nep-com New Economics Papers
on Industrial Competition
Issue of 2007‒02‒17
28 papers chosen by
Russell Pittman
US Department of Justice

  1. Mergers and Barriers to Entry In Pharmaceutical Markets By Granier, L.; Trinquard, S.
  2. Finance and Competition By Harris Dellas; Ana Fernandes
  3. The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control By Oliver Budzinski; Arndt Christiansen
  4. Pricing and Trust By Steffen Huck; Gabriele K. Ruchala; Jean-Robert Tyran
  5. Taxation in Two-Sided Markets By Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm
  6. Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition (The) By Marette, Stéphan
  7. Newspapers and Advertising: The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly By Kind, Hans Jarle; Schjelderup, Guttorm; Stähler, Frank
  8. A note on price-taking and price-making behaviours in pure exchange economies By Ludovic Alexandre Julien; Fabrice Tricou
  9. A Note on Cost Arrangement and Market Performance in a Multi-Product Cournot Oligopoly By Lapan, Harvey E.; Hennessy, David A.
  10. Market Structure and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of the Global Automobile Industry By Hashmi, Aamir Rafique; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes
  11. Public Policy in Network Industries By Nicholas Economides
  12. The export of Russian gas to Europe: breaking up the monopoly of Gazprom By Marina Tsygankova
  13. Entry, Innovation and Exit. Evidence from the LAN switch Industry By Roberto Fontana; Lionel Nesta
  14. Destructive Creation By Calvano, Emilio
  15. Advertising and Newspaper Differentiation: On the Role of Readers’ Advertising Taste By Kind, Hans Jarle; Koethenbuerger, Marko; Schjelderup, Guttorm
  16. Re-matching, Information and Sequencing Effects in Posted Offer Markets By Douglas D. Davis; Korenok Oleg; Robert Reilly
  17. Universal Service Obligations: The Role of Subsidization Schemes and the Consequences of Accounting Separation By François MIRABEL; Jean-Christophe POUDOU; Michel ROLAND
  18. Ventes Liées et concurrence sur les marchés énergétiques By Marion PODESTA
  19. Infrastructure Investments and Resource Adequacy in the Restructured US Natural Gas Market – Is Supply Security at Risk? By Christian von Hirschhausen
  20. Market size and attendance in English Premier League football By Rob Simmons; Babatunde Buraimo
  21. Limits to international banking consolidation By Fecht, Falko; Grüner, Hans Peter
  22. Concentration des Marches et Comportements Collusifs : des Conflits entre HHI et Seuils de Collusion By Edmond BARANES; François MIRABEL; Jean-Christophe POUDOU
  23. Strategic factor markets: Bargaining, scarcity, and resource complementarity By Adegbesan, Tunji
  24. Cumulative Innovation, Sampling and the Hold-up Problem By Rufus Pollock
  25. Are Burdensome Registration Procedures an Important Barrier on Firm Creation? Evidence from Mexico By David Kaplan; Eduardo Piedra; Enrique Seira
  26. Pharmaceutical Pricing and Reimbursement Policies in Mexico By Pierre Moïse; Elizabeth Docteur
  27. The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence from eBay By Luis Cabral; Ali Hortacsu
  28. How " natural " are natural monopolies in the water supply and sewerage sector ? Case studies from developing and transition economies By Nauges, Celine; van den Berg, Caroline

  1. By: Granier, L.; Trinquard, S.
    Abstract: After patent expirations in pharmaceutical markets, brand-name laboratories are threatened by generic firms'entry. To fill the gap in the theoretical literature on this topic, we study brand-name .rms.incentives either to deter entry, or to merge with the entrant. These strategies are considered along with the possibility of the brandname firm producing its own generic drug, called a pseudo-generic drug. Using a vertical differentiation model with Bertrand-Stackelberg competition, we show that each strategy, merging and deterring entry, may be Nash equilibrium, according to the generic firm's setup cost level and to the rate of discount.
