nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2015‒04‒02
twenty-two papers chosen by
Russell Pittman
United States Department of Justice

  1. Relative profit maximization and the choice of strategic variables in duopoly By Satoh, Atsuhiro; Tanaka, Yasuhito
  2. Price competition and reputation in markets for experience goods: An experimental study By Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
  3. Corporate Governance and Cartel formation By Suha Alawi
  4. Intervalling-effect bias and evidences for competition policy By Fotis, Panagiotis; Pekka, Victoria; Polemis, Michael
  5. Three Stage Dynamic Game of Merger with Incomplete Information on Competition Commission’s Type By Dejan Trifunovic; Bojan Ristic
  6. Entry barriers to international trade: product versus firm fixed costs. By W. Steingress
  7. Should non-genuine products be expelled from markets? By Keisuke Hattori; Keisaku Higashida
  9. Firm Heterogeneity and Location Choice of European Multinationals By Marti, Josep; Alguacil, Maite; Orts, Vicente
  10. Research joint ventures in an R&D driven market with evolving consumer preferences: An evolutionary multi-agent based modelling approach By Cevikarslan S.
  11. Export versus FDI in Cournot duopoly framework By Andrzej Cieslik
  12. Measuring the Magnitude of Significant Market Power in the Manufacturing and Services Industries: A Cross Country Approach By Polemis, Michael; Fotis, Panagiotis
  13. Policy of airline competition ~monopoly or duopoly~ By Morimoto, Yu; Takeda, Kohei
  14. Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports By Ricardo Flores-Fillol; Alberto Iozzi; Tommaso Valletti
  15. Estimating Dynamic Merger Effciencies with an Application to the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger By Zhao, Wei
  16. Disentangling the European Airlines efficiency puzzle:A network data envelopment analysis approach By Meryem Duygun; Diego Prior; Mohamed Shaban; Emili Tortosa-Ausina
  17. Theory meets practice in the taxi industry: Coase and Uber By Jenk, Justin
  18. Corporate Governance, Bank Mergers and Executive Compensation By Yan Liu; Carol Padgett; Simone Varotto
  19. Competitive Conditions in the Turkish Banking Systems By Ömer AkkuÅŸ; Taner Sekmen; Ä°lyas Şıklar
  20. On Competition in the Banking Sector in Poland and Europe Before and During the Crisis / Jak kszta³towa³a siê konkurencja w sektorze bankowym w Polsce i w Europie przed kryzysem i w okresie kryzys By Malgorzata Pawlowska
  21. Ask Your Doctor? Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pharmaceuticals By Michael Sinkinson; Amanda Starc
  22. Entry of Painters in the Amsterdam Market of the Golden Age By Federico Etro; Elena Stepanova

  1. By: Satoh, Atsuhiro; Tanaka, Yasuhito
    Abstract: We study implications of the choice of strategic variables, price or quantity, by firms in a duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm maximizes its relative profit. We consider general demand and cost functions, and show that the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant in the sense that the conditions of relative profit maximization for the firms are the same in all situations, and so any combination of strategy choice by the firms constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium in a two stage game such that in the first stage the firms choose their strategic variables and in the second stage they determine the values of their strategic variables. We define the relative profit of a firm as the ratio of its profit over the total profit. But, even if we define the relative profit of a firm as the difference between the profits of firms, we can show the same result.
    Keywords: relative profit maximization, choice of strategic variables, duopoly
    JEL: D43 L13
    Date: 2015–03–17
  2. By: Huck, Steffen; Lünser, Gabriele K.; Tyran, Jean-Robert
    Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of price competition in markets for expe-rience goods where sellers can build up reputations for quality. We compare price competition to monopolistic markets and markets where prices are exogenously fixed (somewhere between the endogenous oligopoly and monopoly prices). While oligopolies benefit consumers regardless of whether prices are fixed or endoge-nously chosen, we find that price competition lowers efficiency as consumers pay too little attention to reputation for quality. This provides empirical support to recent models in behavioral industrial organization that assume that consumers may with increasing complexity of the market place focus on selected dimensions of products. We also find that consumers' attention to quality and, hence, provided quality drops when regulated prices are set at levels that are too low.
