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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Höeffler, Felix; Schmidt, Klaus M. |
| Abstract: | In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers but also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard 'retail minus X regulation' may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial. |
| Keywords: | non-spatial product differentiation; resale regulation; spatial product differentiation; vertical restraints; wholesale |
| JEL: | D43 L11 L42 L51 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6248&r=com |
| By: | Emilie Dargaud (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust authority will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. The main objective of this paper is to show that the antitrust authority must take into account the possibility for firms to collude if a merger is rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion ex-post (after a rejection of a merger) whereas they would not make collusion ex-ante. All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. This article does not only suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but it also analyses the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We consider an industry with cost-asymmetric firms and we study the analysis of collusion under leniency programmes. |
| Keywords: | leniency programme ; merger ; oligopoly supergame |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142435_v1&r=com |
| By: | Oilver Budzinski (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg); Katharina Wacker |
| Abstract: | We review the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office Germany) decision on the proposed merger between Springer and ProSiebenSat.1 from an economic point of view. In doing so, it is not our goal to analyse whether the controversial decision by the Bundeskartellamt has been correct or flawed from a legal point of view. Instead, we analyse whether the economic reasoning in the decision document reflects state-of-the-art economic theory on conglomerate mergers. Regarding such types of mergers, anticompetitive effects either do not occur regularly or are more often than not overcompensated by efficiency gains, so that a standard welfare perspective demands reluctance concerning antitrust interventions. This is particularly true if two-sided markets, like media markets, are involved. However, anticompetitive conglomerate mergers are not impossible, in particular in neighbouring markets where there is some relationship between the products of the merging companies. In line with the more-economic approach in European merger control, a particular thorough line of argumentation, backed with particularly convincing economic evidence, is necessary to justify a prohibition of a conglomerate merger from an economic point of view. Against this background, we do not find the reasoning of the Bundeskartellamt entirely convincing and sufficiently strong to justify a prohibition of the proposed combination from an economic perspective. The reasons are that (i) the Bundeskartellamt fails to continuously consider consumer and customer welfare as the relevant standards, (ii) positive efficiency and welfare effects of cross-media strategies are neglected, (iii) in contrast, the competition agency sometimes appears to view profitability of post-merger strategy options to be per se anticompetitive (efficiency offence), (iv) the incontestability of the relevant markets is not sufficiently substantiated, (v) inconsistencies occur regarding the symmetry of the TV advertising market duopoly versus the unique role of the BILD-Zeitung and (vi) the employment of modern economic instruments appears to be underdeveloped. Thus, we conclude that the Bundeskartellamt has not embraced the European more-economic approach in the analysed decision. However, one can discuss whether economic effects are overcompensated in this case by concerns about a reduction in diversity of opinion and threats to free speech. Similar to the Bundeskartellamt, we do not consider these concerns in our analysis. |
| Keywords: | merger control, media markets, more-economic approach, conglomerate mergers, cross-promotion |
| JEL: | L82 L40 K21 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:volksw:200704&r=com |
| By: | Hoppe, Heidrun C.; Lehmann-Grube, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | We introduce product differentiation into the analysis of price competition in markets where suppliers test customers in order to assess whether they will pay for received goods or services. We find that, if the degree of differentiation is sufficiently high, suppliers may improve the average probability that their clientele will pay by charging higher prices. This helps suppliers to sustain high prices in equilibrium. Moreover, endogenizing locations in product space, we demonstrate that the high price level can be implemented in a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium with a high degree of differentiation. This is in contrast to the original Hotelling model with linear travel costs where a pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium fails to exist. |
| Keywords: | Hotelling; Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies; Mixed strategy; Price competition; Testing |
| JEL: | D83 G21 L13 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6229&r=com |