    Keywords: barriers, endogenous mergers, limit pricing, pharmaceuticals, pseudo-
    JEL: I11 L12
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Harris Dellas; Ana Fernandes
    Abstract: Financial constraints are often thought as representing a barrier to entry for new firms, thus potentially limiting competition in product markets. We investigate the relationship between finance and product market competition in the context of a general equilibrium, two-sector model. The analysis highlights the role played by firm heterogeneity as well as by the level and distribution of wealth. Financial development may lead to lower markups (and thus to more competitive markets) in financially dependent sectors, even when it reduces the number of firms and increases standard market concentration indexes. The analysis implies that incumbency is not a sufficient condition to oppose financial liberalization. It also implies that, for a given level of imperfect financial development, poorer countries will tend to have less competitive product markets.
    Keywords: Financial Development; Liberalization; Market Structure; Product Market Competition.
    JEL: L1 E2
    Date: 2007–02
  3. By: Oliver Budzinski; Arndt Christiansen (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Philipps Universitaet Marburg)
    Abstract: An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in order to quantify the price effects in each specific case. The review of the merger between the software firms Oracle and PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important instance of parallel application of these sophisticated economic tools by the EU and US authorities so far. This makes an in-depth study of the case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive assessment worthwhile. Therefore, we highlight certain similarities as well as (minor) differences between the EU and US proceedings. Interestingly, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was not blocked nor even required to be modified in the two jurisdictions. We derive a number of interesting insights and, in particular, point out problems and lessons associated with the use of sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the major insights encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany predictive economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics of dynamic and evolutionary competition.
    Keywords: Merger control, unilateral effects, econometric analysis, simulation models, market definition
    JEL: F02 K21 L41
    Date: 2007
  4. By: Steffen Huck (University College London); Gabriele K. Ruchala (University College London); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: We experimentally examine the effects of flexible and fixed prices in markets for experience goods in which demand is driven by trust. With flexible prices, we observe low prices and high quality in competitive (oligopolistic) markets, and high prices coupled with low quality in non-competitive (monopolistic) markets. We then introduce a regulated intermediate price above the oligopoly price and below the monopoly price. The effect in monopolies is more or less in line with standard intuition. As price falls volume increases and so does quality, such that overall efficiency is raised by 50%. However, quite in contrast to standard intuition, we also observe an efficiency rise in response to regulation in oligopolies. Both, transaction volume and traded quality are, in fact, maximal in regulated oligopolies.
    Keywords: markets; price competition; price regulation; reputation; trust; moral hazard; experience goods
    JEL: C72 C90 D40 D80 L10
    Date: 2007–01
  5. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Koethenbuerger, Marko (Center for Economic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität); Schjelderup, Guttorm (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a monopolist’s output and reduce the deadweight loss by subsidizing output. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher advalorem tax rate - rather than a subsidy - could increase output and enhance welfare.
    Keywords: Two-sided markets; ad-valorem taxes; specific taxes; imperfect competition; industrial organization
    JEL: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13
    Date: 2007–02–13
  6. By: Marette, Stéphan
    Abstract: This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety overinvestment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.
    Keywords: information, market structure, safety, standard.
    Date: 2007–02–12
  7. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Schjelderup, Guttorm (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Stähler, Frank (Dept. of Economics, University of Otago)
    Abstract: Newspapers are two-sided platforms that sell their product both to readers and advertisers. Media firms in general, and newspapers in particular, are considered important providers of information, culture and language in most countries. Newspapers are therefore given preferential tax treatment. We show that lower ad valorem taxes lead newspapers to become more differentiated. Thereby the competitive pressure falls, possibly resulting in higher newspaper prices and reduced quality investments.
