|
on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Li, Sanxi ; Peitz, Martin ; Zhao, Xiaojian |
| Abstract: | Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers, a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclosure rules. |
| Keywords: | Information disclosure , informative advertising , targeted advertising , consumer awareness , behavioral bias , non-common prior , consumer protection , behavioral industrial organization |
| JEL: | L51 M38 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:37377&r=com |
| By: | Maarten Janssen ; Sandro Shelegia |
| Abstract: | When consumers search sequentially for prices and product matches, their beliefs of what they will encounter at the next rm are important in deciding whether or not to continue to search. In search environments where retailers have a common cost that is not known to consumers and is either the outcome of a random process or strategically set by an upstream rm, it is natural for consumers to have symmetric beliefs. We show that market outcomes under symmetric beliefs are quantitatively and qualitatively dierent from outcomes when consumers hold passive beliefs. Market prices are higher with symmetric beliefs (and can be as high as the joint prot maximizing prices), and are non-monotonic in the search cost. Moreover, price rigidities arise endogenously as retailers are not willing to charge prices above consumers' reservation utility. These phenomena become exacerbated in a vertical relations environment. |
| JEL: | D40 D83 L13 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vie:viennp:1501&r=com |
| By: | Jason Pearcy (Montana State University ) |
| Abstract: | In markets where consumers have switching costs and firms cannot price discriminate, firms have two conflicting strategies. A firm can either offer a low price to attract new consumers and build future market share or a firm can offer a high price to exploit the partial lock-in of their existing consumers. This paper develops a theory of competition when overlapping generations of consumers have switching costs and firms produce differentiated products. Competition takes place over an infinite horizon with any number of firms. This paper shows that the relationship between the level of switching costs and the number of firms determines whether firms offer low or high prices. Similar to previous duopoly studies, switching costs are likely to facilitate higher equilibrium prices only when there is a small number of firms and switching costs are large. Unlike previous studies this paper demonstrates that with a sufficiently large number of firms, switching costs have the opposite effect and prices are lower with switching costs when compared to equilibrium prices without switching costs. The equilibrium of the model also contains realistic features uncommon to other models in the literature where some consumers switch in equilibrium and a symmetric pure strategy price exists with more than two firms. |
| Keywords: | Switching Costs, Product Differentiation, Dynamic Competition, Discrete Choice |
| JEL: | D2 D4 L1 |
| Date: | 2009–04–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnu:wpaper:1004&r=com |
| By: | Guido Menzio (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania ); Nicholas Trachter (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ) |
| Abstract: | We develop a search-theoretic model of the product market that generates price dispersion across and within stores. Buyers differ with respect to their ability to shop around, both at different stores and at different times. The fact that some buyers can shop from only one seller while others can shop from multiple sellers causes price dispersion across stores. The fact that the buyers who can shop from multiple sellers are more likely to be able to shop at inconvenient times induces causes price dispersion within stores. Specifically, it causes sellers to post different prices for the same good at different times in order to discriminate between different types of buyers. |
| Keywords: | Search, Price dispersion, Price discrimination, Bargain hunting |
| JEL: | D43 |
| Date: | 2015–01–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:15-003&r=com |
| By: | X. Henry Wang (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia ); Chenhang Zeng (Research Center for Games and Economic Behavior, Shandong University ) |
| Abstract: | This note extends the simultaneous-move endogenous technology choice model of Mills and Smith (1996) in two directions. First, expanding consideration to when the technology set is sufficiently convex, we find that the likelihood for asymmetric equilibrium in technology choice does not expand under simultaneous moves. Second, introducing sequential moves in the technology choice stage, we find that (i) if the technology set is insufficiently convex then the same amount of asymmetry is obtained as under simultaneous moves, (ii) if the technology set is sufficiently convex then sequential moves lead to more asymmetric technology choices, and (iii) the first mover always chooses a more efficient technology in any asymmetric equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | technology choice, endogenous heterogeneity, duopoly. |
| JEL: | D2 D8 L2 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shn:wpaper:2015-02&r=com |
| By: | L. Lambertini ; G. Piagnataro ; A. Tampieri |
| Abstract: | We determine the emergence of the Porter Hypothesis in a large oligopoly setting where the industry-wide adoption of green technologies is endogenously determined as a result of competition among coalitions. We examine a setting where the initial technology is polluting, firms decide whether to be brown or green and compete in quantities. We find that the Porter hypothesis may emerge as a market configuration with all green firms spurred by environmental regulation, even if consumers are not environmentally concerned. Finally, we single out the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the green grand coalition is socially optimal and therefore yields a win-win outcome. |
