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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Mark Armstrong; John Vickers |
| Abstract: | Mark Armstrong, John Vickers We analyze a market where some consumers only consider buying from a specific seller while other consumers choose the best deal from several sellers. When sellers are able to discriminate against their captive customers, we show that discrimination harms consumers in aggregate relative to the situation with uniform pricing when sellers are approximately symmetric, while the practice tends to benefit consumers in sufficiently asymmetric markets. |
| JEL: | D8 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2018–10–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:858&r=com |
| By: | Richard L. Carson (Department of Economics, Carleton University) |
| Abstract: | This paper argues that product differentiation is compatible with perfect competition under free entry and exit and small firm size relative to size of market. Despite Chamberlin’s view, monopolistic competitors are price takers, even though each firm’s product has no perfect substitute. There is a difference between perfect competition with product homogeneity and perfect competition with differentiated products, however. Advertising can pay off with differentiated products because products have separate identities—and price depends on quality—even though firms are price takers for any given quality. A differentiated oligopoly may resemble monopolistic competition a la Chamberlin in some ways. |
| Keywords: | Monopolistic Competition, Perfect Competition, Product Differentiation |
| JEL: | D41 D43 |
| Date: | 2018–10–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:car:carecp:18-12&r=com |
| By: | Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Köster, Mats |
| Abstract: | We provide a novel intuition for the observation that many brand manufacturers have restricted their retailers' ability to resell brand products online. Our approach builds on models of salience according to which price disparities across distribution channels guide a consumer's attention toward prices and lower her appreciation for quality. Thus, absent vertical restraints, one out of two distortions – a quality or a participation distortion – can arise in equilibrium. The quality distortion occurs if the manufacturer provides either an inefficiently low quality under price salience or an inefficiently high quality in order to prevent price salience. The participation distortion arises as offline sales might be entirely abandoned in order to prevent prices from becoming salient. Both distortions are ruled out if vertical restraints are imposed. As opposed to the current EU legislation that considers a range of vertical restraints as being hardcore restrictions of competition, we show that these constraints can be socially desirable if salience effects are taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Salience,Online Sales,Antitrust,Vertical Restraints,Distribution Channels |
| JEL: | D21 K21 L42 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181498&r=com |
| By: | Pierre Dubois; Helena Perrone |
| Abstract: | Traditional demand models assume that consumers are perfectly informed about product characteristics, including price. However, this assumption may be too strong. Unannounced sales are a common supermarket practice. As we show, retailers frequently change position in the price rankings, thus making it unlikely that consumers are aware of all deals o¤ered in each period. Further empirical evidence on consumer behavior is also consistent with a model with price information frictions. We develop such a model for horizontally di¤erentiated products and structurally estimate the search cost distribution. The results show that in equilibrium, consumers observe a very limited number of prices before making a purchase decision, which implies that imperfect information is indeed important and that local market power is potentially high. We also show that a full information demand model yields severely biased price elasticities. |
| Keywords: | imperfect information, price dispersion, sales, search costs, product differentiation, consumer behavior, demand estimation, price elasticities |
| JEL: | D4 D83 L11 L66 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_047_2018&r=com |
| By: | Koski, Heli |
| Abstract: | Abstract This paper empirically analyzes how a data broker affects competition in oligopolistic product markets. It examines a unique case concerning the two dominant Finnish food retail companies’ voluntary withdrawal from information exchange via a data broker. Moreover, the companies jointly approached the Finnish antitrust authority, originating an investigation whether their prior horizontal information exchange was illegal. This resulted in the permanent termination of a data broker’s business in the Finnish food retail sector. The empirical analysis employs quarterly data from the food retail sector of the old EU15 countries for 2005–2017. The difference-in-differences model is used to explore the competitive impacts of a termination of vertical and horizontal information exchange via a data broker in the Finnish food retail sector. Data suggest that competition was less fierce and product prices higher after the termination of information exchange via a data broker. Longer-term evidence on the price increase in the absence of a data broker is inconclusive. Furthermore, discontinuation of data exchange from the downstream to the upstream firms facilitated downstream bargaining power and generated a long-term increase in the gap between retail and producer prices. |
| Keywords: | Data brokers, Market for data, Competition, Competition policy |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L41 L81 |