    Keywords: Two-sided markets; ad-valorem taxes
    JEL: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13
    Date: 2007–02–13
  8. By: Ludovic Alexandre Julien; Fabrice Tricou
    Abstract: This paper explores the rationale of price-taking and price-making behaviours in the context of Walrasian and Cournotian pure exchange economies. Beside the influence of the number of agents, we underline the role of the structure of preferences in the definition and in the working of market power. Through three equilibrium variations of the same basic economy, we obtain several results about price manipulation, about asymptotic identifications for large economies and for degenerate preferences, and about welfare comparisons. Perfect competition does not only correspond to the case of large economies, but may also concern economies where fundamental market powers are more or less equivalent.
    JEL: D43 D51
    Date: 2006
  9. By: Lapan, Harvey E.; Hennessy, David A.
    Abstract: Model invariances have been used extensively to understand welfare and conduct consequences of firm heterogeneity in a one-product Cournot oligopoly. Nothing is known about the richer and more realistic context of firm heterogeneity in multi-product Cournot oligopoly. In this note, welfare in a two-product Cournot oligopoly is shown to increase (decrease) with an increase in correlation between unit costs when the outputs complement (substitute) in demand. A more qualified correlation structure is required for the result to apply in a three-product Cournot oligopoly when products complement in demand.
    Keywords: Arrangement increasing; Complementarity; Invariance
    Date: 2007–02–14
  10. By: Hashmi, Aamir Rafique; Van Biesebroeck, Johannes
    Abstract: The question that how market structure and innovation are related has been extensively studied in the literature. However, there is hardly any notable study on this question for the global automobile industry. We fill this gap by studying the relationship between market structure and innovation in the global automobile industry for the 1980-2005 period. We use the dynamic industry framework of Ericson and Pakes (Review of Economic Studies, 1995) and estimate the parameters of the model using a two-step procedure proposed by Bajari et al (Econometrica, forthcoming). Since the global auto industry has seen a lot of consolidation since 1980, mergers are an important ingredient of our model. After estimating the parameters of the model, we simulate the industry forward and study how changing market structure (mainly due to mergers) affects innovative activity at the firm as well as the industry level. Our findings are the following. (1) The effect of market structure on innovation in the global auto industry depends on the initial state of the industry. If the industry is not very concentrated, as it was in 1980, some consolidation may increase the innovative activity. However, if the industry is already concentrated, as in 2005, further consolidation may reduce the innovation incentives. (2) Mergers reduce the value of merging firms though they may increase the aggregate value of the industry. (3) Mergers between big firms eventually reduce consumers' utility.
    Keywords: Competition and Innovation; Automobile Industry; Dynamic Games
    JEL: O31 L62 L13
    Date: 2007–02–13
  11. By: Nicholas Economides
    Date: 2006
  12. By: Marina Tsygankova (Statistics Norway)
    Abstract: Having exports from more than one Russian gas producer has been an important issue in the Russian–EU energy dialogue during the last decade. Nevertheless, in June 2006, Russian Federal law legalized the de facto export monopoly of Gazprom. Political and commercial interests have regularly explained the Russian strategy for the European gas market. However, it is important that economic efficiency is also taken into account. Economists often evaluate the efficiency of a policy through its effect on national welfare. In this paper, I examine both theoretically and numerically whether a liberalization of Russian gas exports would increase Russian national welfare, given that the Russian domestic market is already deregulated. The results of the paper show that the dominant position of Gazprom in the Russian gas industry might stimulate the government to support Gazprom's export monopoly. The market share of independent producers in the Russian gas market would have to be significantly increased for Russian export liberalization to be welfare enhancing.