| JEL: | L13 L51 Q50 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp989&r=com |
| By: | Aniol Llorente-Saguer (School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London ); Ro'i Zultan (Department of Economics, Ben-Gurion University ) |
| Abstract: | The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. In equilibrium, collusive negotiations are either successful or are avoided altogether, hence such analysis neglects the effects of failed collusion attempts. In such contingencies, information revealed in the negotiation process is likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which collusion is possible, but negotiations often break down and information is revealed in an asymmetric way. The existing theoretical analysis of our setup predicts that the first-price mechanism deters collusion. In contrast, we find the same level of collusion in first-price and second-price auctions. Furthermore, failed collusion attempts distort the bidding behavior in the ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first-price auctions. |
| Keywords: | Collusion, experiment, auctions, bribes |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D44 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2014_18&r=com |
| By: | Berglund, Henrik (Chalmers University of Technology ); Sandström, Christian (The Rato institute ) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: Why do entrant firms sometimes gain the upper hand under conditions of discontinuous technological change? Previous research on this topic has either looked at the role of established competencies and/or firm incentives to invest in a new technology. In this paper we explore an alternative explanation. Drawing upon evidence from the ongoing transition from CCTV to digital, IP based video surveillance, we argue that entrant firms may be more prone to act entrepreneurially, i.e. more inclined to proactively create or transform markets and build ecosystems. As new technologies frequently require altered behaviour among customers and stakeholders, this capability is sometimes critical in order to succeed in a technological transition. Our contribution therefore lies in pointing out that not only may incentives to allocate R&D resources differ among entrants and incumbents, firms might also have different incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities of creating or transforming markets. |
| Keywords: | Disruptive Innovation; Entrepreneurship; Incentives; Technological Discontinuities; business model; ecosystem. |
| JEL: | O14 |
| Date: | 2014–12–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0239&r=com |
| By: | Richards, Timothy J. ; Yonezawa, Koichi ; Hamilton, Stephen F. |
| Abstract: | It is generally not optimal for consumers to become perfectly informed about all prices and all available products in a multi-product retail environment when search is costly. We examine the link between the cost of search and product variety o¤ered by multi-product retailers. Using a hierarchical model in which consumers search among stores and then among brands, we nd statistically signi cant costs both for search among stores and for brands within a store. We also nd that the costs of search rise with variety, suggesting that retailers may improve their market power by increasing assortment depth. |
| Keywords: | consumer search, variety, retail prices, attribute search, market power, Consumer/Household Economics, |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae14:182778&r=com |
| By: | Sugata Marjit ; Arijit Mukherjee ; Lei Yang |
| Abstract: | We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank financed Cournot duopoly when firms face an imperfect credit market. We consider two situations without or with credit rationing. When there is no credit rationing moderately higher cost of external finance may affect the degree of collusion, but a substantial increase keeps it unaffected. Permanent adverse demand shock in this set up does not affect the possibility of collusion, but may aggravate the finance constraint and eventually lead to collusion. We also discuss the case with credit rationing. |
| Keywords: | Collusion, Credit Market JEL Classification: D21, D43, G21 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notgep:15/01&r=com |
| By: | Isabel Teichmann ; Vanessa von Schlippenbach |
| Abstract: | A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further if the upstream firm chooses a mixed distribution system in which it makes use of an intermediary to distribute the good to a subset of the retailers and delivers directly only to the remaining downstream firms. |
| Keywords: | Vertical relations, delegation, downstream monopolization, commitment problem, channel structure, multi-tier industry |
| JEL: | L12 L14 L42 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1440&r=com |
| By: | Bolotova, Yuliya |
