nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2020‒06‒22
24 papers chosen by
Russell Pittman
United States Department of Justice

  1. Kill Zone By Kamepalli, Sai Krishna; Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi
  2. Dynamic Competition in Negotiated Price Markets By Jason Allen; Shaoteng Li
  3. Market Power and Price Discrimination: Learning from Changes in Renewables Regulation By ., Imelda; Fabra, Natalia
  4. Winning Big: Scale and Success in Retail Entrepreneurship By Hollenbeck, Brett; Giroldo, Renato
  5. Preferences, Confusion and Competition By Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo; Schmutzler, Armin
  6. On the Disclosure of Promotion Value in Platforms with Learning Sellers By Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela
  7. Environmental Preferences and Technological Choices : Is Market Competition Clean or Dirty? By Aghion, Philippe; Bénabou, Roland; Martin, Ralf; Roulet, Alexandra
  8. Uniform Pricing versus Third-Degree Price Discrimination By Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel
  9. An Impulse-Regime Switching Game Model of Vertical Competition By Ren\'e A\"id; Luciano Campi; Liangchen Li; Mike Ludkovski
  10. Patents to Products: Product Innovation and Firm Dynamics By Argente, David; Baslandze, Salomé; Hanley, Douglas; Moreira, Sara
  11. Economic and Econometric Analyses of the World Petroleum Industry, Energy Subsidies, and Air Pollution By Kheiravar, Khaled H
  12. Redistribution through Markets By Mohammad Akbarpour; Piotr; Scott Duke Kominers
  13. Selling Constraints By Moraga-González, José-Luis; Watanabe, Makoto
  14. Price Parity Clauses for Hotel Room Booking: Empirical Evidence from Regulatory Change By Ennis, Sean; Ivaldi, Marc; Lagos, Vicente
  15. Does Firm Investment Respond to Peers' Investment? By Maria Cecilia Bustamante; Laurent Frésard
  16. Product differentiation in video games: A closer look at Fortnite's success By Moritz, Karl-Heinz; Schöber, Timo; Stadtmann, Georg
  17. Legal Regulations of E-commerce in China: Focusing on the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the E-Commerce Law (Japanese) By KAWASHIMA Fujio
  18. Monopolies Inflict Great Harm on Low- and Middle-Income Americans By James A. Schmitz
  19. Firm size and economic concentration: An analysis from lognormal expansion By Lina Cortés; Juan M. Lozada; Javier Perote
  20. La convergence « médias et télécoms » à l’épreuve de la COVID-19 By Gérard Pogorel; Augusto Preta
  21. Dana Eti ve Süt Sektörlerinde Tedarik Zinciri ve Karlýlýk Analizi By Yusuf Emre Akgunduz; Seyit Mumin Cilasun; Elif Ozcan Tok
  22. Economic Properties of Multi-Product Supply Chains By Philip A. Tominac; Victor M. Zavala
  23. Optimal payment contracts in trade relationships By Fischer, Christian

  1. By: Kamepalli, Sai Krishna; Rajan, Raghuram G; Zingales, Luigi
    Abstract: We study why high-priced acquisitions of entrants by an incumbent do not necessarily stimulate more innovation and entry in an industry (like that of digital platforms) where customers face switching costs and enjoy network externalities. The prospect of an acquisition by the incumbent platform undermines early adoption by customers, reducing prospective payoffs to new entrants. This creates a "kill zone" in the space of startups, as described by venture capitalists, where new ventures are not worth funding. Evidence from changes in investment in startups by venture capitalists after major acquisitions by Facebook and Google suggests this is more than a mere theoretical possibility.
    Keywords: Acquisitions; Digital Platforms; Kill Zone
    JEL: G31 G34 L41
    Date: 2020–05
  2. By: Jason Allen; Shaoteng Li
    Abstract: This paper develops a framework for investigating dynamic competition in markets where price is negotiated between an individual customer and multiple firms repeatedly. Using contract-level data for the Canadian mortgage market, we provide evidence of an “invest-then-harvest” pricing pattern: lenders offer relatively low interest rates to attract new borrowers and poach rivals' existing customers, and then at renewal charge interest rates which can be higher than what may be available through other lenders in the marketplace. We build a dynamic model of price negotiation with search and switching frictions to capture key market features. We estimate the model and use it to investigate (i) the effects of dynamic competition on borrowers' and banks' payoffs, (ii) the implications of dynamic versus static settings for merger-studies, and (iii) the impacts from recent Canadian macroprudential policies.