    Keywords: Russia; Natural gas; export; monopoly; national welfare
    JEL: D43 D60 L13 Q38
    Date: 2007–02
  13. By: Roberto Fontana; Lionel Nesta (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques)
    Date: 2007
  14. By: Calvano, Emilio (GREMAQ, Université de Toulouse 1 and Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
    Abstract: "Destructive Creation" is the deliberate introduction of new, perhaps improved generations of durable goods that destroy, directly or indirectly, the usage value of units previously sold inducing consumers to repeat their purchase. This paper discusses this practice by a single seller in an infinite-horizon, discrete time model with heterogeneous consumers. Despite the lack of commitment power over future prices and introduction policies, this practice restores partially or totally market power even though consumers anticipate opportunistic behavior. However, the monopoly resorts "too much" to this mechanism from an ex-ante, profit maximizing perspective. High prices in earlier periods allow the seller to commit to defer innovation and therefore to maintain buyers' confidence over "durability". The paper characterizes the equilibrium properties of the resulting innovation cycles such as existence, uniqueness and asymptotic stability and discusses potential regulatory remedies in those instances where destructive creation generates economic inefficiencies. This theory applies, among others, to markets characterized by network externalities, compatibility issues, standard setting, social consumption and signal provision and may help explain many restrictive aftermarket practices as well as excessive add-on pricing without relying on any leverage hypothesis.
    Keywords: durable goods; aftermarkets; planned obsolescence;
    JEL: D42 L12 L15 O31
    Date: 2006–12–22
  15. By: Kind, Hans Jarle (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Koethenbuerger, Marko (Center for Economic Studies, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität); Schjelderup, Guttorm (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
    Abstract: Newspapers have an incentive to moderate their profile in order to gain a larger readership and thus higher advertising revenue. We show that this incentive is weakened both if readers are ad-haters and if they are ad-lovers.
    Keywords: Media; Two-sided Markets; Product Differentiation; Hotelling
    JEL: D40 D43
    Date: 2007–02–13
  16. By: Douglas D. Davis (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Korenok Oleg (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business); Robert Reilly (Department of Economics, VCU School of Business)
    Abstract: This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate the effects of some standard procedural variations on outcomes in posted offer oligopoly experiments. Procedures studied include the presence or absence of market information, alterations in the number of trading periods, the use of re-matching or fixed seller pairs, and sequencing effects. Experimental results indicate that while some results are robust to all variations, procedural variations can exert first order effects on outcomes. Results suggest that procedures should be chosen with care in oligopoly experiments, and that results should be carefully interpreted in light of the selected procedures.
    Keywords: market experiments, oligopoly, market concentration
    JEL: C9 D4 L4
    Date: 2007–01
  17. By: François MIRABEL; Jean-Christophe POUDOU; Michel ROLAND
    Abstract: This paper (i) highlights the role that unit subsidies can play in the compensation scheme of a Universal Service Obligation (USO), and (ii) shows that welfare may be reduced when regulation requires accounting separation of network activities for vertically integrated USO providers. This suggests that accounting separation should be avoided when a USO is implemented.
    Keywords: Universal Service Obligations, Network Industries, Regulation.
    JEL: L43 L51 L52
    Date: 2007
  18. By: Marion PODESTA
    Abstract: Dans cet article nous nous proposons d'analyser les effets de l'ouverture à la concurrence sur les stratégies de tarification des ventes liées à travers un modèle de choix discret. Nous montrons que dans une situation de duopole vendre les biens de manière indépendante est un équilibre de Nash pareto dominant pour les deux firmes, cependant elles peuvent également se coordonner sur d'autres équilibres et notamment suivre une stratégie de ventes liées. Ce résultat vient à l'encontre de celui du monopole qui incite les firmes à pratiquer une stratégie de tarification mixte, alors que dans un environnement duopolistique, l'intensité concurrentielle domine l'effet positif des ventes liées via la discrimination par les prix.
    JEL: D43 L13 Q4
    Date: 2006
  19. By: Christian von Hirschhausen
    Abstract: The objective of this paper is to analyze the development of US natural gas infrastructure over the last two decades and to discuss its perspectives. In particular, we focus on the relationship between the regulatory framework for the natural gas sector and the development of investment in LNG terminals, interstate pipelines, and storage facilities. We also discuss some cross-sectional investment issues related to financing (cost of capital, financial markets) and regulation (price caps, siting). We conclude that while some improvements in the regulatory framework might enhance investments in the US natural gas sector, there is no reason to be overly concerned about infrastructure investments, resource adequacy, or supply security.