| Date: | 2018–10–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rif:wpaper:61&r=com |
| By: | Konstantinos Charistos (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia) |
| Abstract: | This paper underlines the impact of indirect network externalities on the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement to deter collusion between advertising-selling platforms. Since two-sided collusion is less likely to be sustained as consumers (e.g. readers/viewers) become more ad-avoiders while the opposite is true for one-sided collusion, firms may be induced to semi-collude (collude on advertising while competing for consumers) instead of colluding on both sides. When firms semi-collude on advertising and consumers are neutral towards advertisements, the imposition of fines based on the illegal gain of the colluding side (one-sided fines) enhances cartel deterrence compared to fines based on the total illegal profits (two-sided fines). |
| Keywords: | Antitrust enforcement, Collusion, Media markets. |
| JEL: | K21 L12 L41 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2018_10&r=com |
| By: | Unsorg, Maximiliane |
| Abstract: | Constantly rising expenditures for pharmaceuticals and uninformed consumers require government intervention in firms’ pricing strategies. To this end, reference pricing systems are frequently employed as regulatory mechanisms. This paper considers a duopoly market with vertically differentiated firms: a brand-name firm and a firm producing a generic version or a branded copy (depending on competition type). It can be proven that the introduction of a reference price leads to lower equilibrium prices for both firms and that it can induce fiercer competition between brand-name and generic/branded copy firms. Additionally, it can be shown that reference pricing promotes generic usage under sequential price competition. When implementing a reference pricing system, an increased market coverage and, hence, an improved provision of medical supply can be achieved due to the lower prices and the stimulated demand for drugs. Even under a higher supply the consumers’ expenditures decrease under reference pricing. Finally, the model proves the superiority of reference prices over price caps and therefore indicates that reference pricing systems should be preferred. |
| Keywords: | reference pricing,pharmaceutical market,copayment,price cap,price competition,consumer expenditure |
| JEL: | I11 I18 L51 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181533&r=com |
| By: | Göller, Daniel; Andersson, Kjetil |
| Abstract: | A substantial share of customers in emerging markets use dual-SIM phones and subscribe to two mobile networks. A primary motive for so called multi-simming is to take advantage of cheap on-net services from both networks. In our modelling effort, we augment the seminal model of competing telephone networks á la Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) by a segment of flexible price hunters that may choose to multi-sim. According to our findings, in equilibrium, the networks set a high off-net price in the linear tariffs to achieve segmentation. This induces the price hunters to multi- sim. We show that increased deployment of dual-SIM phones may induce a mixing equilibrium with high expected on-net prices. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, deployment of a technology that increases substitutability, and thereby competition, may end up raising prices. |
| Keywords: | Network competition,multi-sim,dual-SIM phones,price discrimination |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L96 D43 L13 L96 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181567&r=com |
| By: | Konstantinos Charistos (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia) |
| Abstract: | The impact of leniency programs on cartelists’ decision to allocate the incriminating evidence is investigated. Firms are allowed to possess either exclusive or common pieces of cartel-related evidence. The cartel organization is able to allocate the incriminating evidence in an attempt to enhance the sustainability of the illicit agreement. Assuming that the Antitrust Authority (AA) provides incentives that induce confession, reporting is either partial or universal. It is shown that in the former case the cartel organization selects to split and equally share the evidence (each firm possesses only exclusive pieces) whereas in the latter case every firm may possess perfect evidence. Unless the conviction of an investigated cartel is unlikely, when the AA optimally anticipates the cartel’s ability to allocate the evidence, only partial information is obtained. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust enforcement, Collusion, Leniency programs. |
| JEL: | K21 L12 L41 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2018_11&r=com |
| By: | Bolotova, Yuliya |
| Keywords: | Teaching, Communication, and Extension, Agribusiness Economics and Management, Food and Agricultural Marketing |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274503&r=com |
| By: | Jacob P. Gramlich; Serafin J. Grundl |
| Abstract: | Theory predicts that "common ownership" (ownership of rivals by a common shareholder) can be anticompetitive because it reduces the weight firms place on their own profits and shifts weight toward rival firms held by common shareholders. In this paper we use accounting data from the banking industry to examine empirically whether shifts in the profit weights are associated with shifts in profits. We present the distribution of a wide range of estimates that vary the specification, sample restrictions, and assumptions used to calculate the profit weights. The distribution of estimates is roughly centered around zero, but we find statistically significant estimates in either direction in some cases. Economically, most estimates are fairly small. Our interpretation of these findings is that there is little evidence for economically important effects of common ownership on profits in the banking industry. |