    Keywords: Financial institutions; Financial services; Market structure and pricing
    JEL: L2 D4 G21
    Date: 2020–06
  3. By: ., Imelda; Fabra, Natalia
    Abstract: In many settings, market power gives rise to price differences across markets. While arbitrage reduces market power and price discrimination, it need not be welfare-enhancing. Instead, as shown in this paper, addressing market power directly (e.g., through forward contracts) also reduces price discrimination while improving consumers' and social welfare. Empirical evidence from the Spanish electricity market confirms our theoretical predictions. Using detailed bid data, we exploit two regulatory changes that switched from paying renewables according to variable or fixed prices, and vice-versa. Overall, we find that fixed prices (which act as forward contracts) were more effective in weakening firms' market power, even though variable prices led to less price discrimination through arbitrage. This shows that it is in general not correct to equate increased price convergence and stronger competition or enhanced effciency.
    Keywords: arbitrage; Forward contracts; market power; price discrimination; renewables
    Date: 2020–05
  4. By: Hollenbeck, Brett; Giroldo, Renato
    Abstract: In this paper we study a novel setting where firms were randomly allocated differently sized retail chains in a new and rapidly growing industry. Beginning in 2014, Washington State used a lottery to allocate licenses to firms in the newly legalized retail cannabis industry. This lottery generates random variation in firm size and in the level of market concentration. We also observe detailed data on all subsequent industry transactions, including prices, wholesale costs, markups, and product assortments. We find that firms that are randomly allocated more retail store licenses in the lottery ultimately earn much higher per store profits than single-store firms. Retailers in multi-store chains charge lower margins, offer larger product assortments, and pay lower wholesale prices. They also face higher but more elastic consumer demand. Similarly at the market level, more concentrated markets have lower average prices and markups. We conclude that higher retail scale and a more concentrated retail sector can benefit consumers and firms alike.
    Keywords: Economies of scale, retail pricing, markups, entrepreneurship
    JEL: L11 L22 L81
    Date: 2020–05–20
  5. By: Hefti, Andreas; Liu, Shuo; Schmutzler, Armin
    Abstract: Do firms seek to make the market transparent, or do they confuse consumers in their product perceptions? We show that the answer to this question depends decisively on preference heterogeneity. Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, confusion is not necessarily an equilibrium in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms strive to fully educate consumers. By contrast, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion becomes part of the equilibrium strategies. The adverse welfare consequences of confusion can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option, or inefficiently refrain from buying. Qualitatively similar insights obtain for political contests, in which candidates compete for voters with heterogeneous preferences.
    Keywords: consumer confusion; differentiated products; obfuscation; polarized/indecisive preferences; Political Competition; price competition
    JEL: D43 L13 M30
    Date: 2020–05
  6. By: Gur, Yonatan (Stanford U); Macnamara, Gregory (Stanford U); Saban, Daniela (Stanford U)
    Abstract: In many marketplaces that facilitate trade with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus, prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers but platforms can influence prices through (i) price-dependent promotion policies that can increase demand for a product by featuring it in a prominent position in the webpage and (ii) the information revealed to sellers about the value of being promoted. Identifying effective joint information design and promotion policies is a challenging dynamic problem as sellers can sequentially learn the promotion value from sales observations and update prices accordingly. We introduce the notion of confounding promotion policies, which are designed to prevent a Bayesian seller from learning the promotion value (at the expense of the short-run loss of diverting consumers from the best product offering). Leveraging these policies, we characterize the maximum long-run average consumer surplus that is achievable through joint information design and promotion policies when the seller sets prices myopically. We then establish a Bayesian Nash equilibrium by showing that the seller's best response to the platform's optimal policy is to price myopically at every history. The equilibrium we identify is platform-optimal within the class of horizon-maximin equilibria, in which strategies are not predicated on precise knowledge of the horizon length, and are designed to maximize payoff over the worst-case horizon. Our analysis allows one to identify effective platform policies in a broad range of demand models.