| By: | Kwangwoo Park; George Pennacchi |
| Abstract: | A model of multimarket spatial competition is developed where small, single-market banks compete with large, multimarket banks (LMBs) for retail loans and deposits. Consistent with empirical evidence, LMBs are assumed to have different operating costs, set retail interest rates that are uniform across markets, and have access to wholesale funding. If LMBs have significant funding advantages that offset any loan operating cost disadvantages, then market-extension mergers by LMBs promote loan competition, especially in concentrated markets. However, such mergers reduce retail deposit competition, especially in less concentrated markets. Prior empirical research and our own analysis of retail deposit rates support the model’s predictions. |
| Keywords: | Bank mergers |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0704&r=com |
| By: | Paolo G. GARELLA; Emmanuel PETRAKIS |
| Abstract: | The literature so far has analyzed the effects of Minimum Quality Standards (MQS) in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical differentiation, with only two firms, and perfect information. We consider products that are differentiated horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers' information, and more than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers' perception of produced qualities. This increases the firms' returns from quality enhancing investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic effects. Our analysis justifies the use of MQS in industries where consumers cannot precisely ascertain the quality of goods, for instance pharmaceuticals or products with chemical components involved |
| Keywords: | Minimum Quality Standards, Imperfect Consumer Information, Oligopoly, Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation, Industry Regulation |
| JEL: | L0 L5 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-12&r=com |
| By: | Emrah Arbak (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]); Marie-Claire Villeval (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | When it examines the risk of coordinated effects, an antitrust authority will usually compare the situation where the merger is accepted with an attendant risk of collusion with the benchmark case in which competition is present ex-post. The main objective of this paper is to show that the antitrust authority must take into account the possibility for firms to collude if a merger is rejected. In fact, firms can have incitations to make collusion ex-post (after a rejection of a merger) whereas they would not make collusion ex-ante. All the papers on mergers and collusion tend to look at a minimal discount factor threshold for collusion to be sustained. This article does not only suggest necessary and sufficient conditions for collusion to be enforced but it also analyses the choice which firms have as to whether to collude. We consider an industry with cost-asymmetric firms and we study the analysis of collusion under leniency programmes. |
| Keywords: | endogenous switching models ; experiment ; influence ; leadership ; voluntary contribution |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142461_v1&r=com |
| By: | Claudio A. Piga (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Enrico Bachis (Business School, Nottingham University) |
| Abstract: | Using evidence from an original dataset of more than 12 million fares, this study sheds light on two issues relating to the pricing behaviour of the main European airlines: 1) the extent to which an airline’s dominant position at the origin airport, at the route and the city-pair level affects the airlines’ market power; 2) whether fares follow a monotonic time path consistent with the pursuing of an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy. Our estimates reveal that enjoying a dominant position within a route is conducive to higher fares, possibly because of the limited size of many “natural monopoly” routes that facilitate the incumbent’s engagement in a limit pricing strategy. On the contrary, a larger share within a city-pair does not seem to facilitate the exercise of market power, thereby suggesting the existence of a large degree of substitutability between the routes in a city-pair. |
| Keywords: | on-line pricing; price discrimination; dispersion; yield management. |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L93 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_11&r=com |
| By: | Désiré Vencatachellum (HEC Montréal - [HEC Montréal]); Bruno Versaevel (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | There is evidence that competing firms delegate R&D to the same independent profit-maximizing laboratory. We draw on this stylized fact to construct a model where two firms in the same industry offer transfer payments in exchange of user-specific R&D services from a common laboratory. Inter-firm and within-laboratory externalities affect the intensity of competition among delegating firms on the intermediate market for technology. Whether competition is relatively soft or tight is reflected by each firm's transfer payment offers to the laboratory. This in turn determines the laboratory's capacity to earn profits, R&D outcomes, delegating firms' profits, and social welfare. We compare the delegated R&D game to two other ones where firms (i) cooperatively conduct in-house R&D, and (ii) non-cooperatively choose in-house R&D. The delegated R&D game Pareto dominates the other two games, and the laboratory earns positive profits, only if within-laboratory R&D services are suffciently complementary but inter-firm spillovers are suffciently low. We find no room for policy intervention, because the privately profitable decision to delegate R&D, when the laboratory participates, always benefits consumers. |
