nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2015‒05‒22
27 papers chosen by
Russell Pittman
United States Department of Justice

  1. Multiproduct competition in vertically related industries By Shohei Yoshida
  2. Two-Period Resource Duopoly with Endogenous Intertemporal Capacity Constraints By Berk, Istemi
  3. Strategic dual sourcing as a driver for free revealing of innovation By Noriaki Matsushima; Laixun Zhao
  4. Full Disclosure of Knowledge Between Rivals By Mário Alexandre Patrício Martins da Silva
  5. On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: Competitive equilibrium à la Nash By Elena L. del Mercato; Vincenzo Platino
  6. Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price By Krämer, Florentin; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Spann, Martin; Stich, Lucas
  7. Buyer-Supplier Networks and Aggregate Volatility By MIZUNO Takayuki; SOUMA Wataru; WATANABE Tsutomu
  8. The influence of leveraged buyouts on target firms' competitors By Grupp, Marcel; Rauch, Christian; Umber, Marc P.; Walz, Uwe
  9. Interrelationships Among Input Costs and Product Prices: Notes on the Empirical Use of a Price Input-output Model By Marcelo de M. Lara Resende
  10. Market Definition, Market Power By Louis Kaplow
  11. Another cluster premium: Innovation subsidies and R&D collaboration networks By Tom Broekel; Dirk Fornahl; Andrea Morrison
  12. Technology Transfer in ASEAN Countries: Some Evidence from Buyer-Provided Training Network Data By Dionisius A. NARJOKO
  13. What do firms know? What do they produce? A new look at the relationship between patenting profiles and patterns of product diversification By G. Dosi; M. Grazzi; D. Moschella
  14. Innovation in contemporary economies By Elzbieta Pohulak-Zoledowska
  15. Persistence of Various Types of Innovation Analyzed and Explained By Tavassoli, Sam; Karlsson, Charlie
  16. Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Trade By Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara; Paillacar, Rodrigo
  17. Private versus Social Incentives for Pharmaceutical Innovation By Paula González; Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo
  18. Drug Prices and Pressure Group Activities in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Becker Model By Anne Maria Busch
  19. Drug Prices, Rents, and Votes in the German Health Care Market: An Application of the Peltzman Model By Anne Maria Busch
  20. Retail Globalization and Household Welfare: Evidence from Mexico By David Atkin; Benjamin Faber; Marco Gonzalez-Navarro
  21. Competition for advertisers and for viewers in media markets By Anderson, Simon P; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle
  22. "The Effects of Domestic Mergers on Exports: A Case Study of the 1998 Korean Automobile Industry" By Hiroshi Ohashi; Yuya Toyama
  23. Structure of global buyer-supplier networks and its implications for conflict minerals regulations By Takayuki Mizuno; Takaaki Ohnishi; Tsutomu Watanabe
  24. Paving the way for better telecom performance: Evidence from the telecommunication sector in MENA countries By Riham Ahmed Ezzat
  25. The Road Transportation Industry in Brazil: Market Structure, Performance and Government Regulation By Newton de Castro
  26. Capacity Mechanism in the European Context: Can we ensure internal market synergies? By Neuhoff, Karsten; Schwenen,Sebastian
  27. Regulación y libre competencia: el servicio de aseo de Bogotá By Juan Manuel Monroy Barragán; Juan David Pachón Baena

  1. By: Shohei Yoshida
    Abstract: The paper investigates how competition between two multiproduct downstream firms in vertical relationships affects horizontal relationships: competitor collaboration and performance difference. When the upstream market consists of exclusive suppliers, the efficient firm may have incentive for technology transfer without any payment to its less efficient rival, which can be a credible device of the efficient firm to enlarge its more profitable product. Moreover, such technology transfer enhances both consumer surplus and social welfare. The inefficient downstream firm may earn more than the efficient firm under upstream markets with exclusive suppliers and with discriminatory monopolist.
    Date: 2015–05
  2. By: Berk, Istemi (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the strategic firm behavior within the context of a two-period resource duopoly model in which firms face endogenous intertemporal capacity constraints. Firms are allowed to invest in capacity in between two periods in order to increase their initial endowment of exhaustible resource stocks. Using this setup, we find that the equilibrium price weakly decreases over time. Moreover, asymmetric distribution of initial resource stocks leads to a significant change in equilibrium outcome, provided that firms do not have the same cost structure in capacity additions. It is also verified that if only one company is capable of investment in capacity, the market moves to a more concentrated structure in the second period.
