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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Martinez Cillero Maria (European Commission - JRC); Napolitano Lorenzo (European Commission - JRC); Rentocchini Francesco (European Commission - JRC); Seri Cecilia; Zaurino Elena (European Commission - JRC) |
| Abstract: | HIGHLIGHTS ‣ Technological mergers and acquisitions (M&As) increase investors' market power by around 2% beyond standard M&As, with stronger effects concentrated among top R&D investors, US-based investors, and high-tech manufacturing investors. ‣ The increase in market power seems primarily driven by the consolidation of control over existing patents, limiting knowledge diffusion and making it harder for competitors to catch up. ‣ These findings support ongoing policy discussions on updating merger review regulations, as traditional concentration metrics may not fully capture competition risks posed by large technology firms. ‣ Technological assets and innovations are often embedded and masked within larger M&A deals. Separating the technology component of patents would allow regulators to assess competition concerns related to innovation while still allowing the acquisition to proceed. ‣ The analysis draws on a newly constructed firm-level dataset to provide a more systematic picture of technological M&As and market power. |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:iptwpa:jrc145729 |
| By: | Haruvy, Ernan; Heinrich, Timo; Walker, Matthew J. |
| Abstract: | This paper studies hold-ups in markets where sellers may impose undisclosed surcharges. While prior work has examined price transparency’s role in market outcomes, the distinct effect of a transparency norm—separate from a fairness norm—remains unestablished. We formulate a simple model that separates these norms and characterizes their equilibrium implications across different market settings. The model shows that price competition yields higher buyer surplus than ultimatum bargaining and that this surplus increases with transparency concerns but decreases with fairness concerns because of softened competition. Compulsory surcharges cannot be higher in bargaining, as sellers prefer a higher price to a higher surcharge as long as it does not change the buyer’s probability of acceptance. Experimental results confirm the transparency norm’s influence: Total prices are lower with price competition, and surcharges are lower with ultimatum bargaining. Additionally, surcharges rise when pricing is outside of the seller’s control. Estimates of the behavioral parameters reveal that sellers weigh transparency at least as heavily as fairness. The results imply that firms fearing hold-ups should still procure goods and services in competitive market structures. |
| Keywords: | surcharge, transparent pricing, fairness, social norm, hold-up, procurement |
| JEL: | C91 D47 D82 L14 M55 |
| Date: | 2026–01–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127601 |
| By: | Chen, Yongmin; Li, Zhuozheng; Zhang, Tianle |
| Abstract: | We study the impacts of repeat purchases on consumer search and price competition in an overlapping generations model. Search incentives are higher for “new” consumers and lower for “old” consumers in each generation, which changes price competition directly for these consumers and also indirectly through intertemporal rivalry. There exist two types of consumer loyalty, with remarkably different competitive effects. Relative to the single-purchase benchmark, equilibrium price is lower when brand preference is unlikely to persist, but higher when discount factors are relatively low. |
| Keywords: | search, repeat purchase, dynamic search incentive, price competition |
| JEL: | D8 L1 |
| Date: | 2026–02–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127995 |
| By: | Manning, Alan; Petrongolo, Barbara |
| Abstract: | We investigate employer monopsony power in local labour markets in the UK. We propose a model in which market power stems from idiosyncratic worker preferences over non-wage attributes of jobs, including the commuting distance. This set-up delivers point-specific, overlapping local labour markets. The resulting concentration index reflects the intensity of commuting flows between local areas, and is lower than the conventional index based on self-contained, non-overlapping areas because commuting across local areas expand workers’ outside options. We estimate that employment concentration in local labour markets was slightly falling over the past 2 decades. The model-based concentration index is negatively correlated to local wages and performs better than other purely local concentration measures. However, in quantitative terms, the observed fall in concentration can predict only a negligible increase in wages. |
| Keywords: | job search; reference dependence; reservation wages; wage cyclicality |