| Abstract: | During the recent decade the organizations of agricultural producers in the national dairy, potato, egg and mushroom industries implemented various pre-production and production restriction practices with the primary objective of agricultural output price stabilization. The buyers of the affected agricultural commodities have challenged the legal status of production restrictions in a number of recent and current antitrust lawsuits, arguing that the Capper-Volstead Act, a limited antitrust exemption, does not protect production restrictions. Using the theory of oligopoly, this research evaluates potential market effects of agricultural production restrictions by comparing the organizations of agricultural producers with classic illegal cartels, which harmful effects antitrust law aims to prevent. The available empirical evidence on the market and price effects of agricultural output control practices is discussed in light of the theoretical analysis. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust, Capper-Volstead Act, cartels, cooperatives, output control agreements, Sherman Act., Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Marketing, D4, D7, K2, L1, L2, L4, Q1., |
| Date: | 2015–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:saea15:196848&r=com |
| By: | Toikkanen, Heini ; Niemi, Jyrki |
| Abstract: | In this study we estimated vertical price transmission in the Finnish food sector by using the Engle-Granger two-staged co-integration method. The results indicate that the producer price of beef and the consumer price of beef roast are co-integrated and that price transmission is quite effective. Liquid milk does not significantly differ from raw milk. However, the consumer price of liquid milk and the producer price of milk do not follow each other. The producer price and consumer prices of eggs are not co-integrated, either. A highly competitive market situation has existed on both egg and dairy markets during the 21st century. |
| Keywords: | Finnish food market, co-integration, price transmission, Demand and Price Analysis, |
| Date: | 2014–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:eaae14:182820&r=com |
| By: | Briglauer, Wolfgang ; Frübing, Stefan ; Vogelsang, Ingo |
| Abstract: | Our survey reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on all alternative policies to promote the deployment of new fiber-based communications infrastructure. Since such investment is expected to induce substantial positive externalities, dynamic efficiency becomes a particularly important policy goal. The available policies refer to i) different kinds of ex ante sector-specific regulations including cost-based access regulations as well as softer regulations such as regulatory holidays or geographically differentiated regulations, ii) deregulatory approaches based on effective competition law implementation and competitive market structures including allowance of co-investment models, and iii) public subsidies to cover non-profitable ('white') areas. Our survey identifies the most significant research gaps, finding that numerous studies related to the impact of access regulations exist, whereas only a much smaller branch of literature addresses the impact of competition policies, and even fewer studies analyze the impact of public subsidies on new communications deployment. Moreover, our work allows for a generic framework for policy recommendations that identifies the comparative advantages of the individual policy options for different market structures and for varying degrees of externalities. We find that public subsidies are the dominant policy alternative in white areas, whereas access regulations can be the preferred policy in white or 'grey' areas, where only monopoly structure or co-investment models lead to private investment. Deregulatory policies might be preferable in grey areas, if there is sufficient pressure from competitive outside options and if competition law is strong. Finally, deregulatory policies including soft regulation are the dominant policy in 'black' areas, where several independent infrastructure operators exist. |
| Keywords: | survey,policy framework,investment,new communications infrastructure,regulation,competition,subsidies |
| JEL: | L43 L44 L96 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:15003&r=com |
| By: | Andrew Ching (University of Toronto ); Masakazu Ishihara (New York University ) |
| Abstract: | For information/digital products, the used goods market has been viewed as a threat by producers. However, it is not clear if this view is justified because the used goods market also provides owners with an opportunity to sell their products. To investigate the impact of the used goods market on new goods sales, we collect a unique data set from the Japanese video game market. Based on the data, we develop and estimate a new dynamic structural model of consumers' buying and selling decisions. The estimation results show that the consumption value of owners depreciates much faster than that of potential buyers, and consumers are heterogeneous in transaction costs of buying and selling used copies. We also find evidence that new and used copies are not close substitutes, and consumers are forward-looking. The latter suggests that the future resale opportunity could increase consumers' willingness-to-pay for new copies. Using the estimates, we quantify the impact of eliminating the used game market on publishers' profits. We find that this policy would reduce the average profits per game by 10% if publishers do not adjust their prices. However, if they adjust prices optimally, it would increase the average profits per game by 19%. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed014:782&r=com |
| By: | Akio Kawasaki |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the problem of hub airport privatization, similar to the studies by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012). However, differentiating from their papers, this paper introduces a domestic airline network. That is, each country has one major hub airport and some local airports. The main result obtained in this paper is as follows. When at least one country has a small domestic airline network, the same result as that by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012) is obtained. However, when both countries have a large domestic airline network, the public airport may be an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, depending on the size of the airline network and the degree of airline competition, asymmetric equilibrium can also appear. |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcr:wpaper:e64&r=com |