    Keywords: Dynamic Duopoly; Cournot Competition; Endogenous Intertemporal Capacity Constraints; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
    JEL: D43 L13 Q32
    Date: 2015–05–05
  3. By: Noriaki Matsushima; Laixun Zhao
    Abstract: This paper examines the role of dual sourcing (e.g., outside options) in vertical and horizontal relations. In a bilateral monopoly market, if either the upstream or downstream firm has outside options, the other firm could lose from seemingly positive shocks, e.g., market expansion or technology improvements. We extend this setting to a bilateral duopoly market in which each downstream firm has outside options and upstream firms can engage in cost reducing investments and generate technological spillovers. We find that each upstream firm has an incentive to voluntarily generate technological spillovers to its upstream rival if the downstream firms have better outside options.
    Date: 2015–05
  4. By: Mário Alexandre Patrício Martins da Silva (Faculdade de Economia do Porto)
    Abstract: We develop a symmetric duopoly model with strategic R&D spillovers where a specific type of innovation, recombinant innovation is introduced. Two major factors of effective knowledge spillovers, the technological learning parameters of the recombinant generation of new knowledge and the absorptive capacity of firms, are assumed to be exogenously determined. However, the third principal factor of the effectiveness of learning from rivals is endogenous: it is assumed that firms have control over the two individual spillover coefficients of the model. It is shown that identical firms operating in the same industry choose the highest level for the two spillover variables under plausible constellations of learning parameters. Furthermore, the realistic set of learning parameters is enlarged in the case where firms are able to commit to knowledge sharing strategies at the outset, thereby increasing the possibility of firms fully disclosing their knowledge in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Endogenous spillovers, knowledge sharing, absorptive capacity, recombinant innovation.
    JEL: O30
    Date: 2015–05
  5. By: Elena L. del Mercato (Paris School of Economics - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Vincenzo Platino (Paris School of Economics - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)
    Abstract: We consider a general equilibrium model of a private ownership economy with consumption and production externalities. The choices of all agents (households and firms) may affect utility functions and production technologies. The equilibrium notion blends Arrow-Debreu with Nash, that is, agents (households and firms) maximize their goals by taking as given both commodity prices and choices of every other agent in the economy. We provide an example showing that under standard assumptions, such economies may have infinitely many equilibria. We present our model with firms' endowments following Geanakoplos, Magill, Quinzii and Drèze (1990). Firms' endowments consist of amounts of commodities held by the firms to generate receipts from sales of initially-held stocks of commodities and claims from debts, subsidies and taxes expressible in terms of them. We prove that almost all economies are regular in the space of endowments of households and firms
    Keywords: Externalities; private ownership economies; competitive equilibrium à la Nash; regular economies
    JEL: C62 D51 D62
    Date: 2015–05
  6. By: Krämer, Florentin; Schmidt, Klaus M.; Spann, Martin; Stich, Lucas
    Abstract: Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP) are customer-driven pricing mechanisms that give customers (some) pricing power. Both have been used in service industries with high fixed capacity costs in order to appeal to additional customers by reducing prices without setting a reference price. In this experimental study we compare the functioning and the performance of these two pricing mechanisms. We show that both mechanisms can be successfully used to endogenously price discriminate. PWYW can be very successful if there is an additional promotional benefit to using PWYW and if marginal costs are not too high. PWYW is a very aggressive competitive strategy that achieves almost full market penetration. NYOP is a less aggressive strategy that can also be used if marginal costs are high. It reduces price competition and segments the market. Low valuation customers are more likely to use NYOP while high valuation customers prefer a posted price seller.