| JEL: | R14 J01 L81 J1 |
| Date: | 2024–07–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:137500 |
| By: | Ashfaq, M.; Toxvaerd, F.; Wei, Y. |
| Abstract: | We study collusive agreements in an infinite-horizon model in which firms invest in inventories of intermediate goods and compete in quantities of final goods. Stocks of inventories act as capacity constraints at the time of production but can be replenished for future use through investment. Input stocks simultaneously impact firms' ability to deviate from collusive agreements and their ability to punish such deviations and therefore have ambiguous effects on the sustainability of collusion. We characterize subgame perfect equilibria in grim trigger strategies in which firms potentially hold asymmetric excess inventories on the collusive path. We show that the sustainability of collusive agreements is non-monotone in inventory stocks. While holding excess capacity is costly and unproductive, the practice can improve firms' ability to sustain anticompetitive agreements. |
| Keywords: | Collusion, Cartels, Inventories, Capacity Constraints |
| JEL: | L13 L41 D25 |
| Date: | 2026–02–27 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2612 |
| By: | Chun Pang Chow; Hiroyuki Kasahara; Yoichi Sugita |
| Abstract: | We establish nonparametric identification of production functions, total factor productivity (TFP), price markups, and firms' output prices and quantities, as well as consumer demand, using firm-level revenue data, without observing output quantity, in a monopolistically competitive environment with a fully nonparametric demand system. This result overturns the widely held view -- formalized by Bond, Hashemi, Kaplan, and Zoch (2021) -- that output elasticities and markups are not nonparametrically identifiable from revenue data without quantity information. Under the additional restriction that demand satisfies the homothetic single-aggregator (HSA) structure of Matsuyama and Ushchev (2017), we further nonparametrically identify the representative consumer's utility function from firm-level revenue data. This new identification result enables counterfactual welfare analysis without parametric assumptions on preferences. We propose a semiparametric estimator that is feasible for standard firm-level datasets under a Cobb--Douglas production specification. Monte Carlo simulations show that the estimator performs well, while treating revenue as output induces substantial bias. Applying the estimator to Chilean manufacturing data, we reject the CES specification in favor of HSA, and find that market power reduces welfare by approximately 3%--6% of industry revenue in the three largest manufacturing industries in 1996. |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2603.01492 |
| By: | Sharat Ganapati; Colin J. Hottman |
| Abstract: | Transaction-level quantity discounts are a pervasive feature of US trade, shaping both price variation and tariff incidence. Using administrative microdata, we show that these discounts reflect transaction-level scale economies rather than market power. Accounting for these micro-level economies resolves a key puzzle: while observed import prices rose one-for-one with 2018-2019 US tariffs, we show this was driven by the loss of scale economies as transaction sizes collapsed. Controlling for this scale effect, the strategic pass-through of tariffs to scale-free prices falls to 60 percent, implying foreign exporters absorbed a significant share of the burden through reduced markups. |
| JEL: | F10 F12 F14 |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34901 |
| By: | Sauvé, Edwige |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes with multiple single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem can use data from one product to improve the quality of its other products. We use the framework to study three regulatory policies aimed at leveling the playing field. Restricting the ecosystem’s cross-product data usage, or forcing it to share data with single-product firms, benefits those firms and induces them to innovate more. However, these policies also dampen the ecosystem’s incentive to collect data and innovate, potentially raising prices. Consumers are better off only when single-product firms are sufficiently good at innovating. Facilitating data exchange between single-product firms via a data cooperative can backfire and harm them, because it induces the ecosystem to price more aggressively. For both the data-sharing and data-cooperative policies, there exist data-compensation schemes such that consumers are better off compared to no regulation. |
| Keywords: | Digital ecosystems; innovation; data regulation; data cooperative |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:131492 |