| Keywords: | Common Agency ; externalities ; research and development |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142520_v1&r=com |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales (Departamento de Economía - [Universidad Carlos III de Madrid]); Gary Charness (Department of Economics - [University of California, Santa Barbara]) |
| Abstract: | We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how these different degrees of competition affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies remain. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents' informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous' (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. |
| Keywords: | competition ; efficiency ; experiment ; hidden information |
| Date: | 2007–04–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142849_v1&r=com |
| By: | Daniel Brou; Michele Ruta |
| Abstract: | We construct a model where firms compete in both political and economic markets. In political markets, firms compete for influence over government transfer policy (rents). This activity can be beneficial for the firm, but is purely wasteful from the point of view of society because resources are utilized to achieve a redistribution of income. In the economic market, firms compete for market share through cost reducing technological innovation. Market structure plays an important role in this economy because competition drives firms to invest more in innovation resulting in higher growth. Rent-seeking affects economic growth in two important ways. It diverts resources away from innovation and it affects the number of firms that are supported in equilibrium. The former has a negative effect on growth while the latter effect is ambiguous, depending on whether rent seeking induces entry or exit. This market structure effect depends on a combination of political and economic factors that the theory highlights. |
| Keywords: | Rent Seeking, Market Structure, R&D Investment, Growth, Welfare |
| JEL: | D72 L13 O31 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2007/03&r=com |
| By: | Robert Gagné (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - [Université de Montréal]); Simon Van Norden (CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations - [Université de Montréal]); Bruno Versaevel (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | We analyse the effects of a price floor on price wars (or deep price cuts) in the retail market for gasoline. Bertrand supergame oligopoly models predict that price wars should last longer in the presence of price floors. In 1996, the introduction of a price floor in the Quebec retail market for gasoline serves as a natural experiment with which to test this prediction. We use a Markov Switching Model with two latent states to simultaneously identify the periods of price-collusion/price-war and estimate the parameters characterizing each state. Results support the prediction that price floors reduce the intensity of price wars but increase their expected duration. |
| Keywords: | gasoline prices ; Markov switching model ; oligopoly supergame ; price regulation |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142516_v1&r=com |
| By: | Claudio A. Piga (Dept of Economics, Loughborough University); Enrico Bachis (Business School, Nottingham University) |
| Abstract: | We introduce an on-line pricing tactic where airlines post, at the same time and for the same flight, fares in different currencies that violate the law of One Price. Unexpectedly for an on-line market, we find that price discrimination may be accompanied by arbitrage opportunities and that both tend to persist before a flight’s departure. We find discrimination to be of a competitive type, although arbitrage opportunities are more likely in concentrated routes. Finally, the evidence suggests that discrimination may be used to manage stochastic demand. |
| Keywords: | on-line pricing; price discrimination; Law of One Price; sample selection; dispersion; airlines, exchange rate. |
| JEL: | L11 L13 L93 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_10&r=com |
| By: | Vianney Dequiedt (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - [INRA]); Bruno Versaevel (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - [CNRS : UMR5824] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines]) |
| Abstract: | Patent pools are cooperative agreements between several patent owners to bundle the sale of their respective licenses. In this paper we analyze their consequences on the speed of the innovation process. We adopt an ex ante perspective and study the impact of possible pool formation on the incentives to innovate. Because participation in the creation of a pool acts as a bonus reward on R&D activity, we show that a firm's investment pattern is upward sloping over time before pool formation. The smaller the set of initial contributors, the higher this effect. A pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptance/refusal by the competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations. It also leads a forward looking regulator to delay the clearance date of the pool. This may result in a pool size that is suboptimal from an ex ante viewpoint. |