| Keywords: | Banking ; Common Ownership ; Competition ; Profits |
| JEL: | L10 L40 L20 G21 G34 |
| Date: | 2018–10–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2018-69&r=com |
| By: | Weghake, Jens; Erlei, Mathias; Keser, Claudia; Schmidt, Martin |
| Abstract: | We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the price setting behavior in two-sided markets. We seek to answer two specific research questions: Do participants charge the equilibrium prices that can be derived from a theoretical model? How is the price setting affected by the characteristics of the Nash equilibrium? Our study shows that there are hardly any realizations of the Nash equilibrium. Participants seem to use simple heuristics. The increase in complexity caused by asymmetry has two effects: On the one hand, it makes finding the optimal pricing more difficult so that, on average, we find prices that are further away from optimal prices. On the other hand, higher complexity goes along with stronger signals against non-expedient heuristics so that, on an individual level, the equilibrium is reached in more markets. |
| Keywords: | two-sided market theory,experiment,duopoly,platform competition |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181626&r=com |
| By: | Victor Aguirregabiria; Jihye Jeon |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews recent literature on structural models of oligopoly competition where firms have biased beliefs about primitives of the model (e.g. demand, costs) or about the strategic behavior of other firms in the market. We describe different structural models that have been proposed to study this phenomenon and examine the approaches used to identify firms' beliefs. We discuss empirical results in recent studies and show that accounting for firms' biased beliefs and learning can have important implications on our measures and interpretation of market efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Beliefs; Dynamics; Identification; Learning; Non-equilibrium beliefs; Oligopoly competition; Structural models |
| JEL: | D81 D83 D84 L13 |
| Date: | 2018–10–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-620&r=com |
| By: | Carolin Pommeranz; Bertram Ingolf Steininger |
| Abstract: | In this study, we analyze whether additional payments for energy efficiency are induced by either tenants’ willingness to pay, the market power of landlords, or both. With a German housing dataset from 2011 to 2016, we identify price discrimination for the energy performance certificate using hedonic regressions in a single and double sort setting. Results indicate that a high willingness to pay -– indicated by purchasing power and environmental awareness -– leads to price discrimination effects of 7-8%. These potential extra profits can stimulate investments in energy-based refurbishments by landlords. However, additional market power of landlords –- indicated by housing market conditions –- does not amplify these discrimination effects and is therefore not exploited against tenants. |
| Keywords: | Energy Efficiency; energy performance certificates; green housing; price discrimination |
| JEL: | R3 |
| Date: | 2018–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2018_134&r=com |
| By: | Meran, Georg; Siehlow, Markus; von Hirschhausen, Christian |
| Abstract: | Against the background of the human rights to water and the SDG No. 6, vendors play a pivotal role for an IWRM-based water supply system in the future. With the help of a micro-economic model, an optimal modal split is derived, the result of which is that not all households should be served by the pipe-based municipal supply. Instead, the non-connected households should be served by non-mobile or mobile vendors. Furthermore, we analyze different structures in the unconnected market. If vendors compete against each other, the optimal modal split can be replicated. If vendors form a cartel, market interventions, such as a cost related zonal price cap or a subsidizing strategy, are required for preventing the abuse of market power by the vendors. |
| Keywords: | Production,Pricing,Market Structure,Economics of Regulation,Water,Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity |
| JEL: | L11 L51 Q25 R12 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181584&r=com |
| By: | Thies Lindenthal; Joseph Ooi |
| Abstract: | This paper examines whether homebuilders take advantage of their local market power by setting higher prices for new units they are selling in the neighbourhood. By virtue of the size of their new developments, homebuilders can often dominate the supply of housing units available for sale in a vicinity. Based on a sample of 854 new private housing developments launched in Singapore between 2003 and 2012, a new development, on average, supplies 44% of the total stock of new unsold housing units in the district. The regression results further show a positive and significant relationship between the market power and the prices of units in the development, which is robust even after controlling for the reputation of the homebuilders. This is consistent with the notion that homebuilders take advantage of their domineering position in the local housing market by setting higher prices. We also observe that homebuilders with strong market power took a longer time to sell their units. The combined findings suggests that homebuilders with strong market power take their time to sell the new units at higher prices. |
| Keywords: | Housing; market power |
| JEL: | R3 |
| Date: | 2018–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2018_113&r=com |