    Date: 2020
  7. By: Aghion, Philippe; Bénabou, Roland; Martin, Ralf; Roulet, Alexandra
    Abstract: This paper investigates the joint effect of consumers' environmental concerns and product-market competition on firms' decisions whether to innovate "clean" or "dirty". We first develop a step-by-step innovation model to capture the basic intuition that socially responsible consumers induce firms to escape competition by pursuing greener innovations. To test and quantify the theory, we bring together patent data, survey data on environmental values, and competition measures. Using a panel of 8,562 firms from the automobile sector that patented in 42 countries between 1998 and 2012, we indeed find that greater exposure to environmental attitudes has a significant positive effect on the probability for a firm to innovate in the clean direction, and all the more so the higher the degree of product market competition. Results suggest that the combination of historically realistic increases in prosocial attitudes and product market competition can have the same effect on green innovation as major increase in fuel prices.
    Keywords: climate change; Competition; Environment; Innovation; patents; Social Responsibility
    JEL: D21 D22 D62 D64 H23 O3 O31
    Date: 2020–04
  8. By: Bergemann, Dirk (?); Castro, Francisco (?); Weintraub, Gabriel (Stanford U)
    Abstract: We compare the revenue of the optimal third-degree price discrimination policy against a uniform pricing policy. A uniform pricing policy offers the same price to all segments of the market. Our main result establishes that for a broad class of third-degree price discrimination problems with concave revenue functions and common support, a uniform price is guaranteed to achieve one-half of the optimal monopoly proï¬ ts. This revenue bound holds for any arbitrary number of segments and prices that the seller would use in case he would engage in third-degree price discrimination. We further establish that these conditions are tight and that a weakening of common support or concavity leads to arbitrarily poor revenue comparisons.
    Date: 2020–02
  9. By: Ren\'e A\"id; Luciano Campi; Liangchen Li; Mike Ludkovski
    Abstract: We study a new kind of non-zero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a representative downstream firm to produce a final consumption good. Both firms can influence the price of the commodity. By shutting down or increasing generation capacities, the upstream firm influences the price with impulses. By switching (or not) to a substitute, the downstream firm influences the drift of the commodity price process. We study the resulting impulse--regime switching game between the two firms, focusing on explicit threshold-type equilibria. Remarkably, this class of games naturally gives rise to multiple Nash equilibria, which we obtain via a verification based approach. We exhibit three types of equilibria depending on the ultimate number of switches by the downstream firm (zero, one or an infinite number of switches). We illustrate the diversification effect provided by vertical integration in the specific case of the crude oil market. Our analysis shows that the diversification gains strongly depend on the pass-through from the crude price to the gasoline price.
    Date: 2020–06
  10. By: Argente, David; Baslandze, Salomé; Hanley, Douglas; Moreira, Sara
    Abstract: We study the relationship between patents and actual product innovation in the market, and how this relationship varies with firms' market share. We use textual analysis to create a new data set that links patents to products of firms in the consumer goods sector. We find that patent filings are positively associated with subsequent product innovation by firms, but at least half of product innovation and growth comes from firms that never patent. We also find that market leaders use patents differently from followers. Market leaders have lower product innovation rates, though they rely on patents more. Patents of market leaders relate to higher future sales above and beyond their effect on product innovation, and these patents are associated with declining product introduction on the part of competitors, which is consistent with the notion that market leaders use their patents to limit competition. We then use a model to analyze the firms' patenting and product innovation decisions. We show that the private value of a patent is particularly high for large firms as patents protect large market shares of existing products.