    Keywords: competitive strategies; consumer-driven pricing mechanisms; name your own price; pay what you want
    JEL: D03 D21 D22 D40 L11 M31
    Date: 2015–05
  7. By: MIZUNO Takayuki; SOUMA Wataru; WATANABE Tsutomu
    Abstract: This paper investigates the structure and evolution of customer-supplier networks in Japan using a unique dataset that contains information on customer and supplier linkages for over 500,000 incorporated non-financial firms for the five years from 2008 to 2012. We find, first, that the number of customer links is unequal across firms: the customer link distribution has a power-law tail with an exponent of unity (i.e., it follows Zipf's law). We interpret this as implying that competition among firms to acquire new customers yields winners that attract a large number of customers, as well as losers that end up with fewer customers. We also show that the shortest path length for any pair of firms is, on average, 4.3 links. Second, we find that link switching is relatively rare. Our estimates indicate that 92% of customer links and 93% of supplier links survive each year. Third and finally, we find that firm growth rates tend to be more highly correlated as the closer two firms are to each other in a customer-supplier network (i.e., the smaller is the shortest path length for the two firms). This suggests that a non-negligible portion of firm growth fluctuations stem from the propagation of microeconomic shocks—shocks that affect a specific firm—through the customer-supplier chains.
    Date: 2015–05
  8. By: Grupp, Marcel; Rauch, Christian; Umber, Marc P.; Walz, Uwe
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies' direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors' revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors' revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
    Keywords: Product Market Competition,Peers,LBOs,Restructuring
    JEL: D43 G23 G24 G34
    Date: 2015
  9. By: Marcelo de M. Lara Resende
    Date: 2015–01
  10. By: Louis Kaplow
    Abstract: Market definition and market power are central features of competition law and practice but pose serious challenges. On one hand, market definition suffers decisive logical infirmities that render it infeasible, unnecessary, and counterproductive, and the practice of stating market power requirements as market share threshold tests is incoherent as a matter of empirics and policy. On the other hand, market power is often probative of the desirability of liability, yet the typically assumed functional relationship is unexplored and often implausible. These latter deficiencies are addressed through a ground-up analysis of the channels by which market power can be relevant. It is important to explicitly and simultaneously consider both anticompetitive and procompetitive explanations for challenged practices and to attend to the magnitudes of the social consequences of correct and mistaken imposition of liability in order to identify the various ways and senses in which market power bears on optimal decision-making.
    JEL: D42 K21 L12 L40
    Date: 2015–05
  11. By: Tom Broekel; Dirk Fornahl; Andrea Morrison
    Abstract: This paper investigates the allocation of R&D subsidies with a focus on the granting success of firms located in clusters. On this basis it is evaluated whether firms in these clusters are differently embedded into networks of subsidized R&D collaboration than firms located elsewhere. The theoretical arguments are empirically tested using the example of the German biotechnology firms’ participation in the 6th EU-Framework Programmes and national R&D subsidization schemes in the early 2000s. We show that clusters grant firms another premium to their location, as they are more likely to receive funds from the EU-Framework Programmes and hold more favourable positions in national knowledge networks based on subsidies for joint R&D.
    Keywords: Innovation policy, R&D subsidy, collaboration networks, embeddedness, technology cluster
    JEL: R11 O33 R58 D85
    Date: 2015–05
  12. By: Dionisius A. NARJOKO (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, Indonesia)
    Abstract: Technology transfers are important channels for firms in developing countries to get access to new technology and initiate innovation. This paper examines the geographical pattern of technology transfers in the form of buyer-provided training in domestic and international production networks. Our unique buyer-supplier network data in four countries in Southeast Asia allow us to directly observe the buyer-supplier relationship as well as the existence of inter-firm provision of training for product/process innovation in order to investigate the geographical structure of knowledge acquisition, dissemination, and aggregation among local and non-local firms. The empirical analysis finds the following: (i) the probability of having training provided by the main buyer presents a U-shaped quadratic pattern with respect to the geographical distance between the respondent firms and the main buyers. The geographical proximity to the main buyer seems to be particularly important for local firms. (ii) The training provision is likely for both local and non-local firms when the main buyer is a multinational located in the same country. (iii) The probability of having training from the main buyer is high when the main buyer conducts R&D. (iv) Both local and non-local firms that have training provided by their main buyers are likely to provide training to their main suppliers. (v) In the case of non-local firms, product innovation with production partners is more likely when they have upstream/downstream training. However, such links seem to be weaker in the case of local firms
    Keywords: buyer-provided training; FDI spillovers; backward linkages; Southeast Asia
    JEL: M5 O31 O32 R12
    Date: 2015–05
  13. By: G. Dosi; M. Grazzi; D. Moschella
    Abstract: In this work we analyze the relationship between the patterns of firm diversification, if any, across product lines and across bodies of innovative knowledge, proxied by the patent classes where the firm is present. Putting it more emphatically we investigate the relationship between "what a firm does" and "what a firm knows". Using a newly developed dataset matching information on patents and products at the firm level, we provide evidence concerning firms' technological and product scope, their relationships, the size-scaling and coherence properties of diversification itself. Our analysis shows that typically firms are much more diversified in terms of products than in terms of technologies, with their main products more related to the exploitation of their innovative knowledge. The scaling properties show that the number of products and technologies increase log-linearly with firm size. And the directions of diversification themselves display coherence between neighboring activities also at relatively high degrees of diversification. These findings are well in tune with a capability-based theory of the firm.