    Date: 2006–12
  20. By: Rob Simmons; Babatunde Buraimo
    Abstract: This paper models the impacts of market size and team competition for fan base on matchday attendance in the English Premier League over the period 1997-2004 using a large panel data set. We construct a comprehensive set of control variables and use tobit estimation to overcome the problems caused by sell-out crowds. We also account for unobserved influences on attendance by means of random effects attached to home teams. Our treatment of market size, with its use of Geographical Information System techniques, is more sophisticated than in previous attendance demand studies.
    Date: 2006
  21. By: Fecht, Falko; Grüner, Hans Peter
    Abstract: Heterogenous banking supervision and regulation is often considered as the most important impediment for Pan-European Bank mergers. In this paper we identify other more fundamental reasons for a limited degree of cross-country integration in retail banking. We argue that the distribution of regional liquidity shocks may pose a natural limit to the extent of cross-border bank mergers. The paper derives the impact of different underlying stochastic structures on the optimal structure of cross regional bank mergers. Imposing a symmetry restriction on the underlying stochastic structure of liquidity shocks we find that benefits from diversification and the costs of contagion may be optimally traded off if banks from some but not from all regions merge. Under an additional monotonicity assumption full integration is only desirable if the number of regions with diverse risks is sufficiently large.
    Keywords: Bank Mergers, Financial Integration, Liquidity Transformation, Liquidity Crisis, Risk Sharing
    JEL: D61 E44 G21
    Date: 2006
  22. By: Edmond BARANES; François MIRABEL; Jean-Christophe POUDOU
    Abstract: L'objectif de ce papier est d'étudier les interactions entre contrôle des structures et contrôle des comportements. Dans le cadre d'un modèle proche de Bernheim et Whinston (1990), nous montrons comment la relation entre concentration des marchés et comportement collusif peut être affectée par la présence de firmes contact multimarchés. Il apparaît alors que dans certaines configurations de marché, le test HHI peut rentrer en conflit avec la nécéssité de contrôler les comportements collusifs des firmes.
    Date: 2007
  23. By: Adegbesan, Tunji (IESE Business School)
    Abstract: Strategic factor market theory suggests that without luck or asymmetric expectations, firms can't appropriate gains from acquired resources. Adopting the bargaining perspective on resource advantage, we hold that this is only true in the absence of resource complementarity. We extend factor market theory to account for resource complementarity, and we show that firms can profit when they exhibit superior complementarity to target resources, even in the absence of asymmetric expectations. Thus we provide an alternative interpretation of managers' recent emphasis on externally acquired resources.
    Keywords: Complementarity; bargain perspective; value appropriation; resource acquisition; asymmetric expectation;
    Date: 2007–01–18
  24. By: Rufus Pollock
    Abstract: With cumulative innovation and imperfect information about the value of innovations, intellectual property rights can result in hold-up and therefore it may be better not to have them. Extending the basic cumulative innovation model to include 'sampling' by second-stage firms, we find that the lower the cost of sampling, or the larger the differential between high and low value second-stage innovations, the more likely it is that a regime without intellectual property rights will be preferable. Thus, technological change which reduces the cost of encountering and trialling new 'ideas' implies a reduction in the socially optimal level of rights such as patents and copyright.
    Keywords: Cumulative Innovation; Hold-Up; Sampling; Intellectual Property
    JEL: K3 L5 O3
    Date: 2006
  25. By: David Kaplan (Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)); Eduardo Piedra; Enrique Seira
    Abstract: There has been increasing concern that the difficulty of obtaining firm operation licences in developing countries may decrease firm creation and increase informality. We estimate the effect on new firm creation/registration of a program that speeds up firm registration procedures and makes them more transparent. The program was implemented in Mexico in different municipalities at different dates. Our preferred estimates suggest that new firm registration increased by around 4% in eligible industries. Most of the effect is temporary, being concentrated on the first 10 months after the program is implemented. This suggests that the program’s effect may operate through registering existing firms instead of spurring creation of new ones. We compare this magnitude to some benchmarks to assess its size.