    Keywords: creative destruction; growth; Innovation; patent value; patents; productivity
    JEL: O3 O4
    Date: 2020–05
  11. By: Kheiravar, Khaled H
    Abstract: The decisions made by petroleum producers in the world oil market are both dynamic and strategic, and are thus best modeled as a dynamic game. In the first chapter of my dissertation, I review the literature on the world oil market and discuss my research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic game. My research on econometric modeling of the world oil market as a dynamic game research builds on the previous literature by combining three erstwhile separate dimensions of modeling the world oil market: dynamic optimization, game theory, and econometrics. In the second chapter of my dissertation, I develop and estimate a structural econometric model of the dynamic game among petroleum-producing firms in the world petroleum market. My model incorporates the dynamic behavior and strategic interactions that arise as petroleum-producing firms make their investment, production, merger, and acquisition decisions. I allow firms that are at least partially state-owned to have objectives other than profit maximization alone. I use the structural econometric model to analyze the effects of changes in OPEC membership, a ban on mergers, the privatization of state-owned oil companies, and demand shocks on the petroleum industry. Although I do not assume or impose that OPEC producers collude to maximize joint profits, but instead infer the strategy and payoffs for OPEC firms from the data, I find that OPEC behaves in such a way that is consistent with its mission and also with cartel behavior. Results of counterfactual simulations also show that a ban on mergers would decrease average firm payoff for both OPEC and non-OPEC firms, and decrease consumer surplus. Gasoline taxes have been touted by many economists as an efficient and relatively simple tool to address environmental concerns and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. Nevertheless, rather than removing subsidies and increasing gasoline taxes, many countries still subsidize gasoline, which may have the opposite effect of exacerbating air pollution and other problems associated with gasoline consumption. The Iranian government has heavily subsidized petroleum products since the early 1980s. As a result of these energy subsidies and artificially low national energy price, Iran is one of the most energy-intensive countries in the world. The Iranian government has recently taken a series of measures to reform and cut back on the energy subsidies. In the third chapter of my dissertation, I evaluate the effects of the Iranian subsidy reform on air quality using a regression discontinuity design. My results provide evidence across multiple different empirical specifications that the subsidy reform in Iran led to improvements in air quality. In particular, the first subsidy reform event, which increased gasoline prices and implemented a gasoline consumption quota; and the second subsidy reform event, which increased energy prices and decreased energy subsidies, both led to declines in concentrations of CO, O3, and NO2. In contrast, the fourth subsidy reform event, which increased fuel prices but removed the gasoline consumption quota, was less effective in reducing air pollution.
    Keywords: Business, Petroleum producers, Petroleum-producing firms, Dynamic behavior, Strategic interactions, World oil market, Gasoline taxes
    Date: 2019–01–01
  12. By: Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University); Piotr (Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE); Northwestern University); Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University; University of Chicago)
    Abstract: When macroeconomic tools fail to respond to wealth inequality optimally, regulators can still seek to mitigate inequality within individual markets. A social planner with distributional preferences might distort allocative efficiency to achieve a more desirable split of surplus, for example, by setting higher prices when sellers are poor--effectively, using the market as a redistributive tool. In this paper, we seek to understand how to design goods markets optimally in the presence of inequality. Using a mechanism design approach, we uncover the constrained Pareto frontier by identifying the optimal trade-off between allocative efficiency and redistribution in a setting where the second welfare theorem fails because of private information and participation constraints. We find that competitive equilibrium allocation is not always optimal. Instead, when there is substantial inequality across sides of the market, the optimal design uses a tax-like mechanism, introducing a wedge between the buyer and seller prices, and redistributing the resulting surplus to the poorer side of the market via lump-sum payments. When there is significant within-side inequality, meanwhile, it may be optimal to impose price controls even though doing so induces rationing.
    Keywords: optimal mechanism design, redistribution, inequality, welfare theorems
    JEL: D47 D61 D63 D82 H21
    Date: 2020
  13. By: Moraga-González, José-Luis; Watanabe, Makoto
    Abstract: Each firm has one unit to sell of a differentiated product and each consumer has demand for one unit. Consumers queue at the firms, inspect their products if they get the turn, and choose whether to buy or not. We study how selling constraints, which refer to the possible inability of firms to attend to all the buyers who may queue at their premises, affect the equilibrium price and social welfare. Efficient pricing typically involves a positive markup. A higher price, on the one hand, increases the value of trade (because only trades generating positive surplus are consummated) and, on the other hand, reduces the quantity of trade (because fewer buyers can afford paying a higher price). We show that equilibrium markups are inefficiently high except in the limiting situation of no selling constraints, in which case the equilibrium markup is efficient. Thus, selling constraints constitute a source of market power.
    Keywords: capacity- and selling-constrained firms; ordered search; price posting
    JEL: D4 J6 L1 L8 R3
    Date: 2020–05
  14. By: Ennis, Sean; Ivaldi, Marc; Lagos, Vicente
    Abstract: This paper examines the impact of most favored nation (MFN) clauses on retail prices, taking advantage of two natural experiments that changed vertical contracting between hotels and major digital platforms. The broad E.U. intervention narrowed the breadth of "price parity" obligations between hotels and major Online Travel Agencies (OTAs). Direct sales by hotels to customers subsequently became relatively cheaper. Comparisons with hotel pricing outside the E.U. confirm the reduction in prices for mid-level and luxury hotels. France and Germany went further and eliminated all price-parity agreements. This stronger intervention was associated solely with a significant additional price-reducing effect for mid-level hotels in Germany. Overall, wide MFNs are associated with higher retail prices. Regulating MFNs reduced prices with primary effects coming either from the narrow price-parity intervention or, perhaps, from direct sales becoming cheaper than OTAs in both E.U. and non-E.U. countries, and, interestingly, not from complete elimination of MFNs.