| Keywords: | competition policy ; licensing ; R&D races ; research and development |
| Date: | 2007–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00142497_v1&r=com |
| By: | Ricardo Bernal Fandiño |
| Abstract: | Este trabajo estudia la relación entre los aumentos en la concentración y las dinámicas de competencia del sector financiero crediticio de los últimos años en la economía colombiana. Se encuentra que a pesar de los incrementos en la concentración que reflejan diversos indicadores analizados, el nivel de poder de mercado -medido como el estadístico H de Panzar y Rose (1987) por medio de un análisis de panel de datos- no se ha deteriorado en el periodo 1995-2005. Más aún, existen indicios por los cuales este nivel de competencia se ha incrementado en el periodo, una vez se ha controlado por variables específicas a la entidad así como por variables exógenas macroeconómicas. |
| Keywords: | Concentración; Consolidación; Competencia; Contestabilidad Classification JEL:D4; G21; L13; R12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdr:borrec:432&r=com |
| By: | Franco Malerba (Cespri, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy.); Richard Nelson (Columbia University, New York, USA.); Luigi Orsenigo (University of Brescia and CESPRI, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.); Sidney Winter (Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA.) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present a history-friendly model of the changing vertical scope of computer firms during the evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries. The model is “history friendly”, in that it attempts at replicating some basic, stylized qualitative features of the evolution of vertical integration on the basis of the causal mechanisms and processes which we believe can explain the history. The specific question addressed in the model is set in the context of dynamic and uncertain technological and market environments, characterized by periods of technological revolutions punctuating periods of relative technological stability and smooth technical progress. The model illustrates how the patterns of vertical integration and specialization in the computer industry change as a function of the evolving levels and distribution of firms’ capabilities over time and how they depend on the co-evolution of the upstream and downstream sectors. Specific conditions in each of these markets – the size of the external market, the magnitude of the technological discontinuities, the lock-in effects in demand – exert critical effects and feedbacks on market structure and on the vertical scope of firms as time goes by. |
| Keywords: | Industrial Dynamics, Vertical Integration, Specialization, Technology. |
| JEL: | O30 L10 L60 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp191&r=com |
| By: | Benjamin Bridgman; Shi Qi; James A. Schmitz, Jr. |
| Abstract: | We study the impact of regulation on productivity and welfare in the U.S. sugar manufacturing industry. While this U.S. industry has been protected from foreign competition for nearly 150 years, it was regulated only during the Sugar Act period, 1934–74. We show that regulation significantly reduced productivity, with these productivity losses leading to large welfare losses. Our initial results indicate that the welfare losses are many times larger than those typically studied—those arising from higher prices. We also argue that the channels through which regulation led to large productivity and welfare declines in this industry were also present in many other regulated industries, like banking and trucking. |
| Keywords: | Sugar |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedmsr:389&r=com |
| By: | Iimi, Atsushi |
| Abstract: | Many developing countries have experienced significant developments in their telecommunications network. Countries in Africa are no exception to this. The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. In theory the telecommunications sector has two sector-specific characteristics: network externalities and discrimina tory pricing. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. Some countries in Africa are still imposing certain price restrictions. But more important, it remains a policy issue how the authorities should ensure reciprocal access between operators at reasonable cost. |
| Keywords: | Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory & Research,Access to Markets,Rural Communications,Infrastructure Regulation |
| Date: | 2007–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4200&r=com |
| By: | Sebastian Gundel |
| Abstract: | In this paper the export demand and supply of German manufacturing industry is estimated for the period 1993:1 through 2005:4. The Johansen (1991, 1994) procedure is applied to estimate the long-run relationship in a VECM. Special attention is pointed on the development of the German export price being exposed to the competitive environment of fast growing countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. Since they offer similar high-technology products on international export markets and are gaining market share Germanys export price suffers downward pressure. |
| Keywords: | Manufactured Exports, New Competition, Cointegration, VECM |