| By: | Bertin Martens (European Commission – JRC - IPTS); Frank Mueller-Langer (European Commission – JRC) |
| Abstract: | This study looks at car data markets from an economic perspective. We start from several options for the technical characteristics of data access points that have been discussed among stakeholders in the automotive industry. We examine the structure of data markets that are likely to emerge from these characteristics and the implications for the welfare of manufacturers, aftermarket service providers and drivers. Car manufacturers face competition in car markets and aftersales services. However, they can design the car data architecture to ensure their exclusive access to the data. That would give them a monopoly in the market for car data from their brand. They can use this to increase their leverage on aftersales services markets. Our baseline scenario is the Extended Vehicle proposal that manufacturers prefer. This ensures their data access monopoly and enables them to maximizes revenue from data and data-driven aftersales services. It reduces welfare for drivers and aftersales service providers. Two technical variations on the baseline scenario reduce manufacturers' leverage over data server governance and their monopolistic power. That could reduce social welfare losses and transfer more surplus to drivers and service providers, compared to the baseline scenario. Other scenarios examine alternative data access gateways, for instance by keeping the OBD plug open and by applying real time data portability under the GDPR. These scenarios may offer some scope for regulators if they wish to keep alternative data access channels open in order to stimulate competition in aftersales services markets. However, they entail additional hardware and switching costs for consumers, compared to the baseline and are therefore partial and imperfect substitutes. In two final scenarios we examine the market position of B2B data marketplaces and consumer media services platforms. The potential for data aggregation across car brands and other sources creates some possibilities for these platforms to provide a counterweight to monopolistic behaviour by the manufacturers. However, manufacturers' control over the data supply and access to the in-car human interface ensures that they retain substantial leverage over these platforms. Regulators may consider creating the conditions for a more level playing field between OEM services and third-party aftersales service providers. As a next step in this research, the general scenario-based observations in this study would have to be complemented with empirical evidence on the data market power of car manufacturers. |
| Keywords: | connected cars, digital data, car data, monopolistic data markets, data regulation, access to data, data trade |
| JEL: | L00 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipt:decwpa:2018-06&r=com |
| By: | Mogens Fosgerau (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); André de Palma (CREST, ENS Paris-Saclay, University Paris-Saclay); Julien Monardo (CREST, ENS Paris-Saclay, University Paris-Saclay) |
| Abstract: | We develop a class of demand models for differentiated products. The new models facilitate the BLP method (Berry et al., 1995) while numerical inversion of the demand system is not required. They can accommodate rich patterns of substitution and complementarity while being easily estimated with standard regression techniques and allowing very large choice sets. We use the new models to describe markets for differentiated products that exhibit segmentation according to several dimensions and illustrate their application by estimating demand for cereals in Chicago. |
| Keywords: | Demand estimation; Differentiated products; Discrete choice; Generalized entropy; Representative consumer |
| JEL: | C26 D11 D12 L |
| Date: | 2018–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1802&r=com |
| By: | Matteo Benetton (Berkeley); Davide Fantino (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | We make use of an allocation rule by the ECB for Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) to provide causal evidence on the effect of unconventional monetary policy on the cost of loans to firms. Using transaction-level data from Italy’s Central Credit Register and a difference-in-difference identification strategy, we show that treated banks decrease loan rates to the same firm by approximately 20 basis points compared with control banks. We then study how the effects of the liquidity injection vary according to the competition in the banking sector, exploiting the local nature of bank-firm lending relationships and exogenous variations in the number of pawnshops across Italian cities during the Renaissance. Our results suggest that banks' market power can significantly impair the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy, especially for safer and smaller firms. |
| Keywords: | Unconventional monetary policy, bank competition, pass-through. |
| JEL: | E51 E52 L11 |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1187_18&r=com |
| By: | Birg, Laura |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effect of a change in the mandatory manufacturer rebate on wholesale prices for pharmaceuticals on competition by parallel imports. First, it analyzes the effect of a manufacturer rebate on competition by parallel imports in a two-country model. An increase in the manufacturer rebate increases the market share of parallel imports. Second, the paper exploits a policy reform in Germany in 2010, which increased the manufacturer rebate by 10 percentage points. Using a data set with prescription drugs with competition from parallel imports, I estimate the e¤ect of the change in the manufacturer rebate on competition by parallel imports. Estimation results suggest that an increase in the manufacturer rebate has increased the market share of parallel imports and the number of importers. |