    Keywords: Digital Platforms; Hotel Industry; Impact Evaluation; Most favored customer; Most favored nation; Online Travel Agency; Price Parity Clause
    JEL: K21 L14 L42 L81
    Date: 2020–05
  15. By: Maria Cecilia Bustamante (University of Maryland - Department of Finance); Laurent Frésard (University of Lugano; Swiss Finance Institute)
    Abstract: We study whether, how, and why the investment of a firm depends on the investment of other firms in the same product market. Using an instrumental variable based on the presence of local knowledge externalities, we find a sizeable complementarity of investment among product market peers, holding across a large majority of sectors. Peer effects are stronger in concentrated markets, featuring more heterogeneous firms, and for smaller firms with less precise information. Our findings are consistent with a model in which managers are imperfectly informed about fundamentals and use peers' investments as a source of information. Product market peer effects in investment could amplify shocks in production networks.
    Keywords: investment, peer effect, competition, agglomeration economies
    JEL: G31
    Date: 2020–05
  16. By: Moritz, Karl-Heinz; Schöber, Timo; Stadtmann, Georg
    Abstract: Fortnite is the most successful video game in terms of revenues generated. Since it belongs to the 'free-to-play games', the company has to optimize the in-game-shop to generate revenues. Product dif- ferentiation is one possibility to optimize the profitability of the game. In this paper, we use a microeconomic approach in order to highlight the implications of product differentiation for the profit maximization problem.
    Keywords: Fortnite,gaming,Freemium,product di erentiation,market segmentation
    Date: 2020
  17. By: KAWASHIMA Fujio
    Abstract: In China, e-commerce transactions, represented by those done through Alibaba-run e-commerce shopping malls such as Taobao and T-mall, have been developing rapidly. In addition, taking advantage of the proliferation of smart phone payment services which have developed faster than in Japan, a variety of new information technology-related businesses have been introduced into markets, such as ride sharing, bike sharing, internet food delivery and so on. At present, most of such new entrants have been integrated, through capital and other relationships, into either one of Alibaba group, which runs Taobao, T-mall ad Alipay, or Tencent Group, which runs Wechat and Wechat Pay, which together constitute the two largest IT conglomerates. By demonstrating the contrast between the current trends in Japan, the United States and the European Union towards more and more stringent antimonopoly/competition laws regulation of IT giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, this discussion paper introduces legal regulations, especially regulations through China's Anti-Monopoly Law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law and E-Commerce Law, of Chinese IT giants and their characteristics and limitations. This paper also examines what lessons we can learn for corresponding regulations in other jurisdictions and development of international rules.
    Date: 2020–04
  18. By: James A. Schmitz
    Abstract: Today, monopolies inflict great harm on low- and middle-income Americans. One particularly pernicious way they harm them is by sabotaging low-cost products that are substitutes for the monopoly products. I'll argue that the U.S. housing crisis, legal crisis, and oral health crisis facing the low- and middle-income Americans are, in large part, the result of monopolies destroying low-cost alternatives in these industries that the poor would purchase. These results would not surprise those studying monopolies in the first half of the 20th century. During this period extensive evidence was developed showing monopolies engaging in these same activities and many others that harmed the poor. Models of monopoly were constructed by giants in economics and law, such as Henry Simons and Thurman Arnold, to explain these impacts of monopoly. These models are of sabotaging monopolies. Unfortunately, in the 1950s, the economics profession turned its back on this evidence, these models and these giants. It embraced the Cournot model of monopoly, that found in textbooks today. In this model the monopolist chooses its price, nothing more. Gone are the decisions on whether to sabotage substitutes or to employ any of the other weapons at the disposal of sabotaging monopolies. I'll call this Cournot monopoly the toothless monopoly. Using this model, the economics profession has concluded that the costs of monopoly are small. But the toothless monopoly model is ill-equipped to study the "costs of monopoly." By relying on it, the economics profession has made major errors in its study of monopoly.
