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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Friedrichsen, Jana (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for social image. The market outcome features partial pooling and product differentiation that is not driven by heterogeneous valuations for quality but by image concerns. A typical monopoly outcome is a two-tier product line resembling a \"masstige\" strategy as observed in luxury goods markets. Products can have identical quality and differ only in price and image, thereby rationalizing quality-equivalent line extensions. Under competition, both average quality and market coverage are (weakly) higher but monopoly can yield higher welfare than competition. |
| Keywords: | image concern; conspicuous consumption; two-dimensional screening; nonlinear pricing; |
| JEL: | L12 L15 D11 D21 D82 |
| Date: | 2018–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:70&r=com |
| By: | Francesca Barigozzi (Department of Economics, University of Bologna); Ching-to Albert Ma (Boston University) |
| Abstract: | We study subgame-perfect equilibria of the classical quality-price, multistage game of vertical product differentiation. Each firm can choose the levels of an arbitrary number of qualities. Consumers' valuations are drawn from independent and general distributions. The unit cost of production is increasing and convex in qualities. We characterize equilibrium prices, and the effects of qualities on the rival's equilibrium price in the general model. We present necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium differentiation in any of the qualities. |
| Keywords: | multidimensional product differentiation, quality and price competition |
| JEL: | D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2018-003&r=com |
| By: | Patrick Rey (Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse Capitole); Thibaud Vergé (CREST; ENSAE) |
| Abstract: | We develop a general but tractable framework of multilateral vertical contracting between upstream and downstream ?firms, without any restriction on tariffs, and yet taking into account their impact on downstream competition. In equilibrium, tariffs are cost-based and replicate the outcome of a multi-brand oligopoly, a fi?nding in line with the analysis of a recent merger. To illustrate its versatility, we use this framework to analyze the effect of vertical restraints (resale price maintenance and retail price parity clauses) and of alternative business models (resale vs. agency). Finally, we extend the framework so as to endogenize the market structure. |
| Keywords: | Bilateral contracting; vertical relationships; agency; resale price maintenance;price parity clauses |
| JEL: | L13 L42 D43 K21 |
| Date: | 2017–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2017-44&r=com |
| By: | Hamelmann, Lisa; Klein, Gordon J. |
| Abstract: | At present, there is a wide debate on regulating geo-blocking, an online practice that prevents consumers from buying or having access to products and services from another country. This practice is not only used by retailers, but is also of great importance in the market for digital visual broadcasting. We develop a model to identify the cases, in which firms have an incentive to include geo-blocking clauses in their licensing agreements. In addition, we analyze the effects of restricting geo-blocking on the level of innovation of two vertically differentiated goods and on the overall product variety. Our results show that the market outcome primarily depends on the level of competition between the two goods. For instance, regulatory changes do not have any impact if competition is very low or very high. However, if competition is sufficiently high, the removal of geo-blocking decreases the level of innovation of the good that is traded. The product quality of the other firm, instead, increases - as long as R&D costs are sufficiently high. Putting both effects together, it becomes evident that the quality gains do not compensate for the quality losses. In addition, the removal of geo-blocking affects the product variety as well - a lower level of competition increases the product variety and vice versa. |
| Keywords: | Digital Markets,Geo-blocking,Vertical Restraints,Regulation,Investment,Quality |
| JEL: | L42 L51 L52 K21 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:100&r=com |
| By: | Miao, Chun-Hui |
| Abstract: | In many markets, consumers obtain price quotes before making purchases. In this paper, I consider a fixed-sample size model of search for price quotes when sellers must spend resources to learn the true cost of providing goods/services. I find that (1) even with ex ante identical and rational consumers and sellers, there is price dispersion in the equilibrium; (2) the expected equilibrium price can decrease with the search cost of consumers; (3) consumers may engage in excessive search that is detrimental to their own welfare; (4) a decline in the search cost can leave consumers worse off, due to their lack of commitment. |
| Keywords: | Price dispersion, Precontract cost, Search cost, Sealed-bid Auction. |
| JEL: | D4 D40 L0 |
| Date: | 2017–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83689&r=com |
| By: | Smolin, Alex |