    JEL: C81 D22 L20 L25 O31
    Date: 2015–04
  14. By: Elzbieta Pohulak-Zoledowska (Wroclaw University of Economics)
    Abstract: The hereby article discusses the issues related to the existing or required support given by the State to enterprises in order to provide them conditions to innovate. Neoclassical economy puts an emphasis to the price mechanism as a decision making effective tool, but enterprises meet many barriers in creating and introducing innovation, like high cost, high risk or lack of demand for innovation. These phenomena tend to inhibit innovation of enterprises. This means that market is not an efficient mechanism for innovation activity of enterprises, and its imperfections provoke State’s intervention. The goal of the article is to shape the objectives of State’s impact on decisions of innovative enterprises. Research method is the critical literature review and public data on State’s support on business R&D analysis. The research results show State’s support for both – incremental and radical innovation, which proves that innovative activity of enterprises is far from being a spontaneous, market-based process.
    Keywords: innovation, knowledge, market economies, the state
    JEL: H53 O12 O32 O38
    Date: 2015–05
  15. By: Tavassoli, Sam (CIRCLE, Lund University and Blekinge Institute of Technology, Karlskrona); Karlsson, Charlie (Blekinge Institute of Technology, Karlskrona; Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS), KTH, Stockholm and Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the persistency in innovation behavior of firms. Using five waves of the Community Innovation Survey in Sweden, we have traced the innovative behavior of firms over a ten-year period, i.e. between 2002 and 2012. We distinguish between four types of innovations: process, product, marketing, and organizational innovations. First, using Transition Probability Matrix, we found evidence of (unconditional) state dependence in all types of innovation, with product innovators having the strongest persistent behavior. Second, using a dynamic probit model, we found evidence of “true” state dependency among all types of innovations, except marketing innovators. Once again, the strongest persistency was found for product innovators.
    Keywords: Persistence; innovation; product innovations; process innovations; market innovations; organizational innovations; state dependence; heterogeneity; firms; Community Innovation Survey
    JEL: D22 L20 O31 O32
    Date: 2015–05–14
  16. By: Auriol, Emmanuelle; Biancini, Sara; Paillacar, Rodrigo
    Abstract: The paper studies developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR enforcement is U-shaped in a country's market size relative to the aggregated market size of its trade partners: small/poor countries protect IPR to get access to advanced economies' markets, while large emerging countries tend to free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher level of innovation than universal enforcement. An empirical analysis conducted with panel data covering 112 countries and 45 years supports the theoretical predictions.
    Keywords: developing countries; imitation; innovation; intellectual property rights; oligopoly; trade policy
    JEL: F12 F13 F15 L13 O31 O34
    Date: 2015–05
  17. By: Paula González (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide.); Inés Macho-Stadler (Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE.); David Pérez-Castrillo (Department of Economics, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE.)
    Abstract: There is a great deal of debate in society regarding the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing products that are "follow-on" drugs of already existing drugs, rather than the development of breakthrough drugs. This paper provides a theoretical framework to study firm incentives for pharmaceutical innovation that disentangle the quest for breakthrough drugs from the firm effort to develop follow-on drugs. We construct a model with a population of patients treated with one of two --horizontally and vertically differentiated-- drugs. One of the drugs is the pioneer; the other is the result of an innovative process by a firm that seeks to achieve an improvement over the existing drug. Our results offer theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical firms devote too many resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations.
    Keywords: pharmaceuticals, R&D activities, me-too drugs, breakthrough drugs, incremental innovation, radical innovation.