    Keywords: Markets,Price competition,Behavioral IO,Price regulation,Reputation,Trust,Moral hazard,Experience goods
    JEL: C72 C90 D40 D80 L10
    Date: 2015
  3. By: Suha Alawi (King Abdulaziz university)
    Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance and cartel formation, A firm’s participation in cartel depends upon the potential problems that may arise due to price fixing and the incentives provided to the management. The top levels of management such as the board of directors and the CEO are responsible for deciding if the firm will participate in the cartel and manage the corporate governance activities of collusive price fixing agreements. The study is focused on UK cartel firms which has the highest representation in the sample. A total number of 150 cartel firms in 52 cases from all around the world between the years 1990 to 2008 are involved in this study, of which 114 are UK firms. Therefore, this study is dominated by UK firms. The study concludes that UK-based cartel firms characterised by having larger board size compared to non-cartel firms; lower percentage of independent directors (non-executive); higher average of board remuneration; less likely that cartel is formed by family-owned and controlled firm (large shareholders); having older CEOs represented on the board; having CEO who served a less number of years as a director; less likely to have a female CEO represented; more likely to have CEOs who’s combined CEO-chairman position; and a higher average of CEOs bonuses and compensation packages.
    Keywords: Cartels; Antitrust agreements; Corporate governance; Competition; Agency theory.
    JEL: G34 L40
    Date: 2014–07
  4. By: Fotis, Panagiotis; Pekka, Victoria; Polemis, Michael
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is on the one hand to analyze whether the security’s systematic risk beta estimates change as the infrequent trading phenomenon appears and on the other hand to provide useful insight on the impact of mergers and acquisitions on competition policy. The paper employs the models of Scholes and Williams (1977), Dimson (1979), Cohen et al. (1983a) and Maynes and Rumsey (1993) on a small stock exchange with thickly infrequent trading stocks. The empirical results reveal that for some securities the models employed by Scholes and Williams (1977) and Cohen et al. (1983a) improve the biasness of the Ordinary Least Squares Market Model (Maynes and Rumsey, 1993). Regarding competition policy issues, we argue that competitors gain while merged entities loose or at least do not gain from the clearness of the mergers under scrutiny. However, if we focus our attention on each individual merger, the results are rather controversial.
    Keywords: Intervalling-effect bias, Beta risk measurement, infrequent trading phenomenon, mergers and acquisiti¬ons, com¬pe¬¬¬tition po¬licy
    JEL: C4 G12 K0
    Date: 2015–03–24
  5. By: Dejan Trifunovic (University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics); Bojan Ristic (University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics)
    Abstract: Horizontal mergers are of particular interest of anti-trust authorities who must distinguish between mergers that increase market power and are anti-competitive and mergers that result in significant cost savings and are not harmful to consumers. We consider horizontal merger in an environment where competition commission might be strong or weak. Weak commissions are more likely to accept horizontal mergers due to the low level of competency and reputation while strong commissions are more likely to decline horizontal mergers. In developing countries where antitrust policy is not very sophisticated commissions are more likely to be considered as weak and with the accumulation of competence and reputation they move towards strong commissions. This model might explain the situation when international companies that operate in several countries intend to merge. These companies must submit notification to competition commissions in all countries where they operate and each national commission estimates the impact of the merger on the national market. This model might also describe the situation when companies operating dominantly in the national market intend to merge, but they don't know the commission's type since they were not dealing with the commission in the past.We model the interaction between companies that intend to merge and competition commission in a dynamic game of incomplete information where the commission’s type is unknown to merging companies at the moment when they have to decide about notification submission to competition commission. If they are unsatisfied with commission’s decision, they can complain to the court who can confirm commission’s decision or overturn the verdict in favour of the companies. We determine that in perfect Bayesian equilibrium decision of merging companies about notification submission depends on possible weak commission’s decision and they almost completely ignore strong commission’s decision. If merging companies believe that weak commission will accept the merger, they will submit notification. Otherwise, they will restrain from merger. We also conduct an empirical analysis on the case of merger in sugar industry from Serbian regulatory practice that supports the main findings of our model.