    Keywords: Entry,Registration,Informal Sector, Program Evaluation
    Date: 2007–01
  26. By: Pierre Moïse; Elizabeth Docteur
    Abstract: This paper examines aspects of the policy environment and market characteristics of Mexico's pharmaceutical sector, and assesses the degree to which Mexico has achieved certain policy goals. This paper questions the effectiveness of the maximum price regulation. It notes that retail prices for pharmaceuticals are relatively high, although proximity to the United States may have some influence. Although not wholly successful in containing overall drug expenditures, the federal government can claim some measure of success for the public sector market. A high reliance on out-of-pocket spending brings into question the sustainability of financing pharmaceuticals in Mexico. It also contributes to greater inequality, although a new health insurance scheme, the Seguro Popular, is addressing the latter with some success as it endeavours to provide coverage for the half of Mexico's population without health insurance. Finally, the paper acknowledges the government.s efforts in improving efficiency of expenditures and quality of care through new bioequivalency requirements for generics. However, an unintended side-effect of the loss of low cost, non-bioequivalent drugs may be higher average prices for pharmaceuticals. <BR>Le présent document examine certains aspects touchant l'environnement politique et les caractéristiques du marché du secteur pharmaceutique du Mexique, et évalue la mesure dans laquelle le Mexique a atteint certains objectifs politiques. Il met en doute l'efficacité de la réglementation sur les prix maximums et fait observer que les prix de détail des produits pharmaceutiques sont relativement élevés, mais que cette situation est peut-être due en partie à la proximité des États-Unis. Bien que le gouvernement fédéral n'ait pas totalement réussi à maîtriser les dépenses globales de médicaments, il peut revendiquer d'un certain succès en ce qui concerne le marché du secteur public. Un large recours aux versements directs amène à s'interroger sur la viabilité du financement des produits pharmaceutiques au Mexique. Un tel recours contribue également à un accroissement des inégalités, bien qu'un nouveau dispositif d'assurance maladie, le Seguro Popular, remédie dans une certaine mesure à ce problème en s'efforçant d'offrir une couverture maladie à la moitié de la population du Mexique qui n'est pas assurée. Enfin, le document fait état des efforts déployés par le gouvernement pour rationaliser les dépenses et améliorer la qualité des soins moyennant l'adoption de nouvelles dispositions en matière de bioéquivalence des médicaments génériques. Cela étant, la disparition des médicaments peu coûteux non bioéquivalents risque d'avoir pour effet involontaire une augmentation des prix moyens des produits pharmaceutiques.
    Keywords: Mexico, Mexique, pharmaceutical policy, pricing, fixation des prix, reimbursement, remboursement, market, marché, politique du médicament
    JEL: I11 I18
    Date: 2007–02–13
  27. By: Luis Cabral; Ali Hortacsu
    Date: 2006
  28. By: Nauges, Celine; van den Berg, Caroline
    Abstract: Using data from the International Benchmarking NETwork database, the authors estimate measures of density and scale economies in the water industry in four countries (Brazil, Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam) that differ substantially in economic development, piped water and sewerage coverage, and characteristics of the utilities operating in the different countries. They find evidence of economies of scale in Colombia, Moldova, and Vietnam, implying the existence of a natural monopoly. In Brazil the authors cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale. They also find evidence of economies of customer density in Moldova and Vietnam. The results of this study show that the cost structure of the water and wastewater sector varies significantly between countries and within countries, and over time, which has implications for how to regulate the sector.
    Keywords: Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Urban Water Supply and Sanitation,Economic Theory & Research,Water and Industry,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions
    Date: 2007–02–01

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