| Keywords: | parallel imports,manufacturer rebate,pharmaceuticals,regulation |
| JEL: | F12 I11 I18 F12 I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181646&r=com |
| By: | Castriota, Stefano |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness Economics and Management, Production Economics, Ag Finance and Farm Management |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:273802&r=com |
| By: | He, Xi |
| Keywords: | Industrial Org./Supply Chain Management, Food and Agricultural Policy Analysis, Agribusiness Economics and Management |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:274206&r=com |
| By: | Paul Ryan; Clare Branigan |
| Abstract: | The auction literature finds competition drives price outcomes and has both rational and psychological components. In bubble markets psychological factors are likely to be heightened impacting on the dynamics of competitive behavior (Shiller, 2014). We find, in a real estate bubble, guide prices have no influence in generating greater auction competition. In addition, our findings are supportive of the strength of the guide price in acting as an anchor on price outcomes. Thus we find no evidence that auction fever (e.g. Adam et al, 2015) occludes any assimilative role for the guide as an anchor.Interestingly, however, we find evidence consistent with real estate agents systematically setting low guide prices relative to fundamentals, in an apparent belief in the reversal- of- the- anchoring effect (Ku et al, 2006), suggesting their actions in setting guide prices may have, in fact, paradoxically, dampened the effect of the bubble rather than amplifying it. |
| Keywords: | Anchoring; Auction Fever; Auctions; Competition; Guide Prices |
| JEL: | R3 |
| Date: | 2018–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2018_24&r=com |
| By: | Wu, Feng; Guan, Zhengfei |
| Keywords: | Demand and Price Analysis, International Trade, Research Methods/Econometrics/Stats |
| Date: | 2018–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea18:273995&r=com |
| By: | Frédéric Marty (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS) |
| Abstract: | Les décisions Google Shopping de juin 2017 et Google Android de juillet 2018 ainsi que l'intérêt que porte la Commission européenne aux plateformes d'intermédiation en ligne conduisent à s'interroger sur une possible activation de la théorie des facilités essentielles à des actifs tels des moteurs de recherche, des systèmes d'exploitation mobiles, des plateformes dominante ou encore des données. Ce texte s'attache à l'application de cette théorie controversée aux actifs immatériels avant d'évaluer quels pourraient être les conditions et les effets d'une éventuelle application aux actifs concernés. |
| Keywords: | économie numérique, théorie des facilités essentielles, abus de position dominante |
| JEL: | L12 L13 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-27&r=com |
| By: | Nikhil Vellodi (19 West 4th Street, 6th floor, New York, NY10012, US); |
| Abstract: | I study the impact of consumer reviews on the incentives for firms to enter and participate in the marketplace. Firms produce goods of heterogeneous, unknown quality that is gradually revealed through user-generated feedback, and face both entry and exit decisions. For each firm, the platform constructs a rating based on previous consumer feedback that provides the market with information regarding product quality. Under full transparency, consumers' equilibrium choices induces slow feedback rates for struggling firms and new entrants, inducing low entry rates as well as negative selection effects - high-quality firms exit early. This benchmark offers several theoretical predictions, some of which echo existing empirical findings, the others are novel and I test directly using data from Yelp!. I then turn to the design of such ratings systems. These platforms must balance the need to provide consumers with accurate information and high-quality experiences against the need to encourage firms to participate in the marketplace. The key insight is that optimal rating systems involve upper censorship, i.e. the exclusion of reviews from highly-firms' ratings, as a means of making the task of climbing the ratings hill less daunting, thus stimulating entry and stifling exit. Classification-JEL: L13, L43, L96 |
| Keywords: | Product reviews, information design, firm dynamics, optimal stopping, ergodic analysis, directed search |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:18-13&r=com |
| By: | Will Abel (Bank of England); Silvana Tenreyro (Bank of England; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM); London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)); Gregory Thwaites (Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM); London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)) |
| Abstract: | We study the evolution and effects of monopsony power in the UK private sector labour market from 1998 to 2017. Using linked employee-firm micro-data, we find that: (1) Measures of monopsony have been relatively stable across the time period examined - rising prior to the crisis, before subsequently falling again. (2) There is substantial cross-sectional variation in monopsony at the industry level. (3) Higher levels of labour market concentration are associated with lower pay amongst workers not covered by a collective bargaining agreement. (4) For workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the association between labour market concentration and pay is greatly reduced and in most cases disappears. (5) The link between productivity and wage levels is weaker when labour markets are more concentrated. |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1827&r=com |