    Keywords: Horizontal merger, Dynamic game, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
    JEL: L40 L41 C73
    Date: 2014–12
  6. By: W. Steingress
    Abstract: Market size matters for exporters if firms must recover fixed costs. This paper uses the relationship between the extensive margins of exports and destination market size to evaluate whether fixed costs operate at the firm or at the product level. If fixed costs are at the firm level, multi-product firms have a cost advantage and dominate international trade. If fixed costs are at the product level, many firms export different varieties of the same product. Using detailed product level data from 40 exporting countries to 180 destination markets, the results indicate that entry barriers operate at the product level. Looking at firm entry within products across time and destinations, I find evidence of spillover effects that reduce fixed costs for product market rivals, increase firm en- try and augment export revenues. The efficiency gains in production through lower product fixed costs outweigh the competition effects from more firm entry. Trade policies encouraging product entry, such as advertising products in destination markets through export promotion agencies, would result in more firm entry and generate higher export revenues.
    Keywords: Fixed costs, spillovers, market size.
    JEL: F12 F14 F23
    Date: 2015
  7. By: Keisuke Hattori (Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics); Keisaku Higashida (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)
    Abstract: We develop a model in which a `genuine' producer supplying genuine products competes with many `non-genuine' producers supplying the compatible third-party or generic products. We examine whether non-genuine products should be expelled from markets. In particular, we focus on the genuine producer's strategies for driving out non-genuine products: running comparative advertising, building technical barriers, and improving the quality of genuine products. Although the small amount of spending on advertising or building technical barriers improves social welfare, their equilibrium amounts are socially excessive. The quality improvement may raise or reduce welfare, depending on the degree of patent protection. We also find that prohibition of entry of non-genuine producers may improve welfare by discouraging the genuine producer from implementing the drive-out strategies.
    Keywords: Genuine products, advertising, technical barriers, anti-trust law
    JEL: L13 L15
    Date: 2015–03
  8. By: Comanor, William S; Frech, Ted E
    Abstract: The Areeda-Turner rule in U.S. antitrust jurisprudence limits successful predatory pricing cases to circumstances where prices can be shown to have been set below marginal costs. While not cast so, the rule reflects the view that predatory pricing is rarely attempted; and even where attempted is rarely successful; and even where attempted and successful, is difficult to identify. In this paper, we examine the theoretical and empirical foundations of this rule, and conclude that it is time to demote the Areeda-Turner analysis from the status of a rule to that of a potentially useful form of inquiry in predatory pricing litigation, but one which is neither necessary nor dispositive.
    Keywords: Social and Behavioral Sciences, Predatory Pricing, Antitrust, Monopolization, Areeda-Turner Rule, Credibility, Subgame Perfection, Rationality, Chain-Store Paradox
    Date: 2015–03–06
  9. By: Marti, Josep; Alguacil, Maite; Orts, Vicente
    Abstract: In this paper we investigate how the different characteristics of European multinational firms affect their decision to locate in different foreign markets. Considering the existence of n geographically separated markets with different attributes, in terms of entry or fixed costs, variable production costs and the market potential, our theoretical model shows that both firm and country characteristics determine the location of multinational firms. The model reveals that given the characteristics of the countries, the decision to enter a specific country in order to serve all markets globally will depend on all the sources of a firm’s heterogeneity. In the empirical analysis, we drawn on a dataset comprised of harmonized and detailed firm-level data across European countries for 2008 (EFIGE dataset). The results obtained confirm that firms’ international location decision reflects the underlying dissimilarities of European multinational firms, including the specific industry in which they operate. More specifically, our estimations show that among European firms investing in non-European countries, only the most productive firms invest in Latin America and those that decide to enter North America are more productive than firms that locate in China and India. However, we find that this ranking may vary across industries, depending not only on TFP, but also on the years of establishment and the firms’ human capital and R&D intensity.
