability and viability of abolishing the 1-cent and 5-cent coins in the US. |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2511.05599 |
| By: | Colin Davis (The Institute for the Liberal Arts, Doshisha University, JAPAN); Laixun Zhao (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | We study how tax and transfer policies affect economic growth and income inequality in a framework in which growth, market structure and time preferences are all endogenously determined. Firm-level investment in product quality drives economic growth, creating a demand for household savings to finance both market entry and in-house R&D. By distinguishing between affluent households that invest in financial assets and poor households that live hand-to-mouth, and linking the former's savings to an endogenously determined discount rate, we derive the conditions for a stable balanced growth path. We then explore the effects of taxing the wage income and asset income of affluent households, while redistributing the proceeds to poor households, and find that diminishing marginal impatience introduces a new channel where both higher growth and lower inequality can be achieved, through tax policies that influence market concentration. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous time preferences; Diminishing marginal impatience; Endogenous quality growth; Wage income taxes; Interest income taxes |
| JEL: | E00 O31 O41 |
| Date: | 2025–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2025-27 |