| By: | Amromin, Eugene (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ); Kearns, Caitlin (University of California - Berkeley ) |
| Abstract: | We explore a policy-induced change in borrower ability to shop for mortgages to investigate whether market competitiveness affects mortgage interest rates. Our paper exploits a discontinuity in the competitive landscape introduced by the Home Affordable Refinancing Program (HARP). Under HARP, lenders that currently service loans eligible for refinancing enjoyed substantial advantages over their potential competitors. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, we show a jump in mortgage interest rates precisely at the HARP eligibility threshold. Our results suggest that limiting competition raised interest rates on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages by 15 to 20 basis points, translating into higher lender profits. The results are distinct from documented effects of consolidation and capacity reduction in mortgage lending and are robust to a number of sample restrictions and estimation choices. We interpret our findings as evidence that increases in pricing power lead to higher interest rates in mortgage markets. |
| Keywords: | Mortgage crisis; market competition; pricing power; HARP |
| JEL: | E52 G21 |
| Date: | 2014–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:wp-2014-25&r=com |
| By: | Crass, Dirk |
| Abstract: | The market launch of product innovations is the most visible output of a firm's investment in innovation activities. To achieve this objective most efficiently, firms strengthen their technological capabilities, acquire external knowledge in a number of different ways, and optimize their innovation process. The success of a firm's innovation strategy has two dimensions: First, the ability of a firm to master the research and development process, leading to the market introduction of a product innovation. Second, the ability to turn the market introduction of a product innovation into commercial success. While a firms technological abilities make a product innovation possible, this product might face a lack of interest among potential customers after its market introduction. The introduction of a product innovation under a brand name might generate interest, adds credibility and reputation and has the potential for the firm to better appropriate the returns from its innovations. This paper investigates the role of brand use for the commercial success of product innovations, using a representative sample of German firms. The results show that firms can improve the odds of commercial success by pursuing a branding strategy. The market introduction of a product innovation is shown to be associated with 35% larger sales if the firm uses an established brand to introduce the product innovation into the market. |
| Keywords: | innovation performance,brands,trademarks,innovation,Germany |
| JEL: | O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14119&r=com |
| By: | Karthik Balasubramanian (Harvard Business School ); David F. Drake (Harvard Business School, Technology and Operations Management Unit ) |
| Abstract: | The use of electronic money transfer through cellular networks ("mobile money") is rapidly increasing in the developing world. The resulting electronic currency ecosystem could improve the lives of the estimated 2 billion people who live on less than $2 a day by facilitating more secure, accessible, and reliable ways to store and transfer money than are currently available. The development of this ecosystem requires a network of agents to conduct cash-for-electronic value transactions and vice versa. This paper estimates the effect of competition and service quality on mobile money demand. In this setting, service quality consists of service reliability (lower stockout and system downtime rates), pricing transparency, and agent expertise. Among our results, we find that agents experience reduced demand for service failures due to stockouts, but not for service failures due to network downtime, suggesting that consumers differentially ascribe responsibility for service failure based on the type of failure they experience. We find that both stockout rate and agent expertise are important competitive dimensions in this setting. Pricing transparency, on the other hand, has a main effect on demand but has no significant interaction with competitive intensity. This paper furthers our understanding of the impact and interaction of quality and competition in service settings, while developing a foundation for the exploration of mobile money by OM scholars. |
| Keywords: | service operations, operations strategy, competition, base of the pyramid, mobile money |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:15-059&r=com |
| By: | Crass, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Trademarking firms are more productive, generate higher profits, and have a better survival rate. Trademarking firms are in one word more successful, which might motivate non-trademarking firms to adopt a trademark strategy. But this seems not to be the case. The proportion of trademarking firms in the German business sector amounts to just 18%. This figure is quite low, given that nearly each firm has reputation to protect. But why has the vast majority of firms no registered trademarks? Using a representative sample of German firms, the present paper links certain firm characteristics to a firms' propensity to register trademarks. The empirical results point to circumstances under which trademarks are significantly more often used: this is the case where a large distance between a firm and its customers exists, a firm's product quality is difficult to assess, a firm's products are characterized by a limited (but not strong) substitutability, and where a firm is engaged in R&D and introduces innovative products. Trademarks are considerably less frequently used if none of this is the case. |