| By: | Scavino Alfaro, Vicenzo |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a DSGE model with heterogeneous households (HANK) to study how automation shocks psi_t affect the functional distribution of income and inequality when (i) substitution between effective labor and automated capital and (ii) aggregate market power, captured by markups disciplined by antitrust enforcement with real resource costs, coexist. Households face idiosyncratic risk, liquidity constraints, and mobility frictions, and dynamically choose an occupational/sectoral path j; automation can also affect effective productivity heterogeneously across paths. On the policy side, a Citizen Sovereign Wealth Fund partially captures rents associated with automation and market power and finances an in-kind floor and a citizen dividend under explicit operational rules (non-negativity, feasibility, and an institutional cap on public equity ownership). The main contribution is a fully closed framework in terms of timing, detrending, and ex-dividend flow-of-funds, delivering transparent theoretical predictions for the labor share, inequality, and the transmission of technological shocks under heterogeneity, along with a methodological appendix to guide future empirical implementations. |
| Keywords: | automation, artificial intelligence, HANK, market power, markups, antitrust, sovereign wealth fund, citizen dividend, occupational mobility |
| JEL: | D43 D63 E24 E61 L41 O33 |
| Date: | 2025–12–29 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127515 |
| By: | Brodzicki, Tomasz |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an extended framework building on the Melitz model to analyze the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) adoption on firm behavior, market structure, and international trade. We introduce a log-normal distribution of firm productivity and model heterogeneous AI adoption by incorporating fixed costs and a free-rider effect, where non-adopters benefit indirectly from technological diffusion. A key innovation lies in including AI productivity gains, either symmetric in a simplified manner or stochastic, allowing for firm-level variation in implementation success. This addition generates realistic dispersion in post-adoption outcomes and alters firm dynamics near critical survival, investment, and export activity thresholds. We compare deterministic AI adoption trajectories (sigmoid and exponential) with stochastic scenarios, highlighting how uncertainty in AI outcomes can amplify competitive asymmetries and increase market volatility. Under high fixed adoption costs and weak spillovers, the model exhibits strong endogenous concentration effects, especially when adoption follows an exponential path reinforced by feedback loops, potentially approaching scenarios of artificial superintelligence (ASI) or singularity. A sigmoid adoption trajectory implies bounded gains and a more stable equilibrium. The paper also explores the potential breakdown of monopolistic competition assumptions, suggesting oligopolistic drift in concentrated AI-intensive markets. These dynamics give rise to targeted policy implications to promote inclusive technological diffusion and reduce systemic risk. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence; AI; Market Structure; Global Trade; Productivity; Firm Heterogeneity; Technological Change |
| JEL: | D24 F12 F61 L11 O33 |
| Date: | 2024–08–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:127767 |
| By: | Carsten Eckel; Lisandra Flach; Ning Meng |
| Abstract: | Products produced by multiproduct firms can be linked through demand linkages (cannibalization), supply linkages (joint production), or both. We analyze how these within-firm linkages shape the propagation of shocks - such as tariffs - across products and markets and affect firm performance through changes in markups and marginal costs. Exploiting antidumping duties as firm-product-market specific shocks, we provide evidence of both types of linkages and quantify their relative importance. On average, two-thirds of within-firm linkages arise from demand linkages and one-third from supply linkages, with substantial heterogeneity across industries. We further estimate their effects on markups and marginal costs, showing that roughly 80% of the adjustment occurs through marginal costs and 20% through markups. Our findings indicate that disregarding either type of linkage can lead to sizable misestimations of markups and pass-through rates. |
| Keywords: | multiproduct firms, cannibalization effect, joint production, demand linkages, supply linkages, antidumping duties, markups, marginal costs |
| JEL: | D21 D22 D24 F12 F13 F14 L11 L25 |
| Date: | 2026 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_12530 |
| By: | J. Lu Jin; X. Lai Xiaopeng; L. Wang (Audencia Business School); K. Wang Kunyi |
