|
on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Lawrence White |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-01&r=com |
| By: | Luis M.B. Cabral; Thomas Ross |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-09&r=com |
| By: | Allan Collard-Wexler |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-26&r=com |
| By: | John Asker; Estelle Cantillon |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-24&r=com |
| By: | Stennek, Johan |
| Abstract: | Sports organizations, Hollywood studios and TV channels grant satellite and cable networks exclusive rights to televise their matches, movies and media contents. Exclusive distribution prevents viewers from watching attractive programs, and reduces the TV-distributors incentives to compete in prices. This paper demonstrates that exclusive distribution may also give providers of contents incentives to invest in higher quality and, as a result, force competitors to reduce their prices. Exclusive distribution may benefit all viewers, including those who are excluded. |
| Keywords: | advertising; bargaining; exclusive contracts; investment; quality; two-sided market |
| JEL: | C78 D43 K21 L42 |
| Date: | 2007–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6072&r=com |
| By: | Giovanni Cespa (University of Salerno, CSEF and CEPR) |
| Abstract: | Fundamental information resembles in many respects a durable good. Hence, the effects of its incorporation into stock prices depend on who is the agent controlling its flow. Similarly to a durable goods monopolist, a monopolistic analyst selling information intertemporally competes against herself. This forces her to partially relinquish control over the information flow to traders. Conversely, an insider solves the intertemporal competition problem through vertical integration, thus exerting a tighter control over the flow of information. Comparing market patterns I show that a dynamic market where information is provided by an analyst is thicker and more informative than one where an insider trades. |
| Keywords: | Information Sales, Analysts, Insider Trading, Durable Goods Monopolist. |
| JEL: | G10 G12 G14 L12 |
| Date: | 2007–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:174&r=com |
| By: | Michael A. Arnold (Dpt of Economics, U. Delaware); Thierry Pénard (CREM – CNRS) |
| Abstract: | The Internet has introduced a variety of online buying services that expand the reach of sellers and reduce search costs for buyers. In markets in which traditional outlets tend to establish prices through bargaining, these online intermediaries have also altered the price setting process. Perhaps the most well known example is Autobytel.com which provides referral services in the automobile market. By using Autobytel, a buyer can obtain a posted price as an alternative to bargaining with a car dealer ship. To understand the effect of online referral systems on the price setting process, we construct a theoretical model of oligopolistic price competition in which one dealership has an exclusive contract with a referral intermediary. We show that posted prices offered through the referral system are not necessarily lower than offline prices (bargained prices). Our model provides theoretical insights relevant to results in the empirical literature addressing the role that Autobytel and other infomediaries play in online markets. |
| Keywords: | online markets, e-commerce, intermediary, autobytel, pricing |
| JEL: | D4 D83 L19 L89 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:200704&r=com |
| By: | Lawrence J. White |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:06-06&r=com |
| By: | Kubo, Koji |
| Abstract: | This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities. |
| Keywords: | Banking, Imperfect competition, Information production, Banks, Credit, G World，others |
| JEL: | D82 G21 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper15&r=com |
| By: | Sean Barrett; (Department of Economics, Trinity College) |
| Abstract: | The analysis contained in the YHEC report indicates that the report did not consider adequately the role of competition in the market for health insurance. This is a major weakness and appears in part to be due to a late deletion of competition from the report’s final research brief by the HIA.(p.90) The evidence on the average age of BUPA Ireland members, 38 years and VHI members, 44 years provides no basis for transfers from BUPA Ireland to VHI. In the case of females between 38 and 44 years health expenditures decline with extra years. The regressiveness of the transfers and cross subsidies in Irish health insurance under community rating is illustrated by the internal transfers from low cost profitable Plans A and B within VHI to high cost loss making Plans C, D and E. Under the proposed transfer of €34m a year from BUPA Ireland to VHI a low cost BUPA essential health insurance cover with a premium of €272.39 would be levied to cross subsidise VHI Plan E costing €1,316.33 per adult. The price of the most expensive subsidised product under the HIA proposal is 4.8 times the price of the product to be levied in order to finance the cross subsidisation. The average BUPA premium was €327 while the average VHI premium was €435. The price of the average product to be subsidised is therefore 33% greater than the price of the average product to be levied to finance the cross subsidisation. CSO data confirms that expenditure on health insurance rises over all ten income deciles. Incomes in the top decile are 10.1 times those in the bottom decile but health insurance expenditure is 22.9 times greater. Section C of this report deals with the HIA letter to BUPA Ireland requiring the equalisation payment of €34m annually from BUPA Ireland for transfer to VHI which had operating profits of €73.3m (before unexpired risk reserve) in their accounts to February 2004. The HIA presents no analysis of the rationale for the payment. It mistakenly asserts that consumers as a whole will be better off from levying one firm in order to cross-subsidise another. It asserts without evidence that the payments required are significant, rising, likely to rise further in the absence of risk equalisation and that in their absence the stability of the industry will be threatened. While there is recognition of possible withdrawal from BUPA Ireland of some younger members because of the price rise in order to finance payments to VHI there is no recognition in the letter of the benefits of competition to health insurance consumers. Section D examines the competition issues neglected by both YHEC and HIA and the benefits foregone by the anti-competitive levies imposed on BUPA. The Irish health service is characterised by high costs and rent-seeking by producers which are extreme by EU standards. The scope for immediate cost savings and further future leveraged savings in a high cost health service is therefore large but these benefits are foregone by regulators adopting the anticompetitive levies recommended by the regulator in this sector. |
| Date: | 2005–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:wpaper:tep8&r=com |