    JEL: I1 L1
    Date: 2015–05
  18. By: Anne Maria Busch (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)
    Abstract: This article analyzes the shifts of power relation and influence between pharmaceutical industry (producers), pharmacies, and social health insurers (SHI) in Germany based on drug prices. Since the health care reform of 2004, these interest groups have negotiated fees and discounts among each other without any intervention from the government. These negotiations and resulting amendments to the original law express the shift of power of the involved groups, which can be explained with the Becker (1983) model. As a result, a trend becomes apparent, which shows a slight increase in political pressure on the part of SHI and a big decrease of political pressure on the part of pharmacies and producers. This reflects the cost control trend in combination with the empowerment incentives for SHI. The last years have shown increased competition between the interest groups, resulting in more balanced power relations. Nevertheless, the most powerful group is still the producer group and the influence of SHI is still very low.
    Keywords: interest groups, political pressure, health care market, regulation
    JEL: D78 I39 D72 I18
    Date: 2015–05
  19. By: Anne Maria Busch (Leuphana University Lueneburg, Germany)
    Abstract: Using the health care reform of 2004 as an experience, the reaction of consumers (insured persons) and producers (pharmaceutical industry) based on electoral behavior and relating to drug prices and copayments imposed on drugs is analyzed. The changes in prices and medications after this reform make it to a natural choice. For the analysis, the interest group model by Peltzman (1976) is applied to the German health care market. The vote-maximizing government has to find the optimal combination of rent and price of regulation. As a result, the vote-maximizing outcome is determined by a price level which reflects the interests of consumers as well as the pharmaceutical industry. The analysis of the reaction of consumers related to the co-payment rules of 2004 leads to the hypothesis that the regulator, and finally the pharmaceutical industry, sets drug prices in a way that they are ranging from 5 to 50 Euro. Prices between 50 and 100 Euro are possible as well, reflecting a balance of power facing the pharmaceutical industry. Producers who had accepted the 1989 reference price had an incentive to increase their price while lowering their sales volume.
    Keywords: German health care market, interest groups, political pressure, lobbyism
    JEL: D72 D78 I39
    Date: 2015–05
  20. By: David Atkin; Benjamin Faber; Marco Gonzalez-Navarro
    Abstract: The arrival of global retail chains in developing countries is causing a radical transformation in the way that households source their consumption. This paper draws on a new collection of Mexican microdata to estimate the effect of foreign supermarket entry on household welfare. The richness of the microdata allows us to estimate a general expression for the gains from retail FDI, and to decompose these gains into several distinct channels. We find that foreign retail entry causes large and significant welfare gains for the average household that are mainly driven by a reduction in the cost of living. About one quarter of this price index effect is due to pro-competitive effects on the prices charged by domestic stores, with the remaining three quarters due to the direct consumer gains from shopping at the new foreign stores. We find little evidence of significant changes in average municipality-level incomes or employment. We do, however, find evidence of store exit, adverse effects on domestic store profits and reductions in the incomes of traditional retail sector workers. Finally, we show that the gains from retail FDI are on average positive for all income groups but regressive, and quantify the opposing forces that underlie this finding.
    JEL: F15 F23 O24
    Date: 2015–05
  21. By: Anderson, Simon P; Foros, Øystein; Kind, Hans Jarle
    Abstract: Standard models of advertising-financed media assume consumers patronize a single media platform, precluding effective competition for advertisers. Such competition ensues if consumers multi-home. The principle of incremental pricing implies that multi-homing consumers are less valuable to platforms. Then entry of new platforms decreases ad prices, while a merger increases them, and ad-financed platforms may suffer if a public broadcaster carries ads. Platforms may bias content against multi-homing consumers, especially if consumers highly value overlapping content and/or second impressions have low value.