    Keywords: multinational firms, firm heterogeneity, location choices, European FDI
    JEL: D24 F14 F21 F23
    Date: 2015–03–05
  10. By: Cevikarslan S. (UNU-MERIT)
    Abstract: RD collaborations have increasingly attracted the attention of both academic and business circles in the last couple of decades. Several empirical studies have concentrated on the firms incentives to participate in these collaborations. This paper presents an alternative approach to RD collaborations using an evolutionary, multi-agent based and sector-level RD model. The model will firstly be used to simulate the evolution of an RD driven market composed of profit-driven firms and boundedly rational consumers. Next, frequently discussed research questions in the relevant empirical literature will be explored. This modelling exercise will extend beyond a basic confirmation/rejection of these research questions by showing that the way a firm is defined as an RD collaborator has a significant effect on research results.
    Keywords: Current Heterodox Approaches: Institutional; Evolutionary; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives;
    JEL: B52 L11 O31
    Date: 2015
  11. By: Andrzej Cieslik (University of Warsaw)
    Abstract: In this paper we study the choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Cournot duopoly framework. First, we identify the conditions necessary for exporting and FDI, depending on costs of exporting and the cost of foreign investment. Then, we discuss various proximity-concentration tradeoffs. Finally, we demonstrate that six possible types of equilibriums may emerge depending on various combinations of the key parameters of the model. These equilibriums include: a monopoly FDI equilibrium, a monopoly exporting equilibrium, a domestic monopoly equilibrium, a duopoly FDI equilibrium, a duopoly exporting equilibrium, and no entry equilibrium.
    Keywords: exporting, foreign direct investment, proximity-concentration tradeoff
    JEL: F23
    Date: 2015–03
  12. By: Polemis, Michael; Fotis, Panagiotis
    Abstract: This paper provides estimates of price-marginal cost ratios for manufacturing and services sectors in the Eurozone, the US and Japan over the period 1970-2007. The estimates are obtained applying τhe methodology developed by Hall (1988) and extended by Roeger (1995) on the EU KLEMS March 2011 database. The major stylized facts that are emerged from the empirical results based on the Ordinary Least Squares, Two Step Least Squares and Bootstrap methods of estimation are a) there is no evidence of imperfect competition across the majority of industries in Eurozone, US and Japan, b) sectors that are more open to internationalisation, experience relatively lower mark up ratios than the ratios experienced in less open sectors to internationalisation and c) deregulated industries generally have lower mark – up ratios than regulated industries, while fragmented industries generally exhibit higher mark – up ratios than segmented ones.
    Keywords: Mark up Ratio; US; Eurozone; Japan; Manufacturing; Services.
    JEL: D43 L13 L16 L60
    Date: 2015–02–05
  13. By: Morimoto, Yu; Takeda, Kohei
    Abstract: We show that monopoly is better than competition in term of social welfare for low frequency routes. Competition affects both flight schedules and airfares. Flight schedules get un-even interval by competition and this leads to large scheduling delay cost (SDC). The increment of SDC is large when the number of flights is small. For low frequency routes, the increment of SDC by competition overwhelms the decreasing in the airfare, so monopoly is better than competition.
    Keywords: Scheduling Delay Cost, Airline Competition, Scheduling
    JEL: R41
    Date: 2015–03–26
  14. By: Ricardo Flores-Fillol (Universitat Rovira i Virgili); Alberto Iozzi (DEF and CEIS, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata"); Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College London, DEF and CEIS, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata" & CEPR)
    Abstract: Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by choosing the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight.
    Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight
    JEL: L1 L2 L93
    Date: 2015–03–24
  15. By: Zhao, Wei
    Abstract: I evaluate the welfare effects of the 1997 merger between Boeing and McDonnell Douglas in the medium-sized, wide-bodied aircraft industry. I develop an empirical model of multi-product firms, allowing for both learning-by-doing and product innovation in a dynamic game to quantify merger efficiency. Merger efficiency from learning-by-doing is then disentangled from both the effects of innovation and market power. The results show that the primary benefits from the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger come from accelerated learning-by-doing. Taking account of all static and dynamic effects, net consumer surplus is found to have increased by as much as $1.57 billion. In contrast, a static model ignoring learning-by-doing and innovation predicts a consumer loss of approximately $20 billion. These results show that ignoring dynamic effects can lead to biased results and erroneous policy decisions regarding the welfare effects of proposed mergers.
    Keywords: Merger Efficiency, Dynamic Oligopoly Model, Learning-by-doing, innovation, Aircraft Industry Merger
    JEL: C73 L13 L40 L62
    Date: 2013–10–19
  16. By: Meryem Duygun (University of Hull. Department of Accounting and Finance); Diego Prior (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Business Department); Mohamed Shaban (University of Leicester, Department of Management); Emili Tortosa-Ausina (IVIE, Valencia and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain)
    Abstract: In recent years the European airline industry has undergone critical restructuring. It has evolved from a highly regulated market predominantly operated by national airlines to a dynamic, liberalized industry where airline firms compete freely on prices, routes, and frequencies. Although several studies have analyzed performance issues for European airlines using a variety of efficiency measurement methods, virtually none of them has considered two-stage alternatives—not only in this particular European context but in the airline industry in general. We extend the aims of previous contributions by considering a network Data Envelopment Analysis (network DEA) approach which comprises two sub-technologies that can share part of the inputs. Results show that, in general, most of the inefficiencies are generated in the first stage of the analysis. However, when considering different types of carriers several differences emerge—most of the low-cost carriers’ inefficiencies are confined to the first stage. Results also show a dynamic component, since performance differed across types of airlines during the decade 2000–2010.
    Keywords: airlines, network DEA
    JEL: C61 D61 L93
    Date: 2015
  17. By: Jenk, Justin
    Abstract: This paper demonstrates how the transformation of the taxi industry is an example of Coase’s Theorem in practice. The Coase Theorem, as postulated by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase (1991), is one of the simplest yet profound ideas in economics. The recent advent of new mobile app entrants in the regulated taxi industry, (such as Uber and Lyft) based on: technology, disruptive innovation; mobile app based businesses; using digital practices with smartphones as the core platform, have allowed the recent and ongoing transformation of the city defined, regulated and oligopolistic taxi markets; with value–added effects. The mobile app taxi companies and their business actions are reducing transaction costs, increasing social utility and disaggregating the structure of firms – in keeping with Coase’s Theorem.
    Keywords: Economics, Coase Theorem, Uber, Transaction Costs, Social Utility, Nature of the firm, Disruptive Innovation, Mobile app, Taxi industry, Raktas, Justin Jenk
    JEL: A1 A2 D0 M0 O1 O3 R4
    Date: 2015–02
  18. By: Yan Liu (ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading); Carol Padgett (ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading); Simone Varotto (ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading)
    Abstract: Using a sample of US bank mergers from 1995 to 2012, we observe that the pre-post merger changes in CEO bonus are significantly negatively related to the strength of corporate governance within the bidding bank. This suggests that bonus compensation is not consistent with the “optimal contracting hypothesis”. Salary changes, on the other hand, are not affected by corporate governance but are positively correlated with pre-post merger changes in the M/B ratio of the bidding banks, in line with “optimal contracting”. We also find that good governance is associated with more accretive deals for the bidder. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that, unlike salary and long-term compensation, bonus compensation is not aligned with value creation and is more vulnerable to CEO manipulation in banks with poor corporate governance.