| Abstract: | A monopolist seller owns an object that has several attributes. A buyer is privately informed about his tastes and uncertain about the attributes. The seller can disclose attribute information to the buyer in a form of a statistical experiment. The seller offers a menu of call options varying in upfront payments, experiments, and strike prices. I study revenue-maximizing menus and show that optimal experiments belong to a simple class of linear disclosures. I fully characterize an optimal menu for a class of single-minded buyers. Surprisingly, the menu is nondiscriminatory and can be implemented by a single partial disclosure followed by a posted price. |
| Keywords: | Attributes, Information Design, Mechanism Design, Private Disclosure, Call Options, Multidimensional Screening, Demand Transformation |
| JEL: | D42 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:84132&r=com |
| By: | Anton Bondarev (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | We consider an abstract setting of the differential r&d game, where participating firms are allowed for strategic behavior. We assume the information asymmetry across those firms and the government, which seeks to support newer technologies in a socially optimal manner. We develop a general theory of robust subsidies under such one-sided uncertainty and establish results on relative optimality, duration and size of different policy tools available to the government. It turns out that there might exist multiple sets of second-best robust policies, but there always exist a naturally induced ordering across such sets, implying the optimal choice of a policy exists for the government under different uncertainty levels. |
| Keywords: | technology lock-in, technological change, strategic interaction, uncertainty, robust policy sets, uncertainty thresholds, robust welfare improving policy, axiom of choice |
| JEL: | C02 C61 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2018/01&r=com |
| By: | Tomomichi Mizuno (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University); Kazuhiro Takauchi (Faculty of Business and Commerce, Kansai University) |
| Abstract: | We constructed a third-market model with a vertical trading structure in which input suppliers engage in the homogeneous price competition `a la Dastidar (1995). We show that in the case of downstream Bertrand competition, a non-monotonic export policy may appear, that is, the optimal export policy can change like a tax–subsidy–tax as the degree of product-substitutability rises. We also show that when the number of domestic input suppliers is at an intermediate level, the conventional result in which the optimal policy is an export subsidy (tax) if downstream is Cournot (Bertrand) rivalry remains. We further discuss welfare comparisons between downstream Cournot and Bertrand cases. |
| Keywords: | Upstream price competition; Export subsidy/tax; Non-monotonic policy; Product substitutability |
| JEL: | F12 F13 L13 D43 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1805&r=com |
| By: | Giancarlo Corsetti (Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM); University of Cambridge); Meredith Crowley (Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Cambridge); Lu Han (University of Cambridge); Huasheng Song (Zhejiang University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a new empirical framework to analyse destination-specific markup and quantity adjustments to bilateral exchange rates by exporters. The framework offers two methodological innovations. First, we develop an unbiased estimator of the markup elasticity that correctly isolates marginal costs in large unbalanced panels where the set of markets served by firms varies endogenously with currency movements. Second, we exploit Chinese linguistics to process characters recorded in Chinese custom forms to build a novel, general, product classification distinguishing high and low differentiation goods|which we can use to proxy for exporters' market power. Applying this framework to exporters from China over 2000-2014, we document substantial heterogeneity in destination-specific markup elasticities across product classes and firm types. Conditional on a price change, the average markup elasticity for highly differentiated consumption goods is 32%; markup adjustments explain three quarters of incomplete pass through into import prices for these goods. In contrast, the average for low-differentiation intermediates is only 5%, suggesting that pricing for these goods responds to global, rather than local, economic conditions. Markup elasticities are higher for both state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises than for private enterprises, which, on average, pursue aggressively competitive strategies throughout our sample. |
| Keywords: | Exchange rates, Pricing-to-market, Product classification, Differentiated goods, Market power, Markup elasticity, China |
| JEL: | F31 F41 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1803&r=com |
| By: | Michael Funk; Christian Jaag; Samuel Rutz |
| Abstract: | Das Bundesgericht hat die Anwendung des Kartellverbots zuletzt deutlich verschärft: Preis-, Mengen- und Gebietsabsprachen sind unabhängig von deren Wettbewerbswirkung de facto verboten. Schon früher hat das Bundesgericht das Wettbewerbsrecht mit ähnlich weitreichenden Entscheiden geprägt. Heute kön-nen Fusionen kaum noch untersagt werden und unangemessene Preise werden nicht mehr sanktioniert. Die bundesgerichtliche Rechtsprechung gefährdet die Kohärenz des Kartellgesetzes: Während im Bereich der Fusionen und unangemessenen Preise ein «Laissez faire»-Ansatz praktiziert wird, wird bei den Abre-den eine äusserst interventionistischen Politik verfolgt. Den Unternehmen werden dadurch starke Anreize gesetzt, das harte Kartellverbot durch Fusionen zu umgehen. |
| Keywords: | Kartellrecht, Schweiz |