| Abstract: | While prior literature has emphasized that coopetition is a critical strategic choice that can enhance a firm's competitive advantage, the antecedents and consequences of the strategy in the international context remain underexplored. Based on the relational view, this study examines whether resource complementarity and goal compatibility foster coopetition between foreign and local partners in international joint ventures (IJVs) and in turn improve performance outcomes.Drawing on the empirical analyses of coopetition between partners in 165 IJVs in China, this study finds that partner resource complementarity and partner goal compatibility are positively associated with coopetition, which in turn correlates with improved IJV performance.Institutional and industrial environments are associated with the effectiveness of resource complementarity and goal compatibility. These findings offer valuable insights for IJV managers seeking to manage cooperation and competition between partners. |
| Keywords: | Market competition, Legal inadequacy, Goal compatibility, Resource complementarity, International joint venture, Coopetition, Coopetition International joint venture Resource complementarity Goal compatibility Legal inadequacy Market competition, CoopetitionInternational joint ventureResource complementarityGoal compatibilityLegal inadequacyMarket competition |
| Date: | 2025–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05460936 |
| By: | Brian Fabo (National Bank of Slovakia); Pavel Gertler (National Bank of Slovakia); Peter Toth (National Bank of Slovakia) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how consumer prices responded to two permanent VAT reductions in Slovakia, which lowered the rate from 20% to 10%, first for essential staples in 2016, and later for a broader set of goods in 2020. Leveraging detailed scanner data and a synthetic difference- in-differences framework, we find that VAT pass-through is highly heterogeneous: it can be full or incomplete, depending on product attributes, demand elasticity, and policy design. The 2016 reform, which targeted clearly defined essential goods, led to complete and persistent price re- ductions. In contrast, the 2020 reform, applied to a loosely defined category of healthy goods, produced only partial and short-lived price effects. Our findings underscore the importance of careful policy design, and suggest that well-targeted VAT cuts can deliver meaningful consumer price relief, while broader or less transparent interventions may instead boost retailer margins without durable benefits for shoppers. |
| JEL: | D12 E62 H22 H25 H31 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:svk:wpaper:1122 |
| By: | Anabela Marques Santos |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the spatial distribution of European Union research and innovation (R&I) funding, comparing excellence-oriented (Horizon 2020) and cohesion-oriented (Cohesion Policy) instruments, and analysing the role of governance level within Cohesion Policy. Using NUTS3-level data from the 2014-2020 programing period and spatial econometric models, we find that Horizon 2020 funding is concentrated in regions with high patent intensity, GDP per capita, and knowledge-intensive services, reinforcing cumulative advantage and contributing predominantly to within-country inequalities in access to funding. Cohesion R&I funding exhibits stronger between-country redistribution and integrates socio-economic vulnerability, though its internal allocation varies with governance: national management fosters clustering and positive spillovers, while regional management spreads resources more widely but intensifies intra-national competition. The results underscore the trade-offs inherent in EU R&I funding; policies that prioritise excellence, redistribution, or spatial coordination cannot maximise all objectives simultaneously, with governance choices mediating the balance between concentration, spillovers, and territorial equity. |
| Keywords: | R&I funding; Cohesion policy; Horizon 2020; Governance |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ict:wpaper:2013/404059 |
| By: | Yixuan Liu; Hua Zhang; Eric Zou |
| Abstract: | Prepaid consumption is a common feature of modern consumer markets and is often presented as a mutually beneficial arrangement: consumers receive upfront discounts, and firms secure future sales. We analyze a large-scale Pay Now, Buy Later (PNBL) program in which consumers prepay for restaurant credit with bonuses, and spend the balance later. Using detailed transaction data from over 4 million consumers, we document widespread balance breakage: approximately 40% of prepaid value is never used. Because many consumers underutilize their balances, merchants recover significantly more than the bonus cost. The median firm earns roughly $5.5 in breakage profit for every $1 of bonus credit issued. While PNBL participation does lead to modest increases in consumer spending over time, firms gain substantially more from breakage than from any loyalty-driven revenue. These findings challenge the prevailing win–win narrative: PNBL schemes often result in a significant transfer from consumers to firms. We develop a stylized contract model to illustrate the misaligned incentives firms face, and show through counterfactual analysis that a simple escrow policy with an appropriately chosen deposit requirement can realign firm incentives and generate more consumer-serving outcomes. |