    Keywords: corporate governance, bank mergers, executive compensation, bonus
    JEL: G21 G28 G34
    Date: 2014–12
  19. By: Ömer AkkuÅŸ (Anadolu University); Taner Sekmen (EskiÅŸehir Osmangazi University); Ä°lyas Şıklar (Anadolu University)
    Abstract: In this paper, we investigate competition in Turkish banking sector over the period 2003– 2012. In order to understand the competitive condition in Turkish banking sector, we use the well-known Panzar-Rosse model based on a nonstructural estimation of the H-statistic by employing the quarterly panel data set. The emprical evidences indicate that the Turkish banking sector operates under conditions of monopolistic competition. Therefore, although there have been growing structural changes in the Turkish banking sector since 2000s, there is no remarkable change in the market structure of the Turkish banking sector and it can still be characterized by the monopolistic competition.
    Keywords: Competition, H-Statistic, Panzar-Rosse Model, Turkish Banking Sector
    JEL: D00 G28 L10
    Date: 2014–06
  20. By: Malgorzata Pawlowska
    Abstract: In the past decades, the banking sector has come to be known in literature as the banking industry as it was geared to increasing profits, banks were growing, and banking products developed dynamically. It was believed that competition in the banking sector makes banks more efficient and stimulates financial innovation opening new markets. The financial crisis of 2007–2008 has sparked the interest of researchers and politicians in competition in the banking sector and its impact on the stability of the financial sector and overall economic growth. However, researchers cannot agree whether more competition improves or hinders stability.The paper is comprised of three sections and a summary. The first section discusses the concept of competition in the banking sector as well as measures of competition. The second section is a review of literature on competition in the banking sector and its determinants. The third section presents the results of research on competition in the EU, including my own research as well as other research. The paper concludes with a short summary.This publication was presented by Ma³gorzata Paw³owska during the 134th mBank-CASE Seminar "The global financial crisis: changes in competition in the banking sector in Europe, the role of regulation and intervention by governments and central banks".
    Keywords: banking and finance, competition, financial services, mergers and acquisitions, market structure, efficiency, credit market, European Union, banking regulation
    JEL: G18 G20 G21 G28 G29
    Date: 2015–01
  21. By: Michael Sinkinson; Amanda Starc
    Abstract: We measure the impact of direct-to-consumer television advertising (DTCA) by drug manufacturers. Our identification strategy exploits shocks to local advertising markets generated by idiosyncrasies of the political advertising cycle as well as a regulatory intervention affecting a single product. We find that a 10% increase in the number of a firm's ads leads to a 0.76% increase in revenue, while the same increase in rival advertising leads to a 0.55% decrease in firm revenue. Results also indicate that a 10% increase in category advertising produces a 0.2% revenue increase for non-advertised drugs. Both the business-stealing and spillover effects would not be detected through OLS. Decomposition using micro data confirms that the effect is due mostly to new customers as opposed to switching among current customers. Simulations show that an outright ban on DTCA would have modest effects on the sales of advertised drugs as well as on non-advertised drugs.
    JEL: I11 L1
    Date: 2015–03
  22. By: Federico Etro (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Elena Stepanova (Department of Economics, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa)
    Abstract: We analyze the evolution of the price of paintings in the XVII century Amsterdam art market to test a hypothesis of endogenous entry: higher probability should attract more entry of painters, which in turn should lead to artistic innovations and more intense competition. We build a price index for the representative painting inventoried in Dutch houses through hedonic regressions controlling for characteristics of the paintings (size, genre, placement in the house), the owners (job, religion, value of the collection, size of the house) and the painters. After a peak at the beginning of the century, the real price of paintings decreases until the end of the century: we provide anecdotal evidence for which high initial prices attracted entry of innovators, and econometric evidence on the causal relation between price movements and entry of painters. The time series analysis supports the idea for which increasing prices attracted entry of innovative painters.
    Keywords: Art market, Endogenous entry, Dutch Golden Age, Hedonic prices, VAR analysis
    JEL: Z11 N0 D4
    Date: 2015

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