| JEL: | K21 L40 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0061&r=com |
| By: | Mao, Liang |
| Abstract: | In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic, because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions. We recommend that the cartel agreement should be endogenously determined in future studies. |
| Keywords: | cartel formation, stable cartel, self-enforcing agreement |
| JEL: | C79 H41 |
| Date: | 2017–11–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83982&r=com |
| By: | Perrotta Berlin, Maria; Qin, Bei; Spagnolo, Giancarlo |
| Abstract: | Fostering whistleblowing through leniency and asymmetric sanctions is regarded as a potentially powerful anti-corruption strategy in the light of its success in busting cartels. The US Department of Justice started a pilot program of this kind in 2016. It has been argued, however, that introduced in China in 1997, these policies did not help against corruption. We map the evolution of the Chinese anti-corruption legislation and aggregate enforcement data, documenting a large and stable fall in prosecuted cases after the 1997 reform. The fall is consistent with reduced corruption detection, but under specific assumptions also with improved deterrence. To resolve the ambiguity, we collect and analyze a random sample of case files from corruption trials. Results point indeed at a negative effect of the 1997 reform on corruption detection and deterrence, but plausibly linked to its poor design: contrary to what theory prescribes, it increased leniency also for bribe-taking bureaucrats that cooperate after being denounced, enhancing their ability to retaliate against whistleblowing bribe-givers. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Leniency; Deterrence; China |
| JEL: | K14 N45 P37 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12634&r=com |
| By: | Cato, Susumu; Matsumura, Toshihiro |
| Abstract: | We investigate the optimal tax and privatization policies in a mixed oligopoly in which a state-owned public firm competes against private firms in a free-entry market. First, we investigate the domestic private firm case. The optimal tax rate is strictly positive except for the full privatization and full nationalization cases, and the relationship between the optimal tax rate and degree of privatization is inverted U-shaped. Further, the optimal degree of privatization is decreasing in the tax rate. Next, we investigate the foreign private firm case and find that the two policies are mutually independent. |
| Keywords: | industrial policy; privatization; free entry; unit tax-subsidy; foreign ownership |
| JEL: | H42 H44 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:82893&r=com |
| By: | Sophia Ying Li; Joe Mazur; Yongjoon Park; James W. Roberts; Andrew Sweeting; Jun Zhang |
| Abstract: | We estimate a model of service choice and price competition in airline markets, allowing for the carriers that provide nonstop service to be a selected subset of the carriers competing in the market. Our model can be estimated without an excessive computational burden and we use the estimated model to illustrate the effects of selection on equilibrium market structure and to show how accounting for selection can change predictions about post-merger market power and repositioning, in ways that are consistent with what has been observed after actual mergers, and possible merger remedies. |
| JEL: | C31 C35 C54 L13 L4 L93 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24214&r=com |
| By: | Ciliberto, Federico; Cook, Emily; Williams, Jonathan |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of consolidation on airline network connectivity using three measures of centrality from graph theory: Degree, Closeness, and Betweenness. Changes in these measures from 1990 to 2015 imply: i) the average airport services a greater proportion of possible routes, ii) the average origin airport is fewer stops away from any given destination, and iii) the average hub is less often along the shortest route between two other airports. Yet, we find the trend toward greater connectivity in the national network structure is largely unaffected by consolidation, in the form of mergers and codeshare agreements, during this period. |
| Keywords: | Network, Consolidation, Airline, Connectivity, Merger, Codesharing |
| JEL: | D85 L2 L4 L93 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83885&r=com |
| By: | Xavier D'Haultfoeuille (CREST); Isis Durrmeyer (Toulouse School of Economics; Université Toulouse Capitole); Philippe Février (CREST) |
| Abstract: | In markets where sellers are able to price discriminate, individuals pay different prices that may be unobserved by the econometrician. This paper considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model à la Berry et al. (1995) with such price discrimination and limited information on prices taking the form of, e.g., observing list prices from catalogues or average prices. Within this framework, identification is achieved by using supply-side conditions, provided that the marginal costs of producing and selling the goods do not depend on the characteristics of the buyers. The model can be estimated by GMM using a nested fixed point algorithm that extends BLP’s algorithm to our setting. We apply our methodology to estimate the demand and supply in the French new automobile market. Our results suggest that discounting arising from price discrimination is important. The average discount is estimated to be 9.6%, with large variation depending on buyers’ characteristics and cars’ specifications. Our results are consistent with other evidence on transaction prices in France. |