| JEL: | D12 D90 G23 G41 K20 L14 L81 M31 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34918 |
| By: | Di Corato, Luca; Moretto, Michele |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a continuous-time regulatory problem in which a firm holds persistent private information about demand and is subject to a flow limited-liability constraint. The regulator regulates prices through a dynamic mechanism that ensures truthful reporting of the evolving type. Limited liability imposes a state-dependent lower bound on the firm’s instantaneous utility, inducing a reflecting boundary in continuation utility and giving rise to a tractable singular-control representation. We derive closed-form expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the associated continuation-utility function, and we characterize the optimal up-front transfer required to induce truthful revelation of the firm’s initial type. The resulting contract is fully explicit and highlights how limited liability shapes information rents and regulatory distortions over time. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy, Financial Economics |
| Date: | 2026–03–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:396239 |
| By: | André Kurmann; Étienne Lalé; Julien Martin |
| Abstract: | This article provides the first systematic assessment of the labor market effects of a 25% decline in travel by Canadians to the United States in 2025. We combine mobile phone data measuring the presence of Canadian visitors at the zip code × industry level with real-time employment data at the establishment level. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we estimate that establishments in the most exposed markets experienced employment declines of about 6%, implying a loss of between 13, 900 and 42, 100 jobs in the United States. These effects are spatially concentrated and should be interpreted as lower bounds, as our analysis is limited to small and medium-sized enterprises and does not account for spillover effects. Cet article fournit la première évaluation systématique des effets sur le marché du travail de la diminution de 25 % des voyages de Canadiens vers les États-Unis en 2025. Nous combinons des données de téléphonie mobile mesurant la présence de visiteurs canadiens au niveau code postal × industrie avec des données d’emploi en temps réel au niveau des établissements. À l’aide d’une approche en différences-en-différences, nous estimons que les établissements situés dans les marchés les plus exposés ont connu des baisses d’emploi d’environ 6 %, ce qui implique une perte comprise entre 13 900 et 42 100 emplois aux États-Unis. Ces effets sont concentrés spatialement et doivent être interprétés comme des bornes inférieures puisque notre analyse se limite aux petites et moyennes entreprises et fait abstraction des effets de débordement. |
| Keywords: | Tourism, Smartphone Data, Employment, Business Dynamics, Tourisme, dynamique des entreprises, Smartphone Data, Emploi |
| JEL: | F14 J21 |
| Date: | 2026–02–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2026s-01 |
| By: | Lee, Daniel Chaein; Kim, Jungkeun; Jhang, Jihoon; Park, Jooyoung; Cho, Areum; Lee, Jaehoon |
| Abstract: | Service firms increasingly use surcharges on complimentary items, yet little is known about how consumers respond to these charges. Across five studies in the restaurant context, we show that even nominal surcharges elicit negative consumer responses. Specifically, adding surcharges to complimentary items lowers engagement with advertisements. Furthermore, even a one-cent surcharge reduces perceived fairness and revisit intention. These effects arise because such surcharges violate communal norms, a type of relationship norm emphasizing genuine concern for others and acts of goodwill. By contrast, the negative effect disappears when exchange norms are activated, while it persists under communal norm activation. Together, these findings advance research on consumer responses to small surcharges on complimentary items and offer practical guidance on how service firms can communicate surcharges to mitigate negative reactions. |
| Keywords: | complimentary items; partitioned pricing; price fairness; relationship norms; surcharge |
| JEL: | L81 R14 J01 |
| Date: | 2026–04–30 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:137507 |