|
on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Francis Bloch (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Simona Fabrizi (Massey University - SIERC); Steffen Lippert (University of Otago - Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two firms to invest too early and analyze collusion schemes whereby one firm prevents the other firm from entering the market. We show that, in the efficient collusion scheme, the active firm must transfer a large part of the surplus to the inactive firm in order to limit preemption. |
| Keywords: | Learning; Preemption; Innovation; New Markets; Project Selection; Entry Costs; Collusion; Private Information; Market Uncertainty |
| Date: | 2011–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00639049&r=com |
| By: | Marie-Laure Allain (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Emeric Henry (Sciences Po - Department of Economics); Margaret Kyle (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The sale of ideas (e.g. through licensing) facilitates vertical specialization and the division of labor between research and development. This specialization can improve the overall efficiency of the innovative process. However, these gains depend on the timing of the sale: the buyer of an idea should assume development at the stage at which he has an efficiency advantage. We show that in an environment with asymmetric information about the value of the idea and where this asymmetry decreases as the product is developed, the seller of the idea may delay the sale to the more efficient firm, thus incurring higher development costs. We obtain a condition for the equilibrium timing of the sale and examine how factors such as the intensity of competition between potential buyers influence it. Empirical analysis of licensing contracts signed between firms in the pharmaceutical industry supports our theoretical predictions. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Licensing, Market structure, Bargaining, Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology. |
| Date: | 2011–11–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00639128&r=com |
| By: | Jose Polo; Néstor Duch; Martà Parellada |
| Abstract: | In this paper we empirically analyze the effects of collaboration in innovation with universities on the firm’s innovative performance. Using data from the Technological Innovation Panel dataset (PITEC for its acronym in Spanish) we have constructed a database of 4643 innovative firms in Spain, where we estimate the impact of different types of collaborative partnerships on the increments on firm’s range and quality of products, and on the improvements of the firm’s production capacity and flexibility. The estimation from an ordered logit model shows that firms collaborating actively with universities, as well as, firms that use universities as their principal source of information are more prone to have product and process additionalities, while subcontracting specific R&D activities to universities do not seem to affect the firm’s innovative performance. A sensitive analysis shows that firms belonging to manufacturing sectors benefit more from the collaboration with universities than firms from services sectors. |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa11p671&r=com |