| Keywords: | Intellectual Property Rights,Trademarks,Reputation,Innovation |
| JEL: | C25 D21 L14 O34 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:14118&r=com |
| By: | David H. Howard ; Peter B. Bach ; Ernst R. Berndt ; Rena M. Conti |
| Abstract: | Drugs like bevacizumab ($50,000 per treatment episode) and ipilimumab ($120,000 per episode) have fueled the perception that the launch prices of anticancer drugs are increasing over time. Using an original dataset of 58 anticancer drugs approved between 1995 and 2013, we find that launch prices, adjusted for inflation and drugs’ survival benefits, increased by 10%, or about $8,500, per year. Although physicians are not penalized for prescribing costly drugs, they may be reluctant to prescribe drugs with prices that exceed subjective standards of fairness. Manufacturers may set higher launch prices over time as standards evolve. Pricing trends may also reflect manufacturers’ response to expansions in the 340B Drug Pricing Program, which requires manufacturers to provide steep discounts to eligible providers. |
| JEL: | I1 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20867&r=com |
| By: | Chris Nosko ; Steven Tadelis |
| Abstract: | We argue that reputation mechanisms used by platform markets suffer from two problems. First, buyers may draw conclusions about the quality of the platform from single transactions, causing a reputational externality across sellers. Second, for a variety of reasons we discuss, reputations will be biased. We document these problems using eBay data and claim that platforms can benefit from identifying and promoting higher quality sellers. We create an unobservable measure of seller quality and demonstrate the benefits of our approach through a controlled experiment that prioritizes better quality sellers. We highlight the importance of reputational externalities and chart an agenda that aims to create more realistic models of platform markets. |
| JEL: | D82 L15 L21 L86 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20830&r=com |
| By: | Kibae Kim (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University ); Jörn Altmann (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University ); Sodam Baek (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University ) |
| Abstract: | Through the advancement of information technology, a new type of innovation could emerge. This innovation type suggests a leading company to open up its software service platform to customers as well as competitors. Many innovation studies have been performed in the past, in order to understand the structure of this interaction among platform users from a network science perspective. By focusing on the internal mechanisms of software vendors only, these studies missed the role of platform providers in the innovation process though. In this paper, we fill this gap by investigating the impact of platform providers on the structure of a software service network. The empirical data about the software services network has been gathered from Salesforce.com AppExchange. It is used to identify the clusters in the network and the network position of each software service. Using the Kruskal-Wallis test, we infer from those results that the network position of the platform providers software services is different from the network position of software services of third party vendors. In particular, our results show that the software services released by the platform provider locate at hub positions, while those released by third party vendors locate at positions interconnecting clusters. These results imply a role division between platform providers and third party vendors in this innovation type. The former leads the overall innovation on the platform, while the third party vendors interconnect software services of different categories. |
| Keywords: | Open Innovation, Software Ecosystem, Platform-as-a-Service, Software-as-a-Service, Salesforce.com, Platform Leadership, Network Analysis, Kruskal-Wallis Test. |
| JEL: | A12 C12 D85 L86 M15 O32 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:2015120&r=com |
| By: | Briones, Roehlano M. ; Gundaya, Debbie M. ; Domingo, Sonny N. |
| Abstract: | The bus transport sector evolved from a highly regulated and concentrated market with a handful of players in the 1970s to a more liberalized albeit still regulated market with hundreds of small operators. Major reforms in bus transport regulation were carried out in the early 1990s and 2000s among which were more liberal policy and a supposed moratorium on new franchises. The current market operates under a complicated regime where regulation and enforcement is shared by several agencies. Market inefficiencies manifest in too many operators and buses, and indiscipline in the road adding to traffic congestion problems in the Metro. The fragmented nature of both the sector`s regulatory and supply side impedes synchronization among stakeholders and incurs huge costs to industry operators and the riding public. |
| Keywords: | competition policy, Philippines, bus transport sector, congestion cost, transport policy |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phd:dpaper:dp_2015-02&r=com |