| Keywords: | demand and supply, unobserved transaction prices, price discrimination, automobiles. |
| JEL: | C51 D12 D22 |
| Date: | 2017–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2017-18&r=com |
| By: | Richard N. Langlois (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | Voices along the whole of the political spectrum are calling for heightened scrutiny of American information-technology companies, especially the Big Five of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. One of the principal themes of this uprising is that present-day antitrust policy, forged in the rusty era of steel, oil, and cars, is now obsolete. We are in the age of information, which ipso facto calls for new rules. A second animating theme is that the antitrust thinking of the Chicago School, which came to prominence in the last quarter of the last century, must be completely overthrown. Proponents of this new antitrust ground their arguments by returning to the historical roots of American antitrust policy. My contention, however, is that the new antitrust gets this history wrong. It both misconceives the nature of the competitive process and deliberately refuses to confront the political economy of antitrust. In so doing, it adopts some of the worst traits of the Chicago School it criticizes while manifesting few of that school’s many virtues. |
| Keywords: | antitrust, platforms, telecommunications, broadcasting, net neutrality |
| JEL: | L10 L40 L50 L96 N72 N82 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2018-01&r=com |
| By: | June Ma; Joshua S. Gans; Rabee Tourky |
| Abstract: | We analyze the Bitcoin protocol for electronic peer-to-peer payments and the operations that support the “blockchain” that underpins it. It is shown that that protocol maps formally into a dynamic game that is an extension of standard models of R&D racing. The model provides a technical foundation for any economic analysis of ‘proof of work’ protocols. Using the model, we demonstrate that free entry is solely responsible for determining resource usage by the system for a given reward to mining. The endogenous level of computational difficulty built into the Bitcoin protocol does not mitigate this usage and serves only to determine the time taken to process transactions. Regulating market structure will mitigate resource use highlighting the importance of identifying the benefits of competition for the operation of the blockchain. |
| JEL: | E42 L1 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24242&r=com |
| By: | Dubois, Pierre; Saethre, Morten |
| Abstract: | Differences in regulated pharmaceutical prices within the European Economic Area create arbitrage opportunities that pharmacy retailers can use through parallel imports. For prescription drugs under patent, such provision decisions affect the sharing of profits among an innovating pharmaceutical company, retailers, and parallel traders. We develop a structural model of demand and supply in which retailers can choose the set of goods to sell to consumers, thus foreclosing the consumers' access to some less-profitable drugs, which allows retailers to bargain and obtain lower wholesale prices with the manufacturer and parallel trader. With detailed transaction data, we identify a demand model with unobserved choice sets using supply-side conditions for optimal assortment decisions of pharmacies. Estimating our model, we find that retailer incentives play a significant role in fostering parallel trade penetration. Our counterfactual simulations show that parallel imports of drugs allows retailers to gain profits at the expense of the manufacturer, whereas parallel traders also gain but earn more modest profits. Finally, a policy preventing pharmacies from foreclosing the manufacturer's product is demonstrated to partially shift profits from pharmacists to both the parallel trader and the manufacturer, and a reduction in the regulated retail price favors the manufacturer even more. |
| Keywords: | Demand estimation; foreclosure; Parallel trade; pharmaceuticals; vertical contracts |
| JEL: | I11 L22 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12649&r=com |
| By: | Bhaskar, V.; Linacre, Robin; Machin, Stephen |
| Abstract: | The economic functioning of online drug markets using data scraped from online platforms is studied. Analysis of over 1.5 million online drugs sales shows online drugs markets tend to function without the significant moral hazard problems that, a priori, one might think would plague them. Only a small proportion of online drugs deals receive bad ratings from buyers, and online markets suffer less from problems of adulteration and low quality that are a common feature of street sales of illegal drugs. Furthermore, as with legal online markets, the market penalizes bad ratings, which subsequently lead to significant sales reductions and to market exit. The impact of the well-known seizure by law enforcement of the original Silk Road and the shutdown of Silk Road 2.0 are also studied, together with the exit scam of the market leader at the time, Evolution. There is no evidence that these exits deterred buyers or sellers from online drugs trading, as new platforms rapidly replaced those taken down, with the online market for drugs continuing to grow |
| Keywords: | dark web; drugs |
| JEL: | K42 |
| Date: | 2017–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:86585&r=com |
| By: | Richard G. Frank; Richard J. Zeckhauser |