    Keywords: genre choice; incremental ad pricing; media bias; media economics; multi-homing; overlap
    JEL: D11 D60 L13
    Date: 2015–05
  22. By: Hiroshi Ohashi (Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo); Yuya Toyama (Department of Economics, The University of Tokyo)
    Abstract: This paper examines the economic consequences of a horizontal merger between Korean automakers that took place in 1998, with a particular emphasis on export market behavior. Estimates of structural demand and supply reveal that the merger enhanced production efficiency of the merged party by 6.3 percent. Simulations, based on these estimates, indicate that while the merger increased domestic prices, it also tripled the export volume of the merged party. Moreover, the e ects of the merger are found to di er by auto model according to the model's pre-merger export status. It is shown that efficiency gains from the merger are likely to increase export volumes for models that were already exported prior to the merger, and to o set domestic market power for those that were not exported even after the merger. Finally, the paper compares the actual merger's e ects to those of an alternative counterfactual merger, nding that the actual merger brought greater bene ts to producers and fewer to domestic consumers. --
    Date: 2015–05
  23. By: Takayuki Mizuno; Takaaki Ohnishi; Tsutomu Watanabe
    Abstract: We investigate the structure of global inter-firm linkages using a dataset that contains information on business partners for about 400,000 firms worldwide, including all the firms listed on the major stock exchanges. Among the firms, we examine three networks, which are based on customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and strategic alliance relationships. First, we show that these networks all have scale-free topology and that the degree distribution for each follows a power law with an exponent of 1.5. The shortest path length is around six for all three networks. Second, we show through community structure analysis that the firms comprise a community with those firms that belong to the same industry but different home countries, indicating the globalization of firms' production activities. Finally, we discuss what such production globalization implies for the proliferation of conflict minerals (i.e., minerals extracted from conflict zones and sold to firms in other countries to perpetuate fighting) through global buyer-supplier linkages. We show that a limited number of firms belonging to some specific industries and countries plays an important role in the global proliferation of conflict minerals. Our numerical simulation shows that regulations on the purchases of conflict minerals by those firms would substantially reduce their worldwide use.
    Date: 2015–05
  24. By: Riham Ahmed Ezzat (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne & Faculty of Economics and Political Science - Université du Caire)
    Abstract: Since the 1980s, developing countries started adopting telecom reforms due to pressures from international institutions. However, Middle East and North African (MENA) countries lagged in adopting such reforms. Even after introducing telecom reforms in the MENA region beginning in 1995, not all countries became better off in terms of various performance indicators. Therefore, this paper empirically assesses the effects of regulation, privatization and liberalization reforms, as well as their simultaneous presences, in the telecommunication sector on the sector's performance using a sample of 17 MENA countries for the period 1995-2010. We assume that different reforms are affected by institutional, political and economic variables with respect to the level of democracy, the legal origin, the natural resources rents per country and the year of independence from colonization. We correct for the endogeneity of telecom reforms, and we use IV-2SLS (Instrumental Variable-Two Stages Least Squares) estimation to analyze their effect on telecom performance in terms of access, productivity and affordability. We find that the privatization of the main incumbent operator and the fixed-line market's liberalization affect the sector's performance negatively in terms of fixed access and affordability. Moreover, we find that the simultaneous presence of an independent regulator and a privatized incumbent helps to eliminate the drawbacks on the sector performance resulting from privatization. However, the simultaneous presences of the other reforms in terms of regulation-competition and privatization-fixed competition do not help to improve the sector's performance
    Keywords: Regulation; privatization; competition; Telecom industry; MENA region
    JEL: L11 L14 L33 L43 L51 L96 O38 O50
    Date: 2015–04
  25. By: Newton de Castro
    Date: 2015–01
  26. By: Neuhoff, Karsten; Schwenen,Sebastian
    Abstract: Using generating and demand resources across national borders brings synergies and improves supply adequacy in Europe as a whole. However, national capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRMs) may pose barriers for the participation of energy resources across borders. This ultimately challenges the idea of a common internal market. Given the current experience with the newly imposed CRMs, indeed the integration of foreign capacities seems challenging as certain regulatory requirements, for instance on interconnector capacity, have to be met. Although all current CRMs in the EU are explicitly of temporary nature, given the current divergence in EU power market design, the question will be not whether but how to agree and coordinate on different forms of capacity remuneration in the EU for the years to come.
    Date: 2014
  27. By: Juan Manuel Monroy Barragán; Juan David Pachón Baena
    Abstract: En este documento se analizan los esquemas público y privado del servicio domiciliario de aseo de la ciudad de Bogotá en materia de tarifas, eficiencia e impactos sociales. Además, se hacen sugerencias de política para una organización adecuada del sistema de aseo.
    Keywords: libre competencia, servicio domiciliario, aseo, oligopolio, regulación.
    JEL: D63 D82 H41 H42 L13 L32 L51
    Date: 2015–01–21

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