| JEL: | C32 F10 F14 |
| Date: | 2007–04–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:cegedp:63&r=com |
| By: | Granlund, David (Department of Economics, Umeå University); Rudholm, Niklas (Department of Economics, Umeå University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, the impact of increased consumer information on brand name and generic pharmaceutical prices is analyzed both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical results show that an increase in information is likely to reduce the price of brand name pharmaceuticals, while the results regarding generics are less clear. In the empirical part of the paper, the introduction of the substitution reform in the Swedish pharmaceuticals market in October 2002 is used as a natural experiment regarding the effects of increased consumer information on pharmaceutical prices. The results clearly show that the reform has lowered the price of both brand name- and generic pharmaceuticals. |
| Keywords: | Pharmaceutical industry; generic competition; generic drugs; brand name drugs |
| JEL: | D80 D83 I11 L65 |
| Date: | 2007–04–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:0709&r=com |
| By: | Nicole Jonker; Thijs Kettenis |
| Abstract: | Since the mid-nineties, usage of the debit card by Dutch consumers has increased considerably. While accounting for three quarters of the total value of retail sales in the early nineties, in 2004 the value share of cash payments had fallen to about two quarters. If the cash to payment card ratio in 2004 had been the same as in 1990, the social costs of retail payments would have come out almost EUR 200 million higher. Consumers will have benefited from these savings through lower consumer prices and bank fees. Estimates indicate that the share of cash (in value terms) will decline further from 46% to about 20% in 2015. Changes in the payment infrastructure can yield even higher cost savings. This appears from the outcomes of fictitious scenarios in which the use of electronic means of payment is promoted by increasing the growth rate of the number of EFTPOS terminals and keeping the number of ATMs at their end-2004 level. The outcome in question is indicative of the effectiveness of any efficiency-enhancing measures that may betaken within the scope of the November 2005 Payment Covenant between banks and retailers. An increase in the number of EFTPOS terminals turns out to be especially effective. |
| Keywords: | cash usage; retail payments; cost efficiency |
| JEL: | E41 E50 H21 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:136&r=com |
| By: | Dequiedt, V.; Menière, Y.; Trommetter, M. |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a common analysis for a large set of multilateral agreements that are used to collectively manage intellectual property in industries as different as biotechnologies or information technologies. It discusses how these agreements, based on existing intellectual property institutions, can encourage innovation either by facilitating technology transfers or by improving the organization of collective innovation processes. In the first part we explain how the collective management of intellectual property rights can be used to facilitate arm’s length technology transfers. Its objective is then to facilitate the access to information about variety, to reduce negotiation costs and to optimize the management of prices. In the second part we explain how the collective management of intellectual property rights can be used to improve the innovation production processes by proposing a wide set of organizational structures ranging from centralized organizations that rely heavily on planning, to decentralized organizations that use incentives to motivate participants. As a conclusion, we highlight new challenges for competition policy generated by those tools. |
| Keywords: | INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT;CONSORTIA;BIOTECHNOLOGY;OPEN SOURCE;SOFTWARE |
| JEL: | D23 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200703&r=com |
| By: | Marco MARINUCCI (Center for Operation Research and Econometrics, Universit‚ Catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | [ENGLISH];This paper reviews the theoretical literature concerning the welfare effects of research joint ventures. The analysis pays attention to both the most debated questions and the topics not yet covered in the literature. The study suggests the existence of two main streams: one positive, the other normative. Moreover, the survey suggests that some questions are still unsolved while others have been not properly faced.;;[ITALIANO];Il contributo del presente lavoro consiste nel valutare come la letteratura teorica ha affrontato il tema delle Research Joint Ventures dal punto di vista dell'analisi di welfare, facendo particolare attenzione ai pricipali problemi affrontati e di capire, allo stesso tempo, le eventuali direzioni ancora da esplorare. Lo studio ha permesso di individuare due filoni, uno di tipo positivo, l'altro di tipo normativo. Inoltre, dalla letteratura si evince che non solo alcuni temi sono rimasti senza una risposta univoca ma che altri non sono stati ancora affrontati in modo adeguato. |
| Keywords: | collusione, innovazione, research join ventures, sussidi, welfare |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L4 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wpaper:284&r=com |