    Keywords: Inequality; Monopoly; Cournot; Competition; Harberger; Sabotage
    JEL: K0 D22 L12 K21 D42 L0
    Date: 2020–05–15
  19. By: Lina Cortés; Juan M. Lozada; Javier Perote
    JEL: C14 L11 L25
    Date: 2020–06–08
  20. By: Gérard Pogorel (SES - Département Sciences Economiques et Sociales - Télécom ParisTech, ECOGE - Economie Gestion - I3, une unité mixte de recherche CNRS (UMR 9217) - Institut interdisciplinaire de l’innovation - X - École polytechnique - Télécom ParisTech - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Augusto Preta
    Abstract: Question d'Europe n°559 15 mai 2020 La convergence « médias et télécoms » à l'épreuve de la COVID-19 L'Europe dans une perspective transatlantique et internationale Gérard POGOREL Augusto PRETA La pandémie de la COVID-19 affecte tragiquement nos sociétés dans le monde entier. Ces circonstances extraordinaires nous ont contraints à passer plus de temps à domicile, limitant sévèrement nos mouvements et déplacements. Les réseaux de télécommunications, les services de communication et les médias jouent un rôle majeur dans la résilience économique et sociale. Ils fournissent les outils nécessaires à la transformation virtuelle du travail. Ils rendent possible le divertissement à la maison, alors que les théâtres, les cinémas et les sports nous sont interdits. Plus que jamais, la nature transformatrice de l'innovation numérique dans les industries des médias et des télécommunications joue sur notre façon de vivre et de travailler. L'IMPACT DE LA COVID-19 SUR L'INDUSTRIE AUDIOVISUELLE Les services de streaming répondent à la demande accrue des populations confinées à domicile. Alors que les chaînes de télévision améliorent leurs offres, combinant programmation linéaire et streaming, les services de streaming spécialisés se sont enrichis et multipliés. Ils proposent des séries télévisées, des documentaires et des longs métrages dans un large éventail de genres. Pionnier sur la scène médiatique, Netflix compte 182 millions d'abonnés payants dans plus de 190 pays en 2020, avec une programmation dans des langues toujours plus nombreuses. Amazon Prime, YouTube, Apple, Disney+ et les nombreux services de streaming proposés par les diffuseurs en Europe-RAI, BBC, ARTE, France Télévisions, pour n'en nommer que quelques-uns-sont devenus la principale composante du haut débit en ligne. L'augmentation massive de l'accès en ligne aux contenus justifie les investissements des opérateurs dans les réseaux et incite le secteur des télécommunications à investir dans les réseaux de prochaine génération (4G, 5G, fibre optique). Dans la crise, le modèle de plateforme de streaming modifie la structure de l'industrie audiovisuelle (cinéma et télévision). D'une part, les plateformes contournent, du fait des circonstances et sans doute dans le temps à venir, le modèle de chronologie des médias que l'industrie cinématographique oligopolistique imposait. De plus en plus de films qui ne peuvent pas être présentés en salle sont diffusés directement en ligne. D'autre part, comme la télévision linéaire ne peut plus compter sur les émissions de télévision en direct, les sports et autres événements, le haut débit empiète sur la diffusion pour fournir un contenu premium. Pour faire face à l'évolution du paysage et à l'essor de la diffusion large bande, les accords de distribution verticale classiques entre les diffuseurs et les opérateurs de réseaux, fournissant principalement la télévision linéaire ou payante, semblent désormais inadéquats. De nouvelles formes de consolidation prévalent, avec des formes d'intégration verticale et horizontale à l'échelle mondiale. Les méga-fusions et acquisitions donnent naissance à de grands conglomérats transfrontaliers ayant des intérêts dans les télécommunications, le câble, la télédiffusion, la vidéo à la demande, ainsi que dans la production et la fourniture de contenus. Ils rivalisent directement avec les leaders du streaming Netflix et Amazon, ainsi qu'avec Apple et Google, riches en moyens financiers.