| Abstract: | Drug pricing in the U.S. is a persistently vexing policy problem. While there is agreement among many policy analysts that supra competitive prices are necessary to promote innovation; significant disagreements arise over how much pricing discretion prescription drug manufacturers should be permitted, and what portion of the sum of producer plus consumer surplus in the prescription drug market should be claimed by manufacturers relative to consumers and other payers. This paper focuses on an extremely costly component of the Medicare Part D program the region of coverage that kicks in once a consumer has spent $4,950 on drugs in a calendar year (roughly $8,100 in total drug spending). At that point there are high levels of insurance for the consumer and reinsurance for the prescription drug plan. Consumers pay 5% of costs; plans pay 15% and the government 80%. That design generates serious inefficiencies. The significant subsidies to plans in the reinsurance region combined with the launch of unique high cost prescription drugs could be expected to lead to and has led to substantial departures from cost-effective outcomes in treatments delivered. We investigate two, possibly complementary, strategies for reducing these inefficiencies. The first follows on the MedPac recommendation that the government reduce its share of risk bearing for the Part D reinsurance benefit. The second focuses on curbing price inefficiencies. It has two components: eliminating monopolistic overpricing, and rewarding the quality of drugs brought to market. It is grounded in the economics of two part tariffs, research on innovation prizes, performance-based contracts, and draws on the mechanism design literature. |
| JEL: | I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24240&r=com |
| By: | Hugh Gravelle (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK); Dan Liu (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK); Carol Propper (Imperial College London, UK); Rita Santos (Centre for Health Economics, University of York, York, UK) |
| Abstract: | We examine whether family doctor firms in England respond to local competition by increasing their quality. We measure quality in terms of clinical performance and patient-reported satisfaction to capture its multi-dimensional nature. We use a panel covering 8 years for over 8000 English general practices, allowing us to control for unobserved local area effects. We measure competition by the number of rival doctors within a small distance. We find that increases in local competition are associated with increases in clinical quality and patient satisfaction, particularly for firms with lower quality. However, the magnitude of the effect is small. |
| Keywords: | Quality, healthcare, choice, competition, family physicians |
| JEL: | I11 I18 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chy:respap:151cherp&r=com |
| By: | Georges Vivien Houngbonon (LGI - Laboratoire de Genie Industriel - CentraleSupélec); François Jeanjean (Orange Labs - Orange Labs [Belfort] - France Télécom) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relationship between competition and investment in the wireless industry from a dynamic perspective. Using firm level data and instrumental variable estimation strategy, it finds that the relationship is inverted-U shaped. The investment maximising intensity of competition is reached when operators' gross profits represent 37 or 40 percent of their revenues, depending on whether capital expenditures are normalised by the number of subscribers. This finding means that investment increases with competition as long as operators' profits are above the thresholds of 37 or 40 percent of their revenues. Under these thresholds, there is a tradeoff between competition and investment. The paper also finds a significant long run effect of competition on investment which amplifies the short run effect by a factor of 3 to 4. |
| Keywords: | Competition,Investment,Mobile Telecommunications |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01653797&r=com |
| By: | Francesco Marchionne (Indiana University); Alberto Zazzaro (University of Naples Federico II; CSEF & MoFiR (Italy)) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyse the relationship between risk and competition in the Italian banking sector over the period from 2006 to 2010. We employ OLS and panel estimators to estimate the impact of the Lerner index, a measure of bank market power, on the Altman Z-score, a proxy of the insolvency probability. Our results are consistent with the traditional charter value paradigm and reject the new risk-shifting paradigm proposed by Boyd-De Nicolo' (2005). We find that the relationship between bank risk and competition becomes more tightening during the financial crisis. Our results are robust to different definitions of crisis and different specifications. |
| Keywords: | bank, competition, stability, financial crisis |
| JEL: | G01 G21 G33 |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:147&r=com |
| By: | Demary, Markus; Rusche, Christian |
| Abstract: | Starting on January 13, 2018, the Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2) will apply in the European Union. Among other things, the Directive's aim is to adapt regulation to the innovations in payment services and to promote the Single Market for non-cash payments. However, PSD2 will only strengthen competition between payment services under a common standard for the access to banking accounts. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iwkkur:72018&r=com |