    Date: 2020–05–18
  21. By: Yusuf Emre Akgunduz; Seyit Mumin Cilasun; Elif Ozcan Tok
    Abstract: [TR] Tarim ve gida sektoru Turkiye ekonomisinde onemli yer tutmakta, ozellikle enflasyon uzerinde belirleyici rol oynamaktadir. Ancak, tedarik zincirinin uzunlugu, karmasikligi ve rekabet eksiklikleri gibi yapisal konular uretici ile tuketici fiyatlari arasinda buyuk farka neden olmaktadir. Bu notta, dana eti ve sut sektorlerinde tedarik zincirinin yapisi ortaya konulmus ve ureticilerin karliliklari analiz edilmistir. Dogrudan nihai tuketiciye urun ulastirabilen uretici oraninin az oldugu gorulmustur. Dana eti ve sut sektorunde, sadece perakende isletmeler ile konaklama ve yiyecek faaliyetlerinde bulunan isletmelere satis yapan ureticilerin, perakende firmalara hic satis yapmayan ureticilere kiyasla sirasiyla yuzde 30 ve yuzde 27 daha yuksek karliliga sahip oldugu bulgusuna ulasilmistir. [EN] Agriculture is a key component of the Turkish economy and food prices play a significant role in inflation. Inefficiencies, complexities and the lack of competition in the agriculture sector and its supply chains lead to large differences between producer and consumer prices. This note studies the supply chains of veal and milk sectors in Turkey and analyses the profitability of producers. We find that only a minority of producers sell their products directly to end-consumers sectors. We further document that in veal and milk sectors producers that sell to retailers and accommodation and food services sectors rather than wholesale traders have 30% and 27% higher profitability, respectively.
    Date: 2020
  22. By: Philip A. Tominac; Victor M. Zavala
    Abstract: We interpret multi-product supply chains (SCs) as coordinated markets; under this interpretation, a SC optimization problem is a market clearing problem that allocates resources and associated economic values (prices) to different stakeholders that bid into the market (suppliers, consumers, transportation, and processing technologies). The market interpretation allows us to establish fundamental properties that explain how physical resources (primal variables) and associated economic values (dual variables) flow in the SC. We use duality theory to explain why incentivizing markets by forcing stakeholder participation (e.g., by imposing demand satisfaction or service provision constraints) yields artificial price behavior, inefficient allocations, and economic losses. To overcome these issues, we explore market incentive mechanisms that use bids; here, we introduce the concept of a stakeholder graph (a product-based representation of a supply chain) and show that this representation allows us to naturally determine minimum bids that activate the market. These results provide guidelines to design SC formulations that properly remunerate stakeholders and to design policy that foster market transactions. The results are illustrated using an urban waste management problem for a city of 100,000 residents.
    Date: 2020–06
  23. By: Fischer, Christian
    Abstract: We study a seller's trade credit provision decision in a situation of repeated contracting with incomplete information over the buyer's payment propensity when the enforceability of formal contracts is uncertain. The payment terms of a transaction are selected in an inter-temporal trade-off between improving the quality of information acquisition and mitigating relationship breakdown risks. When contract enforcement institutions are weak, the optimal within-relationship provision dynamics of trade credit can be uniquely determined. We obtain empirical evidence showing that in developing countries the relevance of trade credit in buyers' payment schedules has risen over-proportionally in recent years.
    Keywords: Payment contracts, Trade credit, Trade dynamics, Relational contracts, Weak institutions
    JEL: D83 F34 L14 O16
    Date: 2020–06–04
  24. By: James H. Love; Stephen Roper; Priit Vahter
    Abstract: Abandoned and failed innovations can be regarded as a part of the natural process of experimentation by firms, which can lead to important lessons being learned. Although the literature suggests some benefit from failure or abandoned innovation activities, prior studies using relatively large firm-level datasets to test the nature of this link are often unable to deal explicitly with the time dimension of learning. We contribute to the literature by showing the dynamic and causal nature of the linkage between abandoned innovation and subsequent innovation outcomes at firms. We demonstrate based on balanced panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms from 2008-2016 that innovation failure not only leads to more successful innovation, but that there is an explicit time dimension to this. We demonstrate that firms which have experienced ‘failure’ (as evidenced by abandoned innovation activities) in the past will have stronger positive effects of recent abandoned innovation activities on innovation output. This is a strong test of the ‘learning-from-failure’ hypothesis. In addition, we find evidence that in addition to enabling cumulative learning processes, abandoning innovation may also act as a dynamic corrective mechanism preventing firms carrying weaker innovation portfolios through from one period to the next.
    Keywords: innovation failure, abandoning innovation activities, learning effects, innovation performance